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ABSTRACT  
For much of American history, in order to promote competition among 
the producers of useful products, the law did not grant protection to the design 
of such products unless the design met the demanding requirements for patent or 
copyright protection.  In the 1980s, an expansion of trade dress law resulted in 
protection of product designs, with the courts relying primarily on the functio-
nality doctrine to preserve the interest in competition.  The functionality doc-
trine, however, riddled by ambiguity and conflicting interpretations, was not 
effective in preventing overly broad protection of the designs of useful products.  
As a result, more and more designs of useful products were insulated from com-
petition through trade dress law protection, and society’s interest in obtaining 
the best goods at the lowest cost was hampered.  
In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has indicated its distrust of this 
expansion of trade dress law.  In particular, in TrafFix Devices v. Marketing 
Displays, the Court narrowed trade dress protection by providing a broader de-
finition of functionality.  Many scholars have struggled to make sense of the 
TrafFix decision, and many courts have struggled to apply it.  The federal courts 
and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board are split in their interpretations and 
applications of the TrafFix holding.  Thus, there is considerable confusion about 
the extent to which the designs of useful products should be protected under 
trade dress law.  It is time to resolve this confusion and return to the earlier era 
when trade dress law did not grant protection to the overall design of useful 
products. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Consider the design of any object sitting in your office: your lamp, your 
chair, your pen, even the stapler and tape dispensers.  Each one is the result of 
both functional and aesthetic design choices.  Almost every day-to-day object 
used was created with both of those needs in mind.  In order to sell, the object 
both has to work and appeal to the tastes of consumers.  A comfortable chair 
that is ugly will not sell, nor will an appealing chair that is uncomfortable.  We 
as consumers want products that serve both utilitarian and aesthetic needs, and 
those who develop these goods invest time and money into designs that appeal 
to both.  Producers do not want their product designs to be copied by others who 
have not made the same investment.  The law, however, has generally been re-
luctant to grant such protection unless the design meets the requirements for 
patent registration, or has features separable from the utility of the object that 
meet the standards for copyright protection.  This reluctance to protect the de-
sign of useful products is based on the policy that favors free competition in the 
sale of goods.1  If, for example, a chair has been designed well to meet our utili-
tarian and aesthetic needs, then consumers and society benefit from having mul-
tiple producers competing to make that product at the highest quality for the 
lowest cost.  Patent or copyright law may give a manufacturer protection for a 
limited period in order to provide the initial incentive to design that object,2 but 
  
1 See infra notes 23–57 and accompanying text.  
2 See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–151 (1989) (holding 
that the patent system encourages “the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonob-
vious advances in technology and design” by granting an “exclusive right to practice the in-
vention for a period of years”); Biotechnology Indus. Org. v. Dist. of Columbia, 496 F.3d 
1362, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that inventors are motivated to create by the expecta-
tion that, through procuring a patent, they will obtain exclusivity over the manufacturing, 
use, and sales of the product, reaping the economic rewards during the patent’s term); Sanofi-
Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 470 F.3d 1368, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[T]he encouragement of 
investment-based risk is the fundamental purpose of the patent grant, and is based directly on 
the right to exclude.”) (quoting Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 599 
(Fed.Cir.1985)).  The greater profits available due to lack of direct competition are the “in-
centives for innovative activities.” See DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM 
RESTORATION ACT, H.R.REP. No. 98-857(I), at 17 (1984).  Likewise, the limited monopoly 
created by the Copyright Act “is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and in-
ventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of 
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has expired.”  Sony Corp. of Ameri-
ca v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).  Monetary rewards were also 
contemplated by the Copyright Act.  See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 
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in the end, society benefits when all producers can copy and sell a design with-
out permission from the original creator. 
This attitude was the predominant view for much of American history.  
Absent patent or copyright protection, the overall design of a product was avail-
able to anyone to copy, limited only by prohibitions against passing off the 
product as coming from someone else, prohibitions which were enforced 
through requirements of labeling.3  As a result of a slow change in trademark 
and unfair competition law, however, that attitude began to shift, and by the 
1980s, there was a growing body of case law that granted designers protection 
against copying their product designs under trademark and unfair competition 
law instead of patent or copyright law.  What started as protection for the pack-
aging and containers used to sell products—i.e., “trade dress”—eventually 
turned into protection of the designs of the products themselves.  Now the de-
sign of that chair, that pen, or even that tape dispenser was potentially protecta-
ble as trade dress, as long as the design or aspects of that design were not func-
tional, and were distinctive enough to serve as an identifier of the source of 
those goods.  Now a competitor might be prohibited from copying that design 
and providing consumers with a better or cheaper version of that object. 
In the last ten years, the Supreme Court has indicated its distrust of this 
trade dress law expansion in two important cases.4  In Wal-Mart Stores v. Sama-
ra Bros.,5 the Court ruled that the design of a product could only receive trade 
dress protection under federal law if it had acquired distinctiveness through 
sales, advertising, and other promotions of that product.6  No product design 
would be protectable until there was proof that consumers relied on that design 
as a means of identifying the source of the goods.7   
The Court narrowed trade dress protection even further in TrafFix De-
vices v. Marketing Displays.8  In TrafFix, the Court addressed the elusive ques-
  
471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985) (holding that the “rights conferred by copyright” were designed to 
assure authors “a fair return for their labors” (citing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Ai-
ken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
3 See infra notes 23–57 and accompanying text. 
4 See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, A High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, TrafFix, 
Moseley, and Dastar—the Supreme Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 237, 261 (2005) (“[T]he clear goal and the undoubted effect of this process [of 
limiting the role of trademark law] is to expand the scope of permissible copying by contract-
ing the scope of trademark protection, in a kind of zero sum game.”). 
5 529 U.S. 205 (2000).   
6 Id. at 216. 
7 Id. at 212–13. 
8 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
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tion of what it meant for a product design to be functional.  With respect to the 
utilitarian aspects of a product’s design, the Court endorsed the so-called tradi-
tional test for functionality: that a feature is functional “when it is essential to 
the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the de-
vice.”9  Moreover, the Court made it clear that competitive necessity was not the 
correct test for functionality and that if the design was “essential to the use or 
purpose” of the product, or affected “the cost or quality” of the product, then it 
did not matter whether there were alternative designs that could be used.10  A 
design that was functional, as so defined, was to be freely available to others for 
copying.11  With respect to aesthetic features, the Court was even broader in its 
definition of functionality.  An aesthetic feature or design that was an important 
ingredient in the success of the product was “functional,” and thus not protecta-
ble as trade dress.12  It seemed at first glance that the Court was making it very 
clear that almost all product design would be unprotected under principles of 
trade dress law.  Only those features that were truly arbitrary and not important 
to the commercial success of the product would be potentially protectable as 
trade dress.13   
Despite its seeming clarity, many scholars have struggled to make sense 
of the TrafFix decision, and many courts have struggled to apply it.  The federal 
courts have split in their interpretations and applications of the TrafFix hold-
ing.14  In particular, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”) and its 
reviewing court, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, have essentially contin-
ued to apply a definition of functionality that was followed prior to the TrafFix 
decision, while paying the case lip service.15  Although much was written initial-
ly after the Supreme Court decided TrafFix,16 little has been written in the last 
  
9 Id. at 33. 
10 Id. at 34. 
11 Id. at 35. 
12 Id. at 33. 
13 See infra notes 261–277 and accompanying text. 
14 See generally Vincent N. Palladino, Trade Dress Functionality After TrafFix: The Lower 
Courts Divide Again, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1219 (2003).  
15 See infra notes 286–299, 507–618 and accompanying text. 
16 See, e,g., Eric Berger, TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.: Intellectual Proper-
ty in Crisis: Rubbernecking the Aftermath of the United States Supreme Court’s TrafFix 
Wreck, 57 ARK. L. REV. 383 (2004); Dorota Niechwiej Clegg, Note, Aesthetic Functionality 
Conundrum and Traderight: A Proposal for a Foster Home to an Orphan of Intellectual 
Property Laws, 89 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003); Tracey McCormick, Note, Will TrafFix ‘Fix’ 
the Splintered Functionality Doctrine?: TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 541 (2003); Palladino, supra note 14; Mark Alan Thurmon, The Rise and Fall 
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five years that addresses the issues in depth.17  In those five years, the case law 
has continued to be confused and inconsistent.   
It is time once again to re-examine that decision and the entire issue of 
trade dress.  Perhaps it is time to turn the clocks back to a time when product 
design per se was not protectable as trade dress and was available for copying 
unless protected by patent or copyright law.  In Part II of this article, I will look 
back at the cases of the twentieth century to trace the shifts in treatment of trade 
dress.  In Part III, I will examine the twenty-first century: the Walmart case, the 
TrafFix case, and in particular, the decisions of the courts and the TTAB in the 
last five years, which continue to reveal the underlying conflicts and inconsis-
tencies in the law.  In Part IV, I will propose a radical reversal of legal policy 
that will eliminate the need for the anguished and inconsistent applications of 
the functionality doctrine and better serve the best interests of both consumers 
and designers of consumer goods. 
II.  TRADE DRESS AND FUNCTIONALITY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY  
A.  Pre-Lanham Act Cases 
As Professor Mark Thurmon described in his exhaustive 2004 article on 
the history and development of the functionality doctrine,18 it seems quite clear 
that prior to the enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946,19 courts did not recognize 
  
of Trademark Law’s Functionality Doctrine, 56 FLA. L. REV. 243 (2004); Harold R. Wein-
berg, Trademark Law, Functional Design Features, and the Trouble with TrafFix, 9 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. 1 (2001). 
17 See, e.g., Perry J. Saidman, Functionality and Design Patent Validity and Infringement, 91 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 313 (2009); Amir H. Koury, Three Dimensional Objects as 
Marks: Does a ‘Dark Shadow’ Loom over Trademark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. 
REV. 335 (2008); Andrew F. Halaby, The Trickiest Problem with Functionality Revisited: A 
New Datum Prompts A Thought Experiment, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SUR. AM. L. 151 (2007); Justin 
Pats, Comment, Conditioning Functionality: Untangling the Divergent Strands of Argument 
Evidenced by Recent Case Law and Commentary, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 515 
(2006); Halpern, supra note 4, at 261. 
18 Thurmon, supra note 16, at 257–71.  Professor Thurmon’s article does an excellent job of 
describing and analyzing the history and development of the functionality doctrine and I do 
not intend to merely restate his thorough explication of that history.  Instead, I wish to de-
scribe the general contours of the history of the functionality doctrine, using a number of cas-
es as indicators of those contours before turning to my own view on the doctrine and where it 
should be, which differs from Professor Thurmon’s.   
19 The Trademark Act of 1946 (hereinafter “the Lanham Act”) §§ 1–74 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1141 (2006)). 
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any trademark protection for the overall design of a product.20  Trademark pro-
tection was limited to words and symbols used to identify products—so-called 
technical trademarks,21 but not to the design of the product itself.  Although 
courts recognized unfair competition claims where a competitor copied a plain-
tiff’s product and attempted to pass the product off as its own, the remedy given 
in such cases was not to prohibit the copying of the plaintiff’s product design.  
Instead, the courts would generally require the defendant to take some action to 
distinguish its product from that of the plaintiff, such as labeling or packaging 
the product to make it clear that the product was not produced by the plaintiff.22  
As parties began to bring claims seeking to prohibit the copying of as-
pects of their products beyond the technical trademarks, the courts began to de-
velop rationales for denying them such a remedy.  The principal rationale for 
denying such relief was the effect it would have on competition.  The courts 
repeatedly articulated a policy in favor of free competition; that is, that no pro-
ducer, in the absence of a patent, should be able to stop a competitor from copy-
ing its product, as long as no passing off was involved.   
This can be seen in several early cases wherein parties sought to register 
designs as trademarks under the predecessor to the Lanham Act.23  For example, 
  
20 See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 257–71.  See also Clegg, supra note 16, at 282–85; 
Weinberg, supra note 16, at 10–14 (discussing early state cases that showed reluctance to 
protect product designs based on the effect on competition). 
21 At common law, technical trademarks were arbitrary symbols or words used to identify a 
person’s goods.  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 4:4, at 4-3 (4th ed. 
1996).  Technical trademarks had to be unique, fanciful, and non-descriptive; “automatically 
distinctive and capable of immediately functioning as symbols of origin.”  Id.; see also Blis-
scraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 1961).  The mark was 
a property right that existed independently of statutory provisions for trademark registration.  
Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel 
Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 333 (1938). 
22 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 258.  
23 In 1905, Congress passed An Act To Authorize the Registration of Trade-Marks Used in 
Commerce with Foreign Nations or Among the Several States or With Indian Tribes, and to 
Protect the Same (hereinafter the Trademark Act of 1905).  33 Stat. 724 (1905) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. § 81).  While the right to own and use a trademark was a common law property 
right, the statute created a system and codification of trademark practice.  ORSON D. MUNN, 
TRADE-MARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 16 (1934).  It provided a procedure for registration, 
created rules for valid marks, and made registered marks public record.  Id.  The Trademark 
Act of 1905 allowed registration of any mark that distinguished the owner’s goods from 
another’s unless it contained “immoral or scandalous matter,” was comprised of the flag, coat 
of arms, or insignia of a country or state, or the mark so closely resembled another’s “as to be 
likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public.”  33 Stat. at 725.  Registration 
provided prima facie evidence of (rebuttable) ownership as well as the right to bring suit in 
federal court, where an injunction or damages could be granted for a violation of the owner’s 
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in Herz v. Loewenstein,24 the plaintiff sought to register the design of packages 
in which it sold its toothpicks.25  The process of sealing the packages produced a 
corrugated embossing on the ends of the wrappers, which the plaintiff claimed 
as a trademark.26  The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled 
against the plaintiff, reasoning that “[t]he mark is not placed upon the tooth-
picks, but is produced as a result of a distinct method of sealing the wrap-
pers . . . .  A trademark registration . . . would give appellant a perpetual mono-
poly.27  The trademark act cannot be used as an avenue to escape the limitations 
of the patent law.”28  
The court went on to quote from a Pennsylvania decision, Hoyt v. 
Hoyt,29 stating: 
[T]he trademark must relate to and distinguish the goods to which it is ap-
plied.  For this reason, among others, the size or shape or mode of construc-
  
exclusive right to use the mark in conjunction with their goods.  Id. at 728, 729; MCCARTHY, 
supra note 21, § 5:3 (4th ed. 1996).  Despite the seemingly few restrictions to the subject mat-
ter of a trademark registration under the Act, the Supreme Court had previously defined a 
trademark as a “symbol” or “device.”  Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92.  Because of the re-
quirement that the trademark be “affixed” to the goods or packaging, trademarks did not in-
clude shapes, packages, or containers, nor could they be the articles of merchandise them-
selves.  See Trademark Act of 1905 § 29, 33 Stat. at 731; MUNN, supra at 34; Lars Smith, 
Trade Distinctiveness: Solving Scalia’s Tertium Quic Trade Dress Conundrum, 2005 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 243, 246 n.16 (2005).  Courts were also unwilling to protect a product’s design.  
See Crescent Tool Co. v. Kilborn & Bishop Co., 247 F. 299, 301 (2d Cir. 1917) (holding that 
a plaintiff “may not monopolize any design or pattern, however trifling” and that defendants 
may “copy the plaintiff’s goods slavishly down to the minutest detail” as long as he did not 
pass himself off as the plaintiff in the sale).   
    The Trade-Mark Act of 1920 adopted the procedural provisions of the 1905 Act but 
omitted the provision that made the registration of a trade-mark prima facie evidence of own-
ership.  41 Stat. 533 (1920) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 121).  Ownership must be proven.  Id. 
§ 4, at 534.  The statute was enacted “for the purpose of enabling manufacturers to register 
their trade-marks in this country for the purpose of complying with legislation in foreign 
countries, . . .”  Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 334 
n.21 (1938) (citing S. REP. No. 66-432, at 2 (1920)); Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 71 
F.2d 662, 666 (2d. Cir. 1934).  It did not confer any substantive rights in the registrant.  
Armstrong, 305 U.S. at 322.  However, it created remedies for protecting registrations and 
authorized triple damages for infringement.  Trademark Act of 1920 § 4, 41 Stat. 534 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 124).   
24 40 App. D.C. 277 (D.C. Cir. 1913).  
25 Id. at 278. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See id.  
29 22 A. 755 (Pa. 1891). 
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tion of a box, barrel, bottle, or package, in which goods may be put, is not a 
trademark.  If there is any new or useful combination in the construction of 
such box or package, it should be patented as an invention, if the owner wish-
es to prevent others from using it; but such package cannot be registered as a 
trademark.30 
Thus, the courts in this early period did not even recognize trademark protection 
for packaging, but just for the words or logos used to identify products.   
Similarly, in In re Oneida Community,31 plaintiff appealed the Commis-
sioner of Patent’s refusal to register a “circular or O-shaped film having distinct 
edges” that plaintiff placed on the back of its spoon bowls.32  The court found 
that there was an expired patent covering just such a film, indicating that the 
film was a means of protecting the precious metal from erosion.33  The court 
concluded that plaintiff was rightfully denied registration. 
[T]his is an attempt, under the guise of trademark registration, to obtain a mo-
nopoly of a functional feature of an article of manufacture. . . .  A monopoly 
may not be revived in this way . . . .  Regardless of the patent, . . . this alleged 
trademark should not be registered, for clearly no functional feature of a de-
vice is a proper subject for trademark registration.34 
  
30 Herz, 40 App. D.C. at 278, quoting Hoyt, 22 A. at 756.  See also Davis v. Davis, 27 F. 490, 
491–92 (D. Mass. 1886) (“A trade-mark is some arbitrary or representative device attached 
to or sold with merchandise and serving to designate the origin or manufacture of that mer-
chandise.  I do not think that the merchandise itself, or any method of arranging the various 
packages, can be registered as a trade-mark. . . .  [T]he trade-mark must be something other 
than, and separate from, the merchandise.”). 
31 41 App. D.C. 260 (D.C. Cir. 1913). 
32 Id. at 260. 
33 Id. at 261. 
34 Id. (citation omitted).  These early courts were reluctant also to recognize marks on the prod-
ucts themselves if they were produced as part of the manufacturing process.  In Capewell 
Horse Nail Co. v. Mooney, the plaintiff sued the defendant for copying a pattern of small 
checks stamped onto the head of its horseshoe nails.  172 F. 826, 827 (2d Cir. 1909).  Be-
cause the nails were generally sold by the pound without any packaging to customers, the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant was passing off its nails as those of the plaintiff.  Id.  The 
trial court ruled for the plaintiff, finding that the pattern was adopted as a trademark by the 
plaintiff and “not as an incident of manufacture or primarily for ornamentation.”  Id.  On ap-
peal, the court said that “[t]he real point in the case is whether the mark which defendant 
stamps on its nails . . . is put there as a necessary incident of the process of manufacture.”  Id. 
at 828.  The court agreed with the trial court that, in this case, the defendant had other ways 
of producing nails without creating the pattern found on plaintiff’s nails and therefore, plain-
tiff was entitled to protection.  Id. at 829.  The court by implication, however, suggested that 
marks that were produced as a necessary consequence of the manufacturing process would 
not be protectable. 
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The approach of the Commissioner of Patents and the court reviewing its ac-
tions was consistent with that of the courts determining protection under com-
mon law in terms of recognizing that the public had a right to copy the configu-
ration of useful products in the absence of patent or copyright protection and 
that there should be no trademark protection of such configurations.  At least as 
early as 1877, one court stated that “a trade-mark is always something indicative 
of origin or ownership, by adoption and repute, and is something different from 
the article itself which the mark designates.”35  The court went on to reason that 
unless protected by a patent, “any one may make anything in any form, and may 
copy with exactness that which another has produced, without inflicting legal 
injury, unless he attributes to that which he has made a false origin, by claiming 
to be the manufacture of another person.”36   
This approach, which recognized that trademark protection did not ex-
tend to the configuration of a product and that there was a public right to copy 
the design of unpatented articles as long as the imitator did not pass off his 
goods as the product of the another’s, was also endorsed by the Supreme Court 
in 1896 in Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June Manufacturing Co.37  In that case, 
the defendant was copying the design of the plaintiff’s sewing machines and 
also calling them “Singers.”38  Plaintiff asked the court to enjoin both the copy-
ing of the design and of the name “Singer.”39  The Court refused, finding that 
plaintiff’s patents had expired on the design and that the name “Singer” had 
become the generic designation for that design of sewing machine.40  The Court 
stated, “It is self-evident that on the expiration of the patent the monopoly 
created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly covered by 
the patent becomes public property.”41  The Court went on however, to say: 
But it does not follow, as a consequence of a dedication, that the general pow-
er vested in the public to make the machine and use the name imports that 
there is no duty imposed on the one using it, to adopt such precautions as will 
protect the property of others, and will prevent injury to the public interest, if 
by doing so no substantial restriction is imposed on the right of freedom of 
use.42 
  
35 Fairbanks v. Jacobus, 8 F. Cas. 951, 952 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1877). 
36 Id. 
37 163 U.S. 169, 200 (1896). 
38 Id. at 178. 
39 See id. at 204. 
40 Id. at 183. 
41 Id. at 185. 
42 Id. at 186. 
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Thus, although the Court concluded that the defendant had the right both to 
copy the design of the machines and the name Singer to identify those ma-
chines, it did not have the right to use either without adequately disclosing that 
its machines were not produced by the plaintiff.43  The Court therefore enjoined 
the defendant from using either the design or the name Singer without clearly 
identifying that it, not the plaintiff, was the source of its goods.44 
These early courts also began to address the role of functionality in eva-
luating unfair competition claims.  For example, in Pope Automatic Merchan-
dising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co.,45 the court found that the defendant had not 
engaged in unfair competition by copying the design of the plaintiff’s suction 
cleaners because the plaintiff’s product configuration was “the most efficient 
and economically manufactured form into which the mechanical combination 
can probably be embodied.”46  The court held that to deny the defendant the 
right to copy the most efficient design would give the plaintiff a monopoly to 
which it was not entitled and would unduly burden those who wished to com-
pete with the plaintiff.47  The court reversed the lower court’s injunction in favor 
of the plaintiff.48  The court also found that the defendant had attached a name 
plate to its cleaners which “unmistakably distinguished”49 its products from 
those of the plaintiff.50  Thus, there was no unfair competition and the defen-
dants only copied what the court held to be unprotectable.51 
  
43 Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 203 (1896). 
44 Id. at 204. 
45 191 F. 979 (7th Cir. 1911). 
46 Id. at 981. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 982. 
49 Id. at 980. 
50 Id. 
51 See also Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 962, 965 (2d Cir. 1918) 
(defendant had the right to copy the shape of plaintiff’s shredded wheat cereal product, as it 
was no longer protected by patent, but it had to take reasonable steps to distinguish its prod-
uct from that of plaintiff’s, even if that meant deforming to some extent its own product); 
Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 834 (3d Cir. 1916) (longitudinal corruga-
tion on plaintiff’s hose was functional and no longer covered by patent; therefore, defendant 
had a right to copy that configuration, where defendant had marked its products with its own 
name and trademark); cf. Lektro-Shave Corp. v. Gen. Shaver Corp., 19 F. Supp. 843, 845 (D. 
Conn. 1937) (where the court found that the cylindrical shape of plaintiff’s shaver heads was 
not functional because “any other shape could be used . . . and would operate just as effi-
ciently as one of cylindrical shape,” that defendant had “unnecessarily and knowingly im-
itated its rival’s shaver head in nonfunctional features,” and thus engaged in unfair competi-
tion, and that minor variations adopted by the defendant were too trivial to prevent confu-
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In 1938, the Supreme Court continued to agree with the approach of the 
courts as well as the Commissioner of Patents, as reflected in Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co.52  In that case, the plaintiff was seeking protection against 
the copying of both its product’s name, “Shredded Wheat,” and its pillow shape 
design on the basis of common law principles of unfair competition.53  In ruling 
for the defendant with respect to both claims, the court relied primarily on the 
fact that the patent had expired on the process for making shredded wheat and 
that the product’s pillow shape was a necessary consequence of the manufactur-
ing process.54  Relying on Singer, the Court concluded that once the patent had 
expired, the public had a right not only to use that process, but also to produce 
shredded wheat in the same pillow shape, despite any secondary meaning asso-
ciated with that shape.55  The Court also observed, almost in passing, that be-
cause the shape of the product was functional, it would impede competition if 
protection against copying was afforded to the plaintiff.56  The Court said, “The 
evidence is persuasive that this form is functional—that the cost of the biscuit 
would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other form were substi-
tuted for the pillow-shape.”57 
The Court, however, also recognized that the defendant’s right to copy 
was not unlimited, which was consistent with the earlier cases.  The Court said 
that “Kellogg . . . was free to use the pillow-shaped form, subject only to the 
obligation to identify its product lest it be mistaken for that of the plaintiff.”58  
The Court then found that Kellogg had taken reasonable steps to prevent such 
confusion through its labeling and packaging, and that whatever remaining con-
fusion might ensue outside that scope was beyond the reasonable obligations to 
be imposed on Kellogg, and insufficient to justify enjoining it from copying the 
pillow shape of plaintiff’s product.59 
  
sion).  See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 263–69, 308 n.288; Weinberg, supra note 
16, at 10–14.    
52 305 U.S. 111 (1938). 
53 Id. at 115. 
54 Id. at 119–20. 
55 Id. at 119. 
56 Id. at 122. 
57 Id. at 122. 
58 Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938). 
59 Id. at 121–22.  See also Smith, Kline & French Labs. v. Clark & Clark, where the court ruled 
that the shape, scoring and color of plaintiff’s pills were functional and, if not protected by a 
valid patent, then plaintiff could not prevent the defendant from selling the same drug in the 
same form.  157 F.2d 725, 730–31 (3d Cir. 1946).  The court, however, found that the defen-
dant suggested to those dispensing the pills that they could pass off the defendant’s product 
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Thus, in the pre-Lanham Act era, both federal registration and common 
law protection were denied to the overall configuration of a product in the name 
of promoting and protecting free competition in the design of products.  Except 
to the extent that a court would prohibit passing off, a product manufacturer 
could not prevent the copying of its product configuration in the absence of pa-
tent or copyright protection.  The remedy for passing off was limited to re-
quirements of labeling or other actions to distinguish the defendant’s goods 
from those of the plaintiff and did not include a prohibition against copying the 
functional aspects of the product design itself. 
B.  Post-Lanham Act Cases 
In 1946, Congress enacted the Lanham Act, which, unlike its predeces-
sor, provided certain federal substantive rights to those who registered trade-
marks pursuant to its provisions.60  In addition to providing evidence of owner-
ship, under the Lanham Act, a registration would be considered prima facie evi-
dence of the validity of the mark as well as the registrant’s exclusive right to use 
the mark in connection with the specified goods or services.61  A registrant could 
sue for trademark infringement in federal court under the statute.62  In addition, 
  
as those of the plaintiff.  Id. at 731.  Based on that conduct and not the copying itself, the 
court concluded that the defendant was liable for unfair competition.  Id.  Nonetheless, the 
court disagreed with the lower court’s injunction prohibiting the defendant from selling the 
drug altogether.  Id.  As long as the defendant distinguished its pills from those of the plain-
tiff, it would still be free to sell the drug.  Id.  
60 Marks that were not registrable under the previous legislation became eligible under the 
Lanham Act including service marks, marks that had acquired secondary meaning, and simi-
lar or same marks that were being used in good faith by more than one user in different parts 
of the country without causing confusion.  Lanham Act §§ 2(d), (f), 3, 60 Stat. 427, 428–29 
(1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), (f), 1053).  Whereas ownership of a mark was re-
buttable under the Trademark Act of 1905 and registration created no substantial rights in an 
owner under the Trademark Act of 1920, under the Lanham Act, a mark became generally 
incontestable after a five-year period of continuous use.  Id. § 15, at 433–34 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1065).    
61 Id. § 7(b), at 430 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1057(b)).  Although the Lanham Act does not re-
quire registration of marks, a registration certificate is more valuable under Lanham because 
it provides notice and evidence of the owner’s right to use the mark, as well as proof that the 
mark has been registered on the Principal Register.  If the owner then files an affidavit after 
five years of continuous use, the mark becomes incontestable and not subject to interference.  
Id. §§ 15, 16, at 433–34 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1066); HARRY AUBREY TOULMIN, 
TRADE-MARK ACT OF 1946, 51–52, 85 (W.H. Anderson Co. 1946).  
62 See Lanham Act §§ 32–35, 60 Stat. 427, 437–440 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114–
1118 (providing for remedies against those who were found liable for infringing a registered 
trademark)).  Claims involving trademark disputes were able to be adjudicated in federal 
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Congress created a broader cause of action in unfair competition for unregis-
tered marks in section 43(a).63 
As originally enacted, Congress defined a trademark for purposes of 
registration differently from the way it defined the category of what was pro-
tectable under section 43(a).  Unlike section 43(a) which prohibited the use of 
any “false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, in-
cluding words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the 
same”64 to deceive or cause confusion,65 section 45 defined the term trademark 
as “any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted and 
used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish them 
from those manufactured or sold by others,”66 and section 2 provided a number 
of substantive reasons why a particular mark might be denied registration.67  
  
court “without regard to the amount in controversy or to diversity or lack of diversity of the 
citizenship of the parties.”  Id. § 39, at 440 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1121).  
63 See id. § 43(a), at 441 (codified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)).  Under the 1905 Trade-Mark Act, a 
person who passed off their goods under another’s trademark was liable for damages to the 
owner of the mark.  § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728 (1905).  The Lanham Act expanded liability of 
the wrongdoer to “any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of ori-
gin . . . or any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any 
such false description or representation.”  Lanham Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946) (co-
dified at 15 U.S.C § 1125(a)).   
64 Id. 
65 Although there is little discussion about this initially ignored section in the Lanham Act’s 
legislative history, judicial interpretation has transformed section 43(a) into the preeminent 
federal law for asserting claims against unfair competition.  J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham 
Act § 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 
1996, at 45, 46 (noting that legislative history with respect to section 43(a) is “slight . . . in-
conclusive . . . with almost no mention of the subject matter” despite the lengthy and exten-
sive discussion regarding the Lanham Act overall).   Daphne Robert Leeds, a primary contri-
butor to interpretation and passage of the Lanham Act, believed that the words “false origin” 
in section 43(a) were intended to provide a remedy only against those who made false claims 
about the geographic origin of their products, not against those who might engage in passing 
off or other forms of unfair competition.  Id. at 47; see also Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 777 (1992) (stating that “origin” referred to geographic location of the 
goods).  It was the circuit courts that expanded the definition of origin to include the prod-
uct’s source or manufacturer.  See, e.g., Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 
F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1963) (“We are further of the opinion that the word, ‘origin,’ in the 
Act does not merely refer to geographical origin, but also to origin of source or manufac-
ture.”).  The drafters of the Lanham Act felt that federal registration was necessary to ensure 
national protection of trademarks from infringement and access to federal courts as a forum 
for claims of unfair competition.  McCarthy, supra at 47–48.  
66 Lanham Act § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (1946) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127).   
67 Section 2 provides in part that registration is not available for marks containing immoral, 
deceptive, or scandalous matter, marks that include the flag or coat of arms of any foreign 
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Given the differences in the language, Congress clearly did not intend that sec-
tion 43(a) would reach only deceptive use of registered or registrable marks,68 
nor did it intend to allow for registration of everything that might be protectable 
under section 43(a).69  Although section 43(a) might be read to prohibit a broad-
er range of conduct than merely infringement of trademarks,70  there is no evi-
dence that Congress intended to allow for trademark registration of the design of 
products.  
This is also evident from the registration cases decided under the Lan-
ham Act for the first thirty years after its enactment.  For example, in United 
States Plywood Corp. v. Watson,71 the plaintiff sought to register as a trademark 
the parallel pattern of grooves irregularly spaced along the length of the ply-
wood it manufactured and sold.72  The court upheld the examiner’s refusal to 
register that mark, stating that, “A trademark must have an existence so distinct 
from the goods to which it is applied that it would be readily recognizable by the 
public and by purchasers as an arbitrary symbol adopted to authenticate ori-
  
country, the U.S. or any state, marks that include the name, portrait, or signature of a particu-
lar individual except by that person’s written consent, or any mark that is so similar to an al-
ready registered mark that it would cause confusion or deceive purchasers.  Id. § 2, at 428 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052).   
68 “[I]t is common ground that § 43(a) protects qualifying unregistered trademarks.”  Two Pe-
sos, 505 U.S. at 768.  Section 43(a) “is the only provision in the Lanham Act that protects an 
unregistered mark.”  Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 
F.2d 1217, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987).   
69 The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 substantially rewrote section 43(a), separating it 
into two subsections: (1)(A), which allowed the statute to be used to bring a claim in federal 
court for unregistered trademark, service mark, trade name, and trade dress infringement 
claims, and 1(B), which offered the same purpose with respect to false advertising and prod-
uct disparagement (false factual claims made about the goods or services of others) claims.  
§ 132, 102 Stat. 3935, 3946 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1121); see also McCarthy, supra note 
65, at 53–54.  The revision codified the case law interpretations of the statute, including the 
nearly unanimous rule that statutory remedies available under the Lanham Act for infringe-
ment of registered marks also applied to violations of section 43(a).  McCarthy, supra note 
65, at 54.  By approving and confirming the judicial expansion of this section, Congress’s ac-
tions were significant because it supported the conclusion that section 43(a) was “properly 
understood to provide protection in accordance with the standards for registration in section 
2.”  Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 784.  
70 “Since its enactment in 1946, . . . it has been widely interpreted as creating, in essence, a 
federal law of unfair competition.”  Id. at 783 n.18 (quoting S. REP. NO. 100-515, p. 40 
(1988) (noting that although unsupported by the text, section 43(a) had been applied to cases 
involving unregistered trademark infringement, violations of trade dress, and actionable false 
advertising claims)).  
71 171 F. Supp. 193 (D.D.C. 1958). 
72 Id. at 194. 
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gin.”73  If a pattern of grooves carved into wood was not “distinct” from the 
goods, then clearly the overall configuration of a product would not be distinct 
or protectable.74  The court went on to say: 
A configuration of an article that is functional in character may not acquire a 
secondary meaning so as to be subject to exclusive appropriation as a trade-
mark for the article.  Were the law otherwise, it would be possible for a manu-
facturer or merchant to obtain, in the guise of a trademark registration, a mo-
nopoly in perpetuity on such configuration, with ensuing serious potential 
consequences to the public.75 
Because the court found that the grooves inhibited checking and cracking, hid 
nail holes, and prevented grain raising in the plywood, it concluded that the 
grooves were functional and unregistrable.76  In reaching that conclusion, the 
court relied heavily on a patent assigned to the plaintiff that taught that “shrink-
ing, cracking, checking and swelling can be eliminated, and the deleterious ef-
fects thereof avoided, by gouging the surface or surfaces of the panel with a 
multitude of closely spaced grooves . . . .”77  In fact, the court said that the fact 
that the plaintiff was “attempting to register a patented article . . . , the patented 
features being the very features of shape alleged to be distinctive as a trade-
mark”78 was itself “sufficient to show that registration on either the Principal 
Register or the Supplemental Register would be manifestly improper.”79  Thus, 
the Plywood court reflected the concerns that were already part of the common 
law, i.e., that providing protection to functional products or their functional fea-
tures, especially where those features were already claimed in a patent, would 
inhibit the interest in free competition.  
These issues were also addressed by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals (CCPA), the court responsible for reviewing registration decisions.80  
  
73 Id. at 196. 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 196. 
76 Id. at 194–95. 
77 U.S. Plywood Corp. v. Watson, 171 F. Supp. 193, 194 (D.D.C. 1958). 
78 Id. at 195. 
79 Id. 
80 In 1929, the U.S. Court of Customs Appeals was renamed the U.S. Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, and its jurisdiction was expanded to include patent and trademark appeals 
from the Patent Office, formerly the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia.  Act of Mar. 2, 1929, ch. 488, 45 Stat. 1475 (An Act To change the title of the 
United States Court of Customs Appeals, and for other purposes).  In 1982, The Federal 
Courts Improvements Act combined the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the 
appellate branch of the former Court of Claims, creating a new federal appeals court, the U.S. 
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The court’s 1961 decision in Application of Deister Concentrator Co.81 provides 
an excellent discussion of the definition of functionality and the interplay of 
patent and trademark protection.  In that case, the applicant appealed the ex-
aminer’s refusal to register the rhomboidal shape of its shaking tables, a device 
used to separate solid particles by shape, size and specific gravity for the pur-
pose of concentrating ore and coal cleaning.82  The applicant claimed that all 
other shaking table manufacturers used rectangular-shaped tables and that its 
rhomboidal-shaped table was thus distinctive and recognized in the trade as in-
dicative of the plaintiff’s product.83  Despite evidence that supported the appli-
cant’s claim of secondary meaning, registration was refused based on the fact 
that the rhomboidal shape was utilitarian and functional.84  The TTAB affirmed 
the refusal, agreeing that the shape was functional, and noting further that, be-
cause the tables were made in accordance with an expired and subsisting patent, 
the public would have the right to make tables of a rhomboidal shape after the 
latter patent had expired.85 
In an excellent opinion written by Judge Giles Rich,86 the court observed 
that “the socio-economic policy supported by the general law is the encourage-
ment of competition by all fair means, and that encompasses the right to copy, 
very broadly interpreted, except where copying is lawfully prevented by a copy-
right or patent.”87  Recognizing, however, that the statute itself did not explicitly 
bar registration of functional designs, the court reasoned that, in the absence of 
patent or copyright protection, registration of a mark depended on whether the 
  
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.  96 Stat. 25 (1982); Ellen E. Sward & Rodney F. 
Page, The Federal Courts Improvement Act: A Practitioner’s Perspective, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 
385, 385–86 (1984).   
81 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
82 Id. at 497–58. 
83 Id. at 498. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 498–99. 
86 See generally GILES S. RICH, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CUSTOMS 
AND PATENT APPEALS 131 (1980).  President Eisenhower nominated Rich to be an Associate 
Judge of the CCPA in 1956, where he served for twenty-four years on the bench, never miss-
ing a sitting.  Id. at 132.  See also HOWARD T. MARKEY, Foreword to RICH, supra at iii.  As a 
lawyer, Rich was a principal author of the 1952 Patent Act, the first legislation to codify all 
federal patent laws.  IP Hall of Fame 2006 Inductees, 
 http://www.iphalloffame.com/inductees/2006/Giles_Rich.aspx (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).  
Rich received multiple honors, including the Distinguished Government Service Award from 
George Washington University for outstanding contributions in the industrial-intellectual 
property field.  RICH, supra at 133.    
87 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
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applicant had an exclusive right to prevent others from copying that mark based 
on common law principles.88  The court agreed with the established principle 
that no one had the right to prevent copying of functional features in the absence 
of patent or copyright protection,89 and therefore, no one could register such 
features.  
The Deister court also addressed two other important aspects of the 
functionality doctrine.  First, the court addressed the interplay of patent rights 
and trademark protection.  The court saw no independent significance to the fact 
that the applicant had held a patent on the shape of its shaking table except as 
evidence of functionality.90  The court saw the right to copy as an important pub-
lic right based on principles that existed separately from the patent laws.91  The 
court observed: 
[T]he right to copy is not derived in any way from the patent law; it is a right 
which inheres in the public under the general law except to the extent the pa-
tent law may remove it.  The same is true of copyrights.  When a temporary 
incursion on the public right ends, the public right remains.  No new right is 
born.92         
The court was addressing frequently made judicial statements that held once the 
patent expires, the public then has a right to copy.  Judge Rich wanted it to be 
clear that the starting point is that the public always has the right to copy, and 
that the patent and copyright laws are just limited incursions on that right.   
This recognition of the importance of the public right to copy is also re-
flected in the court’s discussion of the interplay between the functionality doc-
trine and secondary meaning.  The court agreed that the evidence established 
that the shaking table’s rhomboidal shape had acquired secondary meaning and 
was recognized by those in the trade as the goods of the applicant.  The court, 
however, ruled that, despite that secondary meaning, the shape could not be 
protected as a trademark if it were functional.93  The court stated that “there is an 
overriding public policy of preventing their monopolization, of preserving the 
public right to copy.  A certain amount of purchaser confusion may even be 
tolerated in order to give the public the advantages of free competition.”94  Thus, 
  
88 Id.  The Lanham Act did not create trademark rights or ownership but merely provided for 
registration of those that were owned and protectable under common law.  Id.   
89 Id. at 500. 
90 Id. at 501. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. at 501 n.4. 
93 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 505 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
94 Id. at 504. 
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the court concluded that the public right to copy functional features outweighed 
the public need to avoid confusion of source.95  The court observed: 
In final analysis it would seem to be self-evident that government economic 
policy as reflected in law must be determined by the legislature and the judi-
ciary and cannot be left to depend wholly on the attitudes, reactions or beliefs 
of the purchasing public.  Public acceptance of a functional feature as an indi-
cation of source is, therefore, not determinative of right to register.  Preserva-
tion of freedom to copy ‘functional’ features is the determining factor.96     
The court adopted the term “de facto secondary meaning” to apply to those situ-
ations where a design might have acquired purchaser recognition as a designa-
tion of source but where the law nonetheless refused trademark protection of 
that design based on its functionality.97  The court indicated that the courts in 
such cases had not prohibited the copying of those designs, but had instead re-
quired some effort on the part of the competitor to take steps such as labeling to 
avoid purchaser confusion.98  Thus, the right to copy trumped other concerns as 
a general rule, balanced with a limited remedy to prevent consumer confusion in 
appropriate cases by appropriate disclosure requirements.   
The Deister court also struggled with the appropriate definition of func-
tionality.  The court noted that many courts had relied on the definition provided 
in the Restatement of Torts; that a feature of goods is functional when it “affects 
their purpose, action, or performance, or the facility or economy of processing, 
handling or using them.”99  The Deister court recognized an additional definition 
of functionality accepted by courts, i.e., that a feature of an article is functional 




97 Id. at 503.  The court cited Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938), as an ex-
ample of a case where a shape, the pillow shape of shredded wheat, had acquired secondary 
meaning but was denied protection because the court found the public had a right to copy that 
shape, the patent having expired.  Id. 
98 The Deister court quoted Kellogg, which held that the defendant was free to copy the pillow 
shape of shredded wheat “subject only to the obligation to identify its product lest it be mis-
taken for that of the plaintiff.”  Deister, 289 F.2d at 504 (quoting Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120).  
The court also quoted from W. Point Manufacturing Co. v. Detroit Stamping Co., where that 
court said, “imitation [of a functional feature] is privileged if it is accompanied by reasonable 
effort to avoid deceiving prospective purchasers as to the source.  This may frequently be 
done by prominent disclosure of the true source.”  Id. at 500–01 (quoting W. Point, 222 F.2d 
581, 590 (6th Cir. 1955)). 
99 In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 500–01 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (citing RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 742 (1961)).    
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it serves its function.”100  These are very broad definitions of functionality, sug-
gesting that any features that relate in any way to the utility of a product are 
functional and thus not protectable under trademark law.101  Evidence indicated 
that the rhomboidal shape of the shaking table provided a more efficient surface 
by increasing the area available for “riffles” that helped to sort the various solids 
more effectively, clearly meeting these broad definitions of functionality.102  In 
reaching its conclusion that the rhomboidal shape was unregistrable, the court, 
however, further refined its definition of functionality: 
It should be clear from what we have said that we are not denying registration 
merely because the shape possesses utility but because the shape is in essence 
utilitarian.  Where a shape or feature of construction is in its concept arbitrary, 
it may be or become a legally recognizable trademark because there is no pub-
lic interest to be protected.  In such a case protection would not be lost merely 
because the shape or feature also serves a useful purpose. . . .  The Deister ta-
ble deck, however, is shaped as it is only for reasons of engineering efficien-
cy.103 
The court concluded that the table’s rhomboidal shape was therefore functional 
as it was “clearly primarily and essentially dictated by functional or utilitarian 
considerations.”104  The court thus turned what was an extremely broad defini-
tion of functionality into one that may be significantly narrower—seemingly 
redefining functionality to apply only when the feature was shaped or designed 
exclusively for utilitarian purposes.  If the feature was arbitrarily chosen for 
reasons unrelated to utility, it could potentially be protectable.105  
On the same day that it decided Deister, the CCPA also decided Appli-
cation of Shakespeare Co.,106 where the applicant was appealing a refusal to 
register spiral markings on its fishing rods as a trademark.107  The court found 
that the spiral pattern was a direct result of the manufacturing process used to 
  
100 Id. 
101 See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 272–75 and cases cited therein (Restatement defi-
nition of  “functionality” was broader than the definition which had been used by courts, al-
lowing courts to find functionality more easily than under the more narrow definition which 
preceded it).  See also Weinberg, supra note 16, at 15 (overly broad definition of functionali-
ty adopted in Restatement was not widely influential in the courts). 
102 Deister, 289 F.2d at 498, 505. 
103 Id. at 506 (emphasis in original). 
104 Id. at 504. 
105 See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 276–77. 
106 289 F.2d 506 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 
107 Id. 
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make the fishing rods, which was covered by a patent.108  Although the court 
concluded that the applicant correctly asserted that the spiral markings per-
formed no function, it nevertheless upheld the refusal to register because the 
markings were a necessary consequence of using the patented process which 
would be in the public domain once the patent expired.109  The court said: 
Were the spiral marking to be treated as a trademark the holder of the trade-
mark rights would have a potentially perpetual monopoly which would enable 
it either to prevent others from using the process which results in the mark or 
force them to go to the trouble and expense of removing it.  It is immaterial 
that other processes may be available by which glass rods without the mark 
can be made.110 
This holding seems to broaden the scope of functionality from what the court 
had held in Deister.  The markings themselves served no purpose and were not 
designed for utilitarian purposes as Deister seemed to require, but were merely 
the after-effect of a utilitarian process.  Looking at the two cases together, it 
seemed that the CCPA was ruling that only product features that were intention-
ally chosen as arbitrary embellishments would be considered registrable.  A 
non-functional embellishment that resulted from the useful manufacturing 
process would not be registrable, even if there were other ways to make the 
product and avoid those embellishments.111 
In later decisions, the CCPA and Judge Rich elaborated on this defini-
tion.  For example, in Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co.,112 the court upheld a 
refusal to register the applicant’s figure eight-shaped lock design based on func-
tionality.113  That very configuration had been described in a patent issued to the 
applicant’s predecessor in interest, which disclosed that the figure eight shape 
meant that the housing could be constructed with only the minimum amount of 
metal.114  In concluding that the evidence of the patent was sufficient to establish 
  
108 Id. at 507. 
109 Id. at 508. 
110 Id. 
111 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 277 n.139 (Shakespeare decision was based not only on 
patent policy concerns, but also based on the fact that the pattern was hard to remove or de-
sign around and thus would have a detrimental effect on competitors if found to be protected 
against copying). 
112 413 F.2d 1195 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
113 Id. at 1200. 
114 Id. at 1197. 
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a basis for summary judgment that the figure eight design was functional115 and 
thus unregistrable, the court also addressed the appropriate limitations of the 
concept of functionality.   
The court, quoting from Deister, reiterated what it considered a truism 
of trademark law: “a feature dictated solely by ‘functional’ (utilitarian) consid-
erations may not be protected as a trademark; but mere possession of a function 
(utility) is not a sufficient reason to deny protection.”116   The court then went on 
to explain what it meant by this truism.   
That truism in Deister, in its exception, merely reflects the obvious fact that 
some articles, made in a purely arbitrary configuration . . . may perform a 
function . . . which could equally well be served by containers of many other 
shapes, and in such circumstances the incidental function should not by itself 
preclude trademark registrability if the other conditions precedent are present.  
That is a quite different situation from a configuration whose purpose is to 
provide a functional advantage.117   
Thus, the CCPA was establishing a test for registrability based on a definition of 
functionality that was fairly broad; as long as the configuration of a product was 
dictated by, and intended to serve, a utilitarian purpose, and was not merely 
arbitrary and unrelated to that purpose, it would not be registrable.  The exis-
tence of a utility patent which disclosed the configuration for which registration 
was being sought was considered strong evidence that such functionality ex-
isted.118       
  
115 Judge Baldwin dissented from this conclusion, stating that he was troubled by “the majority’s 
acceptance of a single piece of evidence, the Best patent, as conclusively establishing func-
tionality of such nature as to preclude registration.”  Id. at 1200 (Baldwin, J., dissenting).  
116 Id. at 1199 (quoting Deister, 289 F.2d 496, 502 (1961)). 
117 Id.   
118 It is important to distinguish between utility patents, which are considered to be evidence of 
functionality, and design patents, which are not.  Under the Patent Act, “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof” may be granted a utility patent.  35 U.S.C. § 101.  Thus, a utility patent re-
quires that the invention have “practical utility,” In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 
1995), or, in other words, “real world use.”  JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PATENT LAW 196 (2d ed. 2006).  The degree of utility is not important as the statute only de-
mands “full disclosure of a new and unobvious invention which is of some use to someone.”  
In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 955 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., dissenting).  Design patents protect 
the “new, original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture.”  35 U.S.C. § 171.  
Therefore, design patents are limited to decorative features and cannot encompass any struc-
tural or functional features of the underlying article.  MUELLER, supra at 238.  Since a design 
must be non-functional to be eligible for a design patent, a design patent is in fact not at all 
probative of functionality and may be evidence to the opposite end.  See, e.g., In re Honey-
well, 497 F.2d. 1344, 1347–48 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
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During this same period of time, other federal courts were also address-
ing these same issues of registrability and protectability of trade dress.  The de-
cision of the District Court of Maryland in Car-Freshner Corp. v. Marlenn 
Products Co.119  reflects this struggle.  The case involved plaintiff’s pine tree-
shaped air fresheners and a defendant’s attempt to sell the same-shaped prod-
uct.120  Plaintiff had obtained a trademark registration of the pine tree shape in 
1952, but the court ordered that that registration be cancelled.121  To the extent 
that plaintiff seemed to be claiming protection for the shape of the product itself, 
the court observed that “[t]he fact that a trade-mark cannot be the article itself 
applies to both common-law trademarks and to those registered. . . .  The free-
dom to apply a trade-mark to an article . . . does not extend to making the mark 
identical to the article.”122  Thus, despite the fact that the court concluded that 
the pine tree shape was not functional because the shape “is nonessential and 
performs no part in the intended function of the goods,”123 it nevertheless con-
cluded that that shape would not be registrable because it would provide protec-
tion for the shape of the product itself.124  This reflects a restriction against regis-
tration that is much stricter than the rule adopted by the CCPA; the court here 
would find registration improper for the overall shape of a product even if unre-
lated to its utility and arbitrary. 
When the court then turned to the unfair competition claim, however, 
the plaintiff found greater success against Marlenn, despite the fact that the 
court had just concluded that the plaintiff’s mark was not registrable.  The court 
found that the defendant had intentionally copied the exact shape and dimen-
  
119 183 F. Supp. 20 (D. Md. 1960). 
120 Id. at 22. 
121 Id. at 46. 
122 Id. at 26.  The court found that the registration as issued only applied to pictures of plaintiff’s 
product and not to the product itself, but then went on to conclude that if the registration was 
as broad as plaintiff argued and applied to the shape of the product itself, that registration 
would be invalid.  Id. at 25–26. 
123 Id. at 27. 
124 The court also concluded that the mark as registered was descriptive and lacked secondary 
meaning at the time of registration and thus was not properly granted registration.  Id. at 27–
30.  The District Court for the Northern District of New York later disagreed with the Mary-
land court’s conclusion that the pine tree shape was descriptive and found it to be suggestive, 
and thus registrable without a showing of secondary meaning.  Car-Freshner Corp. v. Auto 
Aid Mfg. Corp., 461 F.Supp. 1055, 1060 (N.D.N.Y 1978).  It appears that after the Maryland 
district court had cancelled the registration, the plaintiff successfully re-registered it in 1961.  
The New York district court did not address the question of whether it was improper to regis-
ter the overall configuration of the product, though its conclusion would indicate that it saw 
nothing improper about such a registration.  Id.  
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sions of the plaintiff’s product, which the court found to be non-functional and 
possessing secondary meaning, and had done so knowingly, and with the inten-
tion of passing off its products as those of the plaintiff.125  The court enjoined the 
defendant from further acts of unfair competition without defining the scope of 
that injunction.126  Thus, although concluding that plaintiff’s registration of the 
tree shape should be cancelled, the court nonetheless granted plaintiff some pro-
tection against the defendant’s use of that very shape in passing off its products 
as those of the plaintiff.  The plaintiff might have been quite justifiably confused 
by what appears to be contradictory conclusions of the court.  It is not self-
evident why a design that does not merit registration should be nevertheless 
protectable under unfair competition law.   
The relationship between federal trademark registration and protection 
under state unfair competition law was therefore unclear.  Could a state provide 
protection against copying the design of a product if that product was not regi-
strable under the Lanham Act?  In addition, could protection of that design be 
granted under section 43(a) if the design was not registrable under section 2 of 
the Lanham Act?  
Although that precise issue was not before the Supreme Court, the 
Court did address the underlying theories of these questions in two landmark 
decisions in 1964: Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.127 and Compco Corp. v. 
Day-Brite Lighting Inc.128  In Sears, the Court addressed the issue of whether a 
state, through its unfair competition law, could prohibit the copying of an article 
which was not protected by either patent or copyright law.129  In that case, Stif-
fel’s pole lamp design had been copied by Sears and sold in cartons labeled as a 
Sears product, but without identifying tags on the lamps themselves.130  Stiffel 
sued in part on the basis of its design and utility patents, but those patents were 
declared invalid by the district court for want of invention.131  Thus, Stiffel’s 
only remaining claim was based on state unfair competition law.  Stiffel argued 
that Sears was liable for causing confusion in the trade by copying its design 
  
125 Car-Freshner Corp. v. Marlenn Prods. Co., 183 F. Supp. 20, 45–46 (D. Md. 1960). 
126 Id. at 46. 
127 376 U.S. 225 (1964). 
128 376 U.S. 234 (1964). 
129 Sears, 376 U.S. at 225. 
130 Id. 
131 The appellate court confirmed the lower court’s finding that Stiffel’s patent was invalid.  
Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1963).  Sears had sold the 
Deca pole lamp a year prior which contained “all the essential elements” of the subsequent 
Stiffel pole lamp, with the exclusion of an adjustable leg.  Id.  Therefore, the Stiffel design 
was not new or novel, which is required for patent protection.  See 35 U.S.C. § 101.   
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and selling products which caused consumers to be confused as to their source.  
Both the district court and the court of appeals held Sears liable under the unfair 
competition claim.132   
The Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts, finding that Sears 
was “doing no more than copying and marketing an unpatented article.”133  Re-
lying in part on the Kellogg decision, the Court reiterated that if an article is not 
protected under the patent laws, “the right to make the article—including the 
right to make it in precisely the shape it carried when patented—passes to the 
public.”134  The Court ruled that state unfair competition law could not interfere 
with that public right to copy, and therefore, Sears had the right “to sell lamps 
almost identical to those sold by Stiffel.”135  The Court, however, recognized 
that the states could, through unfair competition law, provide some remedies 
against public confusion which could be caused by such copying: 
Doubtless a State may, in appropriate circumstances, require that goods, 
whether patented or unpatented, be labeled or that other precautionary steps be 
taken to prevent customers from being misled as to the source, just as it may 
protect businesses in the use of their trademarks, labels or distinctive dress in 
the packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, 
from misleading purchasers as to the source of the goods. But because of the 
federal patent laws a State may not, when the article is unpatented and unco-
pyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages for such 
copying.136     
Similarly, in Compco, decided the same day as Sears, the Court addressed the 
defendant’s copying of the plaintiff’s lighting fixture design, for which the pa-
tent was also found to be invalid.137  In addition to copying the design, the de-
fendant had copied the fixture’s cross-ribbing pattern, which was associated 
with the plaintiff’s goods in the trade.138  The evidence showed that Compco had 
taken care to label the fixtures and the containers clearly as being the products 
of Compco and not the plaintiff.139  Despite the defendant’s efforts to label and 
avoid confusion, the lower courts found Compco liable for unfair competition 
under state law and again, the Supreme Court reversed.  The Court held that, in 
the absence of patent or other federal statutory protection, the design was in the 
  
132 Sears, 376 U.S. at 226–27. 
133 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 227 (1964) (footnote omitted).  
134 Id. at 230 (citing Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 120 (1938)).  
135 Id. at 231. 
136 Id. at 232–33. 
137 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 234 (1964). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 237. 
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public domain and could be copied at will.140  The Court, however, went on to 
observe that 
As we have said in Sears, while the federal patent laws prevent a State from 
prohibiting the copying and selling of unpatented articles, they do not stand in 
the way of state law, statutory or decisional, which requires those who make 
and sell copies to take precautions to identify their products as their own.141 
The Supreme Court held that Compco was free to copy the plaintiff’s design.142  
Because the lower courts’ judgment had erroneously prohibited Compco from 
copying the plaintiff’s design and improperly awarded plaintiff damages for 
such copying, the Supreme Court reversed.143  
Both Sears and Compco addressed the potential conflict between federal 
patent law and state unfair competition law and relied on the Constitution’s Su-
premacy Clause to justify the conclusion that state law could not provide protec-
tion for designs that federal law placed in the public domain.144  There is ob-
viously no such Supremacy Clause problem when dealing with Lanham Act 
protection for a design not protected under patent or copyright law, but the un-
derlying policy conflict remains, as the reasoning of the courts in cases like 
Sears, Compco, Kellogg, and Deister reflect.  If the public has an overriding 
right to copy an article unprotected by patent or copyright in the interest of 
competition, then federal trademark law should not be allowed to impede that 
right any more than absolutely necessary to achieve its goal of limiting consum-
er confusion.  Public policy favoring the freedom to copy and compete fairly 
would suggest that the same lines limiting state unfair competition law should 
be drawn to limit federal unfair competition law, i.e., that there should be no 
prohibitions against copying per se, but that federal law should be able to pre-
vent confusion through labeling and disclosure requirements.145  This would also 
support the conclusion that product design should not be registrable given the 
increased aura of protectability that comes with registration, but should, instead, 
only be protected by federal and state unfair competition laws.  Courts can im-
pose labeling and disclosure requirements if necessary, but should not prohibit 
the copying of the design itself.     
  
140 Id. at 238. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. at 238–39. 
143 Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238–39 (1964). 
144 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228–29 (1964); Compco, 376 U.S. at 237. 
145 See Margreth Barrett, Consolidating the Diffuse Paths to Trade Dress Functionality: En-
countering TrafFix on the Way to Sears, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 79, 137–38 (2004). 
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C.  Post Sears-Compco Expansion of Product Design Protection 
As we have seen, up through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sears 
and Compco, trademark law generally did not provide any prohibitions against 
copying the overall configuration of a useful product, but it did provide for re-
medies such as disclosure and labeling to prevent consumer confusion as to 
source when products were alike in configuration.  In the next decade, however, 
the courts began to expand protection of product design and provide remedies 
against copying of articles that arguably would have been considered functional 
and non-protectable under Sears and Compco.   
In Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.146 (hereinafter 
“TESCO”), the plaintiff sued under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, asserting a 
federal unfair competition claim against the defendant who allegedly had inten-
tionally copied the exact shape and configuration of plaintiff’s trapezoidal semi-
trailers.147  The trailers manufactured by the defendant were comparable in quali-
ty and were labeled as the products of the defendant.148  The district court held 
the defendant liable under section 43(a) and granted the plaintiff damages, and 
injunctive relief.149  That injunction, however, was later amended to permit the 
defendant to make and sell semi-trailers with an exterior configuration that was 
identical in configuration to those of the plaintiff.  Although plaintiff appealed 
the amendment, it later conceded that the issue was moot as defendant was no 
longer making trailers in the shape of the plaintiff’s design at the time of the 
appeal.150  The Eighth Circuit therefore dealt only with the issue of liability and 
damages for the defendant’s previous conduct in copying the plaintiff’s trape-
zoidal trailer.151  
The defendant argued that the trailer’s shape was functional, and thus 
not protected against copying under section 43(a).152  The defendant relied in 
large part on Sears and Compco, which the Eighth Circuit found inapposite be-
cause, in the court’s view, those cases did not address trademark law and the 
doctrine of functionality, but rather only whether “state law could extend the 
effective term of patent protection granted by the federal statutes” without con-
  
146 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976). 
147 Id. at 1213. 
148 Id. at 1214 n.2.  
149 Id. at 1214. 
150 Id. at 1213 n.1. 
151 Id.  
152 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir. 1976). 
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flicting with the Supremacy Clause.153 Although the court was correct that Sears 
and Compco did not address the interaction of federal trademark law and patent 
law, the court was too quick to downplay the underlying policy concerns that 
the Supreme Court had articulated in reaching its results, i.e., the freedom to 
copy the design of products that are in the public domain.  The Eighth Circuit 
observed that “[t]he protection accorded by the law of trademark and unfair 
competition is greater than that accorded by the law of patents because each is 
directed at a different purpose.”154  In a footnote, the court made an even bolder 
and seemingly incorrect statement, i.e., that “Sears and Compco recognized that 
a design protected by trademark cannot be copied.”155  In fact, the Supreme 
Court, as recognized in the language quoted above, merely said that states could 
impose labeling and disclosure requirements to prevent confusion where similar 
or identical designs were used in competition.  Nowhere did the Court say that 
such designs could be protected against copying under federal or state trademark 
law. 
The Eighth Circuit then concluded that the defendant had no right to 
copy the design of the plaintiff’s trailers if the design was non-functional and 
had secondary meaning: “Full and fair competition requires that those who in-
vest time, money and energy into the development of good will and a favorable 
reputation be allowed to reap the advantages of their investment.”156  In defining 
functionality, the court quoted Deister for the principle that an arbitrary feature 
or design that incidentally serves a useful purpose is not “functional” for pur-
poses of denying trademark protection.157  Because there was sufficient evidence 
  
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 1215. 
155 Id. at 1215 n.6. 
156 Id. at 1215. 
157 “Where a shape or feature of construction is in its concept arbitrary, it may be or become a 
legally recognizable trademark because there is no public interest to be protected.  In such a 
case protection would not be lost merely because the shape or feature also serves a useful 
purpose.”  Id. at 1218 (quoting In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 506 (C.C.P.A. 
1961)).  The court also quoted the broader definition of functionality used in Pagliero v. Wal-
lace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952), i.e., that design is functional if it is “an impor-
tant ingredient in the commercial success of the product.”  TESCO, 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 
1976) (quoting Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343).  That case involved china patterns, designs that 
could not be considered functional in the utilitarian sense, but that had become recognizable 
as Wallace’s in the trade and by the public.  Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 340.  The court found that 
the china designs had to be considered functional because the “attractiveness and eye appeal” 
of the patterns was “one of the essential selling features of” the china.  Id. at 343–44.  Thus, 
the court held the china designs had an aesthetic appeal which could not be protected against 
copying because “to imitate is to compete in this type of situation.”  Id. at 344.  Pagliero and 
others like it spawned a parallel doctrine of functionality, known as “aesthetic functionality,” 
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to show that the trapezoidal shape of plaintiff’s semi-trailers was “arbitrarily 
designed for the purpose of identification [and] . . . no more than merely inci-
dentally functional,”158 the Eighth Circuit held that the district court’s finding of 
non-functionality under these definitions was not clearly erroneous.159  Thus, the 
overall shape of a truck trailer, an object with an overriding purpose of utility, 
was considered non-functional and protectable under section 43(a).160 
The court upheld the district court’s findings that the trailer shape had 
secondary meaning and that defendant’s copying was likely to cause confusion 
among customers, even though the defendant’s products were clearly labeled as 
its own.161  In reviewing the remedies awarded to the plaintiff, the Eighth Circuit 
modified the lower court’s judgment and allowed the plaintiff to recover all of 
the profits the defendant had made in the three states where the plaintiff’s design 
had acquired secondary meaning and was thus protectable.162  Therefore, at least 
for purposes of a federal claim under section 43(a), the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that not only can a court prohibit copying of a useful article design, it can award 
monetary relief to compensate a plaintiff and penalize a defendant.163  This 
seems contrary to the concerns that the Supreme Court articulated in Sears, 
where the Court concluded that “a State may not, when the article is unpatented 
and uncopyrighted, prohibit the copying of the article itself or award damages 
for such copying.”164     
This narrow reading of Sears and Compco was also adopted by the Dis-
trict Court of New Jersey in Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp.165 that 
same year.  In holding the defendant liable for both common law trademark 
  
which is generally beyond the scope of this article.  See generally Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson 
Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169–170 (1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995)), for the principle that “if a design’s ‘aesthetic value’ lies in 
its ability to ‘confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of 
alternative designs,’ then the design is ‘functional.’”); Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v. Volkswa-
gen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1067–72 (9th Cir. 2006) (general discussion of aesthetic 
functionality, its history, and its meaning in the aftermath of TrafFix). 
158 Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976).  
159 Id. at 1219. 
160 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 279–80 (TESCO represents a return to a focus on competitive 
need as the basis of functionality determinations). 
161 TESCO, 536 F.2d at 1220, 1223. 
162 Id. at 1222. 
163 See id. at 1222–23 (citing W. E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon, Inc., 435 F.2d 656, 664 (2d Cir. 
1970)). 
164 See text supra note 136 (emphasis added). 
165 422 F. Supp. 905 (D.N.J. 1976). 
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infringement and unfair competition, the court rejected the defendants’ attempt 
to rely on Sears and Compco as support for their right to copy the plaintiff’s 
parking meter design.166  The design had been protected by both a utility and 
design patent, but both had expired.167  The defendant claimed that since the 
design was now in the public domain, plaintiff could not rely on trademark law 
to prevent copying under the holdings of Sears and Compco.168  The court disa-
greed, ruling that Sears and Compco were limited to situations where there were 
Supremacy Clause issues because state law was being invoked to extend protec-
tion beyond the term of a patent.169  That, however, seemed to be the very issue 
before the court in Qonaar: the patents had expired on the plaintiff’s parking 
meter design, and the plaintiff was relying on common law trademark and unfair 
competition law to prohibit the defendant from copying its design even though 
its patents had expired.170  The court, however, ignored this parallel and weakly 
attempted to rationalize that, since the Lanham Act never creates trademark 
rights but merely allows for registration of marks protected on the basis of 
common law, the Sears-Compco rationale did not apply to the plaintiff’s claim 
against the defendant.171  The court’s reasoning is not persuasive.  It is not at all 
clear how the Lanham Act figures into the plaintiff’s claim, where the mark was 
not registered and the claim was not apparently based on the Lanham Act at all.   
The court also concluded that the design of the parking meter was not 
functional and thus was protectable as a common law trademark.172  The court 
relied on the plaintiff’s assertion that no other producer used the same ice cream 
cone-shaped configuration for the top of its parking meter and that there were 
many other different possible configurations available to house a parking me-
ter’s mechanism.173  The court rejected the defendant’s reliance on In re Honey-
well,174 where the round configuration of a thermostat was held to be unregistra-
ble even though other shapes were available.175  In Honeywell, the court had said 
that the existence of those alternatives did not change the fact that the round 
  
166 Id. at 911. 
167 Id. at 908. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 911 (citing Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
170 Id. at 908. 
171 Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D.N.J. 1976). 
172 Id. at 914. 
173 Id. at 913. 
174 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
175 Id. at 182. 
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shape was itself “essentially” functional.176  The Qonaar court found Honeywell 
distinguishable, saying no other company had made parking meters in the same 
design as the plaintiff, and concluded that the ice cream cone design was not 
“primarily functional” without further explanation.177  Thus, the evidence of 
alternative designs for parking meters was critical to the finding of non-
functionality in Qonaar. 
The confusion illustrated by this case is indicative of the state of the law 
with respect to the doctrine of functionality and the protection of product design 
in the 1970s.  Sears and Compco along with earlier cases like Kellogg had left 
the courts confused about the relationship between federal trademark law and 
federal patent and copyright law.  There was also uncertainty regarding how to 
weigh the underlying policy concerns with preserving public access to the de-
signs of useful products where those designs were not protected by federal pa-
tent or copyright law.178 
A comparison of two cases involving the same design, the shape of a 
building or kiosk used for a photograph developing store, further illustrates this 
confusion.  In Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc.,179 the New Jersey dis-
trict court concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to preliminary injunctive 
relief because its building design as a whole was functional, and not protectable 
as a mark used to identify the plaintiff’s photograph developing services.180  The 
court defined the standard of functionality, relying in part on Deister and Best 
Lock, as follows: 
  
176 Id. 
177 Time Mechanisms, Inc. v. Qonaar Corp., 422 F. Supp. 905, 914 (D.N.J. 1976). 
178 Thurmon, supra note 16, at 312 (“Courts were reluctant to take the Sears and Compco deci-
sions as far as the Supreme Court’s language seemed to go.”); Ralph S. Brown, Design Pro-
tection, An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1360–62 (1987) (noting that “Sears and 
Compco . . . have had a hard life” and reviewing decisions that read the cases narrowly); 
Note, The Public Interest and the Right to Copy Nonfunctional Product Features, 19 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 317, 335–39 (1977) (reviewing cases showing a “significant judicial dissatis-
faction with the rationale of Sears and Compco”).  
179 425 F. Supp. 693 (D.N.J. 1977). 
180 The plaintiff had a registered service mark for a two-dimensional drawing of the kiosk which 
it used as its logo on advertising.  Id. at 695.  The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a 
preliminary injunction with respect to the defendant’s use of a confusingly similar logo, 
based both on service mark infringement under the Lanham Act and section 43(a)’s prohibi-
tion against unfair competition.  Id. at 711.  The court, however, refused to treat the design of 
the building, a three-dimensional kiosk, as covered by that registration and analyzed the 
plaintiff’s claims with respect to the building design separately from the logo design.  Id. at 
707.  The court denied the plaintiff preliminary relief with respect to the defendant’s use of a 
similar building design.  Id. at 708. 
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In order to determine whether the Fotomat kiosk, or substantial parts thereof, 
is primarily “functional,” the relevant questions are whether the Fotomat 
kiosk, as a whole, is designed and constructed in a manner which primarily 
suits its purpose as a retail sales store; whether the Fotomat kiosk design con-
tributes to the effectiveness with which Fotomat serves its customers; and 
whether such functional purposes are merely incidental to the kiosk’s purpose 
as a source-identifying device.181 
The court concluded that the overall design of the kiosk was functional, saying 
that, “Fotomat should not be able to prevent competitors from employing a type 
of retail outlet which is well-suited to the conduct of drive-in sales by asserting 
a building design service mark which is primarily functional.”182  The court con-
ceded that unique or arbitrary aspects of the kiosk design might be protected, 
but found that the defendant had not copied those features, and that there was 
therefore not a probability that the plaintiff would succeed on its claim of ser-
vice mark infringement based on the copying of the design of the kiosk.183 
The court also analyzed the plaintiff’s claim of unfair competition based 
on section 43(a).  The court defined the difference between the service mark 
infringement claim and the unfair competition claim.   
It is possible to be guilty of unfair competition even when trademark in-
fringement is not present, if use of a similar but noninfringing mark or device 
is combined with unfair practices in a manner which is likely to deceive pur-
chasers regarding the origin of goods under all the circumstances. . . .  The 
law of unfair competition recognizes that one may not simulate the distinctive 
appearance of the place of business or advertising signs of a competitor unless 
proper steps are taken against misleading the public.184   
The court found that the defendant had not engaged in unfair competition with 
respect to the kiosks because the defendant had adopted sufficiently distinctive 
features in their design. 
In contrast, the Kansas district court reached a contrary conclusion in-
volving the design of the Fotomat kiosk shortly after the New Jersey decision.185  
First, the court treated the plaintiff’s service mark registration as covering not 
simply the two-dimensional design used as a logo, but also the three-
dimensional design of the building itself.186  Second, it concluded that the defen-
dant had not presented sufficient evidence at trial to overcome the presumptive 
  
181 Id. at 706. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. at 706–07. 
184 Id. at 709. 
185 Fotomat Corp. v. Cochran, 437 F. Supp. 1231, 1235 (D. Kan. 1977). 
186 Id. at 1236–37. 
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validity of the registered mark.187  The court found that that kiosk design was 
distinctive and arbitrary and “not dictated by the function it was to serve.”188  
The court reasoned: 
Nor would enjoining others from using the building design inhibit competition 
in any way, for defendant’s own expert testified that many other designs 
would provide all the “functional” benefits which defendant claimed inhered 
in this particular design.  While this particular design did shelter the plaintiff’s 
personnel and stock from the elements, it did so no better than a myriad of 
other building designs.  Therefore, while the design had some small element 
of functionality, it was not “in essence” functional.189 
The court acknowledged the opposite conclusion reached by the New Jersey 
Fotomat court, but noted that the New Jersey court had been deciding the case 
under the preliminary injunction standard, and did not have the benefit of the 
evidence that had been introduced at trial in the Kansas case.190 
Although that may, in part, explain the different conclusions reached 
with respect to the functionality of the building design, the two courts also used 
different functionality tests.  The New Jersey court found the design functional 
based on a broad definition which considered whether the design contributed to 
the purpose and effectiveness of the store, but the Kansas court required the 
design to be the best design, i.e. “better than a myriad of other building de-
signs,” in order for it to be functional.  Whereas the New Jersey court articulated 
the underlying policy reasons for denying trademark protection to functional 
designs, the Kansas court did not address those policy concerns.  The two cases, 
as demonstrated by their opposing conclusions and differing tests, reveal the 
confusion in the case law in the 1970s with respect to the doctrine of functional-
ity. 
D.  The 1980s: Morton-Norwich and Inwood 
In 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals handed down one of 
the most influential decisions on the issue of functionality in In re Morton-
Norwich Products.191  As discussed below,192 the TTAB and the Federal Circuit 
continue to rely upon the Morton-Norwich decision in determining whether 
  
187 Id. at 1245. 
188 Id. at 1235. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. at 1236. 
191 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
192 See infra notes 286–299, 301–618 and accompanying text. 
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trade dress is non-functional, and thus registrable under the Lanham Act.  In that 
case, the court determined that the shape of a spray bottle used for household 
cleaning products was not functional and should have been registered.  The 
court, in another thorough opinion written by Judge Rich, carefully parsed the 
steps necessary to determine functionality.   
First, the court revisited the history of the functionality doctrine and its 
underlying justifications, making an interesting and subtle change in how it 
viewed the public right to copy, which, according to Judge Rich in the Deister 
case trumped the producer’s desire to prevent confusion.193  While still recogniz-
ing the right to copy functional aspects of the design of a useful object, the court 
seemed now to give greater weight to the concern with passing off.  The court 
said that “when a design is ‘non-functional,’ the right to compete through imita-
tion gives way, presumably upon balance of that right with the originator’s right 
to prevent others from infringing upon an established symbol of trade identifica-
tion.”194  Although this is not strictly inconsistent with the holding in Deister, 
there seems to be increased deference in the court’s language to the interest of 
producers in preventing copying of their designs than there had been in Deister. 
The court then observed that not every design of every utilitarian article 
would be barred from registration, nor would even every useful design of a utili-
tarian article.  The court opined that it was incorrect to define functionality to 
apply to the design of any useful article.  Whereas such designs might be de 
facto functional,195 they were not necessarily de jure functional,196 and ineligible 
for federal trademark protection.  To find de jure functionality, and thus deny 
trademark protection, required a finding that the design was superior to other 
designs such that others would need to copy that design in order to compete 
effectively.  The court said, “[C]ourts in the past have considered the public 
policy involved in this area of law as, not the right to slavishly copy articles 
which are not protected by patent or copyright, but the need to copy those ar-
ticles, which is more properly termed the right to compete effectively.”197 
Again, this seems a different attitude from what Judge Rich said in 
Deister, where he, in fact, did state that there was a public right to copy that 
existed independently of the patent and copyright laws.  Now Judge Rich was 
  
193 See discussion supra notes 81–98.  
194 In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337.  
195 De facto functionality “indicat[es] that although the design of a product, a container, or a 
feature of either is directed to performance of a function, it may be legally recognized as an 
indication of source.”  Id. 
196 De jure functionality indicates “such a design may not be protected as a trademark.”  Id.  
197 In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
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basing functionality not on that public entitlement, but limiting it to circums-
tances where there was an actual impact on effective competition.198 
The factors identified for determining this “superior” design and the 
“need to compete effectively” also illustrated the court’s narrowing of the defi-
nition of functionality.  The court discussed four types of evidence that would 
bear on a determination of functionality: the existence of an expired utility pa-
tent which disclosed the utilitarian advantages of the design; advertising which 
touted the functional advantages of the design; the absence of alternative de-
signs available to potential competitors; and the comparatively lower cost of 
manufacturing the plaintiff’s design compared to other available alternatives.199  
The third and fourth factors made it clear that if other alternatives were available 
and relatively equal in manufacturing costs, the plaintiff’s design was not likely 
to be considered functional, even if that design was entirely dictated by func-
tional considerations. 
The court concluded that the design of plaintiff’s spray bottle was not 
functional under this definition, placing the most weight on the third factor in its 
analysis.  The court found that: 
a molded plastic bottle can have an infinite variety of forms or designs and 
still function to hold liquid.  No one form is necessary or appears to be “supe-
rior.” . . .  The evidence . . . demonstrates that the same functions can be per-
formed by a variety of other shapes with no sacrifice of any functional advan-
tage.  There is no necessity to copy appellant’s trade dress to enjoy any of the 
functions of a spray-top container.200  
Judge Rich and the CCPA thus seemed to be retreating to a more demanding 
test for finding functionality, making it easier for producers to obtain registra-
tion of their designs. 
Just a few months after the Morton-Norwich decision, the Supreme 
Court revisited this issue for the first time since Sears and Compco, but only in 
passing.  In Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc.,201 one of the 
  
198 Others have interpreted the Morton-Norwich decision as being consistent with Judge Rich’s 
previous rulings which were seen as based on the competitive need rationale more so than the 
functionality standard.  The holding in Morton-Norwich was viewed as a return to the com-
petitive need rationale by courts that had been fluctuating between the two standards.  See 
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 271–83.  See also Barrett, supra note 145, at 99–101 (finding that 
Morton-Norwich relies on a definition of functionality which focuses on the practical effect 
that trade dress protection for a design would have on competition). 
199 In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
200 Id. at 1342. 
201 456 U.S. 844 (1982).  This case was primarily about whether a drug manufacturer could be 
held vicariously liable when pharmacists allegedly infringed the plaintiff’s trademark and 
trade dress for its pharmaceutical product. 
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defenses asserted for the defendant using the same colors as the plaintiff to iden-
tify particular drugs was that its trade dress was functional.202  In a footnote dis-
cussing that defense, the Court provided a definition of functionality: “In gener-
al terms, a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of 
the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”203  The Court cited 
only two cases in support of this definition; Sears and Kellogg.  Citing these 
cases in support of a case involving federal trademark and trade dress law would 
seem to suggest that, in the Court’s view, Sears and Kellogg had a connection to 
federal trademark law and were not irrelevant to the application of the functio-
nality doctrine in such cases.204  It also could have been interpreted to mean that 
the Court would take a harder line before granting trademark protection to the 
design of useful products.  The Inwood definition of functionality is clearly dif-
ferent and potentially broader in scope than that used in Morton-Norwich, which 
requires evidence of the superiority of the design, not just that it is essential to 
the article’s use or purpose.205  As Professor Margreth Barrett asserted, the cita-
tion to Sears suggests that the Supreme Court intended “essential to the use or 
purpose” to require only a showing that the features of the design “play an im-
portant role in the product’s function, regardless of whether alternative designs 
are available that could perform the role just as well.”206  That is, Barrett reads 
Inwood to reflect a definition of functionality where the focus was on utility, not 
the impact on competitors.207 
It would remain for subsequent courts to shed further light on the mean-
ing of the Inwood definition and whether the Morton-Norwich test was consis-
tent with it.  As Professors Thurmon and Barrett discuss,208 several circuit appel-
late courts addressed these issues in the 1980s, reaching differing decisions.  
Interestingly, several courts, while citing Inwood, did not rely on, or even quote, 
the Supreme Court’s language defining functionality.  For example, the Seventh 
  
202 See id. at 850. 
203 Id. at 851 n.10.  The court never addressed the question of whether the plaintiff’s trade dress 
was functional or not, as its focus was rather on the question of vicarious liability. 
204 See Barrett, supra note 145, at 141–43. 
205 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 283–85. 
206 See Barrett, supra note 145, at 88. 
207 See also Andrew F. Halaby, The Trickiest Problem with Functionality: A New Datum 
Prompts A Thought Experiment, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 167 (nothing in Kellogg 
or Sears supports the Inwood formulation of functionality); Weinberg, supra note 16, at 18–
19 (Inwood test is internally inconsistent). 
208 Barrett, supra note 145, at 95–110; Thurmon, supra note 16, at 286–96.  See also McCor-
mick, supra note 16, at 562–66. 
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Circuit in W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene Manufacturing209 cited Inwood as dicta for 
support of its definition of functionality, i.e., that “a functional feature is one 
which competitors would have to spend money not to copy but to design 
around . . . .  It is something costly to do without . . . rather than costly to 
have.”210  The court, however, never explained how this definition fit with the 
Inwood definition.  In applying its definition to the plaintiff’s product—a stack-
ing tray with hexagonal sides, the court concluded that the tray’s shape was irre-
levant to its functioning and that there was no evidence that it was cheaper to 
produce than differently shaped trays.211  Thus, the tray’s design would not be 
considered functional in the utilitarian sense, although the court was willing to 
go beyond the limited Inwood definition to consider the possibility of aesthetic 
functionality.212  The Seventh Circuit decided several other cases addressing the 
issue of functionality in the 1980s, but did not ever rely on, or explain, the re-
levance of the Inwood formulation in its analysis.213  In fact, in Schwinn Bicycle 
Co. v. Ross Bicycles,214 the court concluded that the district court, in finding that 
the defendant was unlikely to prove that the design of plaintiff’s exercise bi-
cycle was functional, had been “led astray by words such as ‘optimal,’ ‘supe-
rior’ and ‘essential’”215 because “the burden of showing that a competitor’s de-
sign is the ‘best possible’ could extend the scope of trademark protection into 
the domain that . . . is within the bounds of lawful competition.”216  Thus, the 
  
209 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985). 
210 Id. at 339. 
211 Id. at 342–43. 
212 See supra note 157 for discussion of aesthetic functionality.  The court then went on to dis-
cuss the doctrine of aesthetic functionality and its possible application to the design of the 
tray, a topic that is beyond the scope of this article.  See generally Thurmon, supra note 16, at 
303–08.  See Clegg, supra note 16, at 308–12 (author proposes uniform treatment of both uti-
litarian and aesthetic functionality); Halaby, supra note 207, at 182–90 (law should not dis-
tinguish between utilitarian and aesthetic functionality but should define functionality based 
on consumer desire for a feature, whether useful or aesthetic). 
213 See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1191–92 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(preliminary injunction vacated in part because district court erred in its application of the 
functionality doctrine in determining that the configuration of plaintiff’s exercise bicycle was 
non-functional); Serv. Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1126 (7th Cir. 1988) (in-
junction prohibiting defendant from copying the trade dress of plaintiff’s insulated beverage 
server was affirmed as there was no error in finding that trade dress was non-functional); 
Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987) (preliminary injunction 
against copying plaintiff’s folding picnic table is upheld as configuration is not functional).  
The court did not cite to Inwood in any of these decisions.   
214 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989). 
215 Id. at 1189. 
216 Id. 
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language used in both Inwood (“essential”) and Morton-Norwich (“superior”) 
was rejected by the Seventh Circuit on the grounds that it would impose too 
heavy a burden on competitors who wished to copy the configuration of a prod-
uct.  Instead, the court preferred the definition adopted in W.T. Rogers that con-
sidered whether the design was costly to work around or do without, which was 
a much broader definition of functionality that permitted far more copying of 
designs by potential competitors. 
Other circuits also did not address or even cite Inwood in determining 
functionality issues in the 1980s.  For example, the Fifth Circuit did not cite 
Inwood, although it relied heavily on Morton-Norwich in finding that the plain-
tiff’s juice bottle was not functional because of available alternative designs and 
indicated the bottle was not a superior design.217  The Tenth Circuit cited Inwood 
for a different principle but did not rely on it at all in concluding that the shape 
of plaintiff’s fishing reel was not functional.  Instead, the court adopted a test 
that looked at the effect on competition.218  Because the trial court had correctly 
considered whether there were alternative ways to manufacture a comparable 
fishing reel, the appellate court upheld that determination.219  The court seemed 
almost to reject the Inwood formulation, saying, “This interpretation does not 
limit functional features to those essential to a product’s operation.”220 
The Second Circuit paid somewhat greater attention to the Supreme 
Court’s Inwood definition of functionality.  In LeSportsac v. K Mart Corp.,221 
the court correctly characterized the Inwood definition as dictum, stating:  
A design feature of a particular article is “essential” only if the feature is dic-
tated by the functions to be performed; a feature that merely accommodates a 
useful function is not enough. . . .  And a design feature “affecting the cost or 
quality of an article” is one which permits the article to be manufactured at a 
lower cost . . . or one which constitutes an improvement in the operation of the 
goods.222   
The court went on to conclude that the district court’s finding of non-
functionality was not clearly erroneous because there were many other ways to 
arrange the design features of the plaintiff’s handbag and therefore, no danger of 
  
217 Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 1984). 
218 Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d. 513, 519 (10th Cir. 1987). 
219 Id. at 519–20. 
220 Id. at 519.  The court went on to suggest that those features that are aesthetically functional 
would also be denied trade dress protection.  Id.  
221 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985). 
222 Id. at 76 (citations omitted).  This explanation was formulated by Judge Oakes in Warner 
Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d. 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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impeding competition.223  Thus, after quoting and explaining the Inwood formu-
lation, the court relied on the evidence of available alternative designs to deter-
mine whether the features were essential to the handbag’s function or affected 
the cost or quality of the product224—a blend of Inwood with one of the critical 
factors in the Morton-Norwich case. 
Two years later, the Second Circuit revisited the issue of functionality 
in Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc.,225 where the defendant allegedly in-
fringed the design of a rain jacket and asserted the design’s functionality as a 
defense.226  In this case, however, the appellate court vacated the preliminary 
injunction granted to the plaintiff because it concluded that the district court had 
failed to apply the functionality standard correctly in determining that the rain 
jacket design was non-functional.227  Unlike the handbag design at issue in LeS-
portsac, where the court had found several alternative designs available to com-
petitors, the design in Stormy Clime did not lend itself to such alternatives.  The 
court observed, “By contrast, the arrangement of the principal features common 
to both the [plaintiff’s and defendant’s rain jackets] appear to be dictated by the 
purpose of providing a low-cost, unencumbering, waterproof jacket for wear 
while playing golf and other sports.”228  The court, citing both Inwood and Mor-
ton-Norwich, went on to provide a more elaborate definition of functionality: 
On one end, unique arrangements of purely functional features constitute a 
functional design.  On the other end, distinctive and arbitrary arrangements of 
predominantly ornamental features that do not hinder potential competitors 
from entering the same market with differently dressed versions of the product 
are non-functional and hence eligible for trade dress protection.  In between, 
the case for protection weakens the more clearly the arrangement of allegedly 
distinctive features serves the purpose of the product (including the mainten-
ance of low cost), especially where the competitor copying such features has 
taken some significant steps to differentiate its product.229   
Although it is not entirely clear why the plaintiff’s arrangement served 
the purpose of the rain jacket in ways that precluded producers from creating 
reasonably competitive alternatives, the appellate court merely found that the 
district court’s finding that there were alternative designs was not adequately 
  
223 LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77. 
224 Id. at 77–78. 
225 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987). 
226 Id. at 972. 
227 Id. at 978–79. 
228 Id. at 976. 
229 Id. at 977. 
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supported by the evidence.230  The court explained why it was important not to 
define functionality too narrowly and thus expand the protection given by trade 
dress law.  In language reminiscent of earlier cases such as Kellogg, Sears, and 
Deister, the court invoked the need to limit trade dress protection of product 
designs to preserve the freedom to copy designs that were not protected by pa-
tent law.231  The Second Circuit also warned courts to proceed with caution so as 
not to upset the balance between the freedom to compete by copying products 
and the need to prevent confusion as to the source of goods.232  The court con-
cluded: 
By focusing upon hindrances to legitimate competition, the functionality test, 
carefully applied, can accommodate consumers’ somewhat conflicting inter-
ests in being assured enough product differentiation to avoid confusion as to 
source and in being afforded the benefits of competition among producers.233 
Because the district court had failed to be sensitive to that balance, the 
appellate court concluded that it had applied the legal standard of functionality 
incorrectly and vacated the injunction issued in favor of the plaintiff.234  The 
right to copy outweighed the concern with consumer confusion in this case. 
Thus, in the aftermath of Inwood and Morton-Norwich, there was still 
considerable confusion over the exact meaning of functionality.  Although there 
appeared to be a consistent concern with the impact on competition if a design 
was protected by trade dress law and frequent reliance on the availability of 
alternative designs as evidence of that effect on competition, the various circuits 
were formulating the test for functionality in differing terms.  Even within a 
circuit, courts seemed to be giving different weight to the conflicting concerns 
between the right to copy and the need to prevent consumer confusion.235  Some 
courts focused more on utility to define functionality whereas others placed 
  
230 Id. 
231 Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1987). 
232 Id. at 977. 
233 Id. at 978–79. 
234 Id. at 979. 
235 It is also important to mention two other matters relating to these cases from the 1980s.  First, 
as described above, most of the principal cases were decided on the basis of the preliminary 
injunction standard so there was not a full presentation of evidence as to competitive effect or 
available alternatives before the courts when rending their decisions.  Second, in all these 
cases, the courts were placing the burden of proof on the defendant to establish functionality 
instead of requiring the plaintiffs to prove non-functionality.  The outcomes might very well 
have been different if, as under current law, see infra note 280, the courts had placed the bur-
den on the plaintiffs. 
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more weight on competitive impact and the availability of alternative designs to 
determine that competitive impact.236   
Although the issues of trade dress and functionality were not directly 
before the Supreme Court in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,237 
its discussion of Sears and Compco merits inclusion as it reflects the Court’s 
continuing concern with the right to copy and the role that the functionality doc-
trine plays in striking the balance between that right and the concerns with con-
sumer confusion.  In Bonito Boats, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida 
statute which prohibited the duplication of unpatented boat hull designs through 
a direct molding process because it conflicted with the federal patent scheme.238  
The Court observed that there is a “a congressional understanding, implicit in 
the Patent Clause itself, that free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which 
the protection of a federal patent is the exception. . . .  State law protection for 
techniques and designs whose disclosure has already been induced by market 
rewards may conflict with the very purpose of the patent laws by decreasing the 
range of ideas available as the building blocks of further innovation.”239  The 
Court cited to and discussed Sears and Compco as embodying this principle of 
the right to copy unpatented ideas and products.240   
The Court, however, also recognized that Sears and Compco, as well as 
other cases decided after those two decisions, left room for some state regulation 
of trade dress to prevent confusion in the marketplace.  The Court observed that 
Sears reflected “an implicit recognition that all state regulation of potentially 
patentable but unpatented subject matter is not ipso facto preempted by the fed-
eral patent laws.”241  Nevertheless, the Court concluded that  
States may not offer patent-like protection to intellectual creations which 
would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal law. . . .  A state 
law that substantially interferes with the enjoyment of an unpatented utilita-
rian or design conception which has been freely disclosed by its author to the 
public at large impermissibly contravenes the ultimate goal of public disclo-
sure and use which is the centerpiece of federal patent policy. . . .  We under-
stand this to be the reasoning at the core of our decisions in Sears and Comp-
co, and we reaffirm that reasoning today.242   
  
236 See generally Barrett, supra note 145, at 95–110. 
237 489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
238 Id. at 168. 
239 Id. at 151.   
240 Id. at 152–57. 
241 Id. at 154.   
242 Id. at 156–57.   
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Because the Florida statute was found to offer patent-like protection, the Court 
struck it down.243 
The question left somewhat undefined by Bonito Boats is where exactly 
the Court would draw the line between permissible and impermissible state pro-
tection of product design trade dress.  The Court suggested that state “protection 
against copying of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products which have ac-
quired secondary meaning such that they operate as a designation of source”244 
would be permissible, and that states “may place limited regulations on the use 
of unpatented designs in order to prevent consumer confusion as to source.”245  
The Court went on to observe that Congress itself has recognized that the need 
to regulate unfair competition is not inconsistent with the patent laws, as reflect-
ed in section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.246  “Congress has thus given federal rec-
ognition to many of the concerns that underlie the state tort of unfair competi-
tion, and the application of Sears and Compco to nonfunctional aspects of a 
product which have been shown to identify source must take account of compet-
ing federal policies in this regard.”247  The Court thus invoked the doctrine of 
functionality as one of the key concepts used to define the scope of protectable 
trade dress, but did not discuss how that doctrine was to be defined. 
The Court returned more directly to the question of how to define func-
tionality in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.248 in 1995.249  Although the 
  
243 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989). 
244 Id. at 158. 
245 Id. at 165. 
246 Id. at 166. 
247 Id. at 166.   
248 514 U.S. 159 (1995). 
249 In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992), the Supreme Court also indi-
rectly endorsed the role that functionality plays in balancing the right to copy with the con-
cern with preventing consumer confusion.  In that case, the Court ruled that trade dress gen-
erally could be protected if it were inherently distinctive without proof of secondary mean-
ing.  In response to concerns that this would result in overprotection of trade dress and a neg-
ative effect on the ability of other to compete, the Court turned to the Fifth Circuit’s defini-
tion of functionality as a reasonable limit on the scope of protectable trade dress.  The Fifth 
Circuit applied a rule that found that a design is functional and unprotectable “if it is one of a 
limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors and free competition 
would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark protection.”  Id. at 775.  The 
Court then observed that this limitation on protectable trade dress “serves to assure that com-
petition will not be stifled by the exhaustion of a limited number of trade dresses.”  Id.   
    Eight years later in the Walmart case, the Court would limit trade dress protection for 
product design by ruling that product design trade dress could never be inherently distinctive 
thus significantly narrowing the scope of the Two Pesos decision.  See infra notes 253–259 
and accompanying text. 
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circuit courts in the 1980s may have paid little or no attention to the Inwood 
functionality definition, after Qualitex, it would be more difficult to dismiss 
Inwood as mere dicta with no persuasive effect.  The Qualitex discussion of 
functionality could also be characterized as dicta, as the central issue there was 
the registrability of color alone as a trademark and not whether the color of the 
product was itself functional, but it is still significant that the Supreme Court not 
only cited Inwood, but quoted its definition of functionality.250  In its discussion 
of why the functionality doctrine did not per se prohibit the registration of colors 
as trademarks, the Court reviewed the policy justifications for the doctrine, i.e., 
the need to preserve competition and to prevent the use of trademark law to mo-
nopolize features that are not protected by patent law.251  Because color some-
times is not “essential to a product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or 
quality,”252 the court concluded that the functionality doctrine was not an abso-
lute bar to the registration of colors as a trademark.  Thus, the Court made it 
clear that its definition of functionality in Inwood was not a casual statement 
capable of being dismissed as dicta, but the continuing formulation of how that 
doctrine should be defined. 
What this definition would mean in real cases, however, was yet to be 
tested or discussed by the Supreme Court.  That opportunity would come early 
in the 21st century. 
III.  THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: WALMART, TRAFFIX AND THE 
REDEFINITION OF TRADE DRESS PROTECTION 
A.  Walmart, TrafFix and the Split in the Circuits 
In March 2000, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that between the 
concern for preventing confusion and the concern with promoting competition, 
the latter concern was the weightier in its view.  In Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara 
  
250 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 165 (“‘[A] product feature is functional,’ and cannot serve as a trade-
mark, ‘if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of 
the article,’ that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put competitors at a significant non-
reputation-related disadvantage.” (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 
844, 850 n.10 (1982))).  The court also quoted the “important ingredient” test for functionali-
ty, but as we will see in our discussion of TrafFix, the court later made it clear that that test 
only applied in cases of aesthetic, not utilitarian, functionality.  See infra notes 271–272 and 
accompanying text.  See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 294–95. 
251 Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164–65. 
252 Id. at 165. 
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Bros,253 the court did not address the issue of functionality itself, but in discuss-
ing another issue relating to trade dress protection, this policy choice came into 
focus.  The plaintiff claimed that Wal-Mart had copied the design of its child-
ren’s clothing and, thus, engaged in unfair competition in violation of section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act.254  The jury found for the plaintiff, and Wal-Mart ap-
pealed, arguing in part that the clothing design was not distinctive and not pro-
tectable trade dress under section 43(a) because there was insufficient evidence 
of secondary meaning.255  The plaintiff asserted that its design was inherently 
distinctive and therefore, automatically protectable without needing evidence of 
secondary meaning. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the plaintiff and reversed.  The 
Court reasoned that it would be against public interest to protect product design 
without an evidentiary showing of secondary meaning, i.e., evidence that the 
public associated the plaintiff as the source of the goods based on the design of 
its clothing.256  The Court stated: 
The fact that product design almost invariably serves purposes other than 
source identification not only renders inherent distinctiveness problematic; it 
also renders application of an inherent-distinctiveness principle more harmful 
to other consumer interests.  Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits 
of competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product 
design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible threats of 
suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent distinctiveness . . . .257 
The Court considered the functionality doctrine itself an inadequate guard 
against this interference with free competition, given the deterrent effect of po-
tential infringement lawsuits.  It concluded that, although word marks and pack-
aging and container trade dress could be inherently distinctive, product design 
could not.258  Without proof of secondary meaning as well as non-functionality, 
there would be no protection against copying product designs.  In so ruling, the 
court substantially narrowed the availability of trade dress protection for product 
design, as only those designs that had been on the market long enough and suc-
cessful enough to create a consumer association with their source could even 
have a chance to obtain trade dress protection under section 43(a).259 
  
253 529 U.S. 205 (2000). 
254 Id. at 208. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 211, 213. 
257 Id. at 213. 
258 Id. at 215. 
259 See generally Halpern, supra note 4, at 253 (stating that the Court in Wal-Mart was “narrow-
ing the role played by trademark in protecting products and their design”).  See also supra 
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A year later, the Supreme Court’s reluctance to give overly broad pro-
tection to product design was made even more clear.260  In TrafFix Devices Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,261 the Court revived the view that the freedom to 
copy unpatented product designs trumped the concern regarding the risk of pub-
lic confusion and provided a broadened definition of functionality which nar-
rowed product designs that would be eligible for trade dress protection.  The 
case involved the plaintiff’s design of a dual-spring stand for road and other 
signs, a design for which the plaintiff had an expired utility patent.262  The de-
fendant reverse-engineered the stand and began producing signs using a similar 
looking dual spring design.263  The plaintiff sued under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, alleging trade dress infringement.264  The district court found that the 
plaintiff failed to prove that there was any question of fact regarding whether the 
design was functional and entered summary judgment for the defendant.265  The 
Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the district court erred by failing to con-
sider other ways that competitors could have configured the design that would 
not have copied the plaintiff’s so obviously.266  Relying on Qualitex and its sec-
ondary definition of functionality, the Sixth Circuit asserted that for a design to 
be functional, it must put competitors at a “significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage”267 and not merely have some impact on competition.  If reasona-
bly comparable alternatives exist for road signs, then the plaintiff’s design can 
be considered non-functional and thus protectable trade dress. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with this formulation of the functionality 
test.  Although the Court’s principal focus was on the evidentiary effect of an 
expired utility patent in determining functionality, the its analysis went beyond 
this issue.  The features of the dual-spring stand were found to be central to the 
claims of the patent on which it was based, creating a burden of proving non-
  
note 249 (Walmart narrowed the scope of trade dress protection that had been allowed under 
Two Pesos).  
260 Halpern, supra note 4, at 260 (“[T]here is no doubt about the Court’s unanimous policy de-
termination to reverse, or at least to stem, the tide of expansive trade dress protection.”). 
261 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
262 Id. at 25–26. 
263 Id. at 26. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Id. at 27. 
267 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (quoting Qualitex Co. 
v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)).  
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functionality that the plaintiff could not satisfy.268  The Court went on to address 
the broader question of the definition of functionality, stating that the Sixth Cir-
cuit’s use of the competitive necessity test for functionality was “incorrect as a 
comprehensive definition. . . .  [A] feature is also functional when it is essential 
to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost or quality of the 
device.”269  The Court now described this, the Inwood formulation it had first 
announced in a 1982 footnote, as the “traditional rule.”270  It said that the sec-
ondary Qualitex formulation, the “significant non-reputation-related disadvan-
tage” test,271 was only relevant in cases of aesthetic as opposed to utilitarian 
functionality.272  To make it even clearer as to how the traditional rule was to be 
interpreted, the Court stated that there was no need to consider design alterna-
tives in making determinations of utilitarian functionality.273  Because the dual 
  
268 Professor Harold Weinberg observed, “One lesson is that for the patent to be relevant, the 
design feature it discloses must be the same design feature that the senior producer seeks to 
protect against trademark infringement.”  Weinberg, supra note 16, at 43. 
269 TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 33. 
270 Id. 
271 See supra note 267 and accompanying text. 
272 The court’s separation of utilitarian functionality from aesthetic functionality has been the 
subject of criticism by some authors.  See, e.g., Halaby, supra note 207, at 172–75;  Thur-
mon, supra note 16, at 250 (“The distinction between aesthetics and utility, therefore, is now 
extremely important.  In close cases . . . [t]his troublesome distinction is likely to lead to a 
great deal of confusion and inconsistency in the lower federal courts.”).  In Au-Tomotive 
Gold, Inc. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the Ninth Circuit struggled to make sense of the 
Supreme Court’s discussion in TrafFix.  457 F.3d 1062, 1073 (9th Cir. 2006); see also J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS § 7:80, at 7-251 (4th ed. 1996).  As 
noted earlier, the issue of aesthetic functionality is beyond the scope of this article. 
273 Some scholars read TrafFix as holding that if functionality is established by other means, 
there is no necessity to consider alternative designs, but not that evidence of alternative de-
signs is precluded from consideration as relevant to the determination of functionality.  See 
Palladino, supra note 14, at 1227–28; Weinberg, supra note 16, at 62 (“Therefore, what 
TrafFix may teach is that when a senior producer has the burden of proving that a choice de-
sign feature is non-functional, a junior producer’s strong evidence of functionality cannot be 
overcome by a senior’s weak evidence of alternative design features.  So read, TrafFix mere-
ly recognizes that multiple forms of evidence bear on functionality, and does not rule out 
considering evidence of alternative design features.”) (footnote omitted).   
    Although it is true that TrafFix does not explicitly address the issue of whether alterna-
tive designs can ever be relevant, its rhetoric certainly makes clear that this is not what the 
Supreme Court considers to be central to that determination.  See also Barrett, supra note 
145, at 116–27 (TrafFix represents a move away from the competitive impact test, adopting 
instead a “role of the feature” test which does not require an examination of design alterna-
tives). 
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spring design was “not an arbitrary flourish,” but rather “the reason the device 
works,” it was functional and non-protectable trade dress.274 
The Court thus seemed to adopt a broad test for functionality: if a de-
sign was what made the product useful, if it related to its utility and was not 
merely arbitrary, it was functional.275  This test, reminiscent of the approach 
used in earlier cases such as Deister, was justified by the same policy concerns 
underlying those earlier cases: 
The Lanham Act does not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation 
in creating a particular device; that is the purpose of patent law and its period 
of exclusivity.  The Lanham Act, furthermore, does not protect trade dress in a 
functional design simply because an investment has been made to encourage 
the public to associate a particular functional feature with a single manufac-
turer. . . .  Whether a utility patent has expired or there has been no utility pa-
tent at all, a product design which has a particular appearance may be func-
tional because it is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects 
the cost or quality of the article.”276 
In repeating the language from Inwood, the Court reemphasized that this 
was the test to use for determining functionality.  Its application of that test to 
the road sign design in TrafFix indicated that what this test meant was that as 
long as the design was a necessary part of what made the product useful and not 
merely an arbitrary embellishment, it should be considered functional and un-
protectable.  Even if there were other ways to design a product that served that 
same purpose, it would not change the fact that the first design was functional.  
Adopting such a broad test for utilitarian functionality was consistent with the 
Court’s view that the right to copy in the absence of patent protection out-
weighed concerns with secondary meaning and the producer’s investment in its 
design. 
Despite the seeming clarity of the Court’s intentions, within a year, 
there was a split in the circuits as the lower courts struggled with the decision 
and its meaning.277  The Fifth Circuit seemed to accept a face value reading of 
  
274 Professor Thurmon observed that the Court’s focus on patent evidence illustrated the shift 
from a focus on competitive need in determining functionality, as patent eligibility is based 
on factors that have nothing to do with whether a competitor will need to copy the features 
claimed.  See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 324–25. 
275 See also Barrett, supra note 145, at 116–27 (TrafFix rejected the competitive impact standard 
and endorsed a test for functionality that focused on whether the features of a product’s de-
sign were material to the use or purpose of the product).  
276 TrafFix Devices Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) (quoting In-
wood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc, 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982)). 
277 See generally Barrett, supra note 145, at 131–35; Palladino, supra note 14, at 1219 passim; 
Thurmon, supra note 16, at 326–34. 
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the TrafFix decision.  In Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH,278  a 
case involving the design of pipette tips used for dispensing of liquids accurate-
ly and rapidly, the jury entered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.279  The appel-
late court reversed, finding that the plaintiff had failed to prove that its design 
was non-functional.280  The appellate court said that although the verdict might 
have been correct under the “competitive necessity” standard formerly applied 
by the Fifth Circuit,281 that standard had been superseded by the Supreme Court 
standard adopted in TrafFix.282  The test for when a design is functional is now 
whether the “feature is essential to the use or purpose of the product or whether 
it affects the cost or quality of the product.”283  The existence of alternative de-
signs was not relevant to that determination, and thus the lower court had erred 
in instructing the jury to consider whether there were alternatives ways of confi-
guring pipette tips to serve the functions performed by the plaintiff’s product.284  
Because the evidence showed that the plaintiff’s product features were not arbi-
trary or ornamental but rather necessary to the operation of the product, the 
  
278 289 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. 2002). 
279 Id. at 354. 
280 The circuits had at one time been split on whether the defendant had the burden to prove 
functionality or whether the plaintiff bore the burden of negating it in a case brought under 
section 43(a).  MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:72, at 7-211 (citing Daniella Rubano, Note, 
Trade Dress: Who Should Bear the Burden of Proving or Disproving Functionality in a Sec-
tion 43(a) Infringement Claim?, 6 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 345 (1995)).  
The Trademark Amendments Act of 1999 resolved this split, placing the burden of proving 
non-functionality on the plaintiff asserting unregistered trade dress infringement. 113 Stat. 
218, 220 (1999).  The amendment  added a third section to section 43(a): “In a civil action 
for trade dress infringement under this Act for trade dress not registered on the principal reg-
ister, the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter 
sought to be protected is not functional.”  See Lanham Act, 60 Stat. 427, 441 § 43(a) (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3)).  This amendment to section 43(a) created a “statutory pre-
sumption that features are deemed functional until proved otherwise by the party seeking 
trade dress protection.”  TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 30; MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:72, at 7-210.  
This amendment may reflect that Congress, like the Supreme Court in Walmart and TrafFix, 
was also attempting to narrow the scope of trade dress protection for the designs of useful ar-
ticles. 
281 See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 435 (5th Cir. 1984). 
282 Eppendorf, 289 F.3d at 356. 
283 Id.  
284 Palladino criticizes Eppendorf as being contrary to TrafFix in ruling that evidence of alterna-
tive designs is always irrelevant to determinations of functionality.  See Palladino, supra note 
14, at 1231–32.  That criticism, however, is not terribly persuasive, given the fairly direct 
language in TrafFix addressing this issue.   
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court reversed, holding that no reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff 
had met its burden of proving non-functionality.285 
In contrast, the Federal Circuit read TrafFix differently and concluded 
that evidence of alternative designs remained a relevant consideration in deter-
minations of functionality.286  The procedural context in Valu Engineering v. 
Rexnord Corp. differed from both TrafFix and Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz  in that 
Valu Engineering involved the review of the TTAB’s decision to uphold a re-
fusal to register a product configuration on the grounds of functionality.287  Thus, 
unlike cases brought under section 43(a), the initial burden in Valu Engineering 
was on the opposer to establish that the mark was functional under section 
2(e)(5) of the Lanham Act.288  The Federal Circuit, however, ruled that the op-
poser in Valu Engineering had presented sufficient evidence to make a prima 
facie case of functionality and therefore, the burden had shifted to the applicant 
to establish that its design was non-functional.289 
The application before the Federal Circuit involved the configuration of 
guide rails placed along a conveyor to prevent objects from falling off, an object 
with an obvious utilitarian function.290  The TTAB had applied the Morton-
Norwich factors and found that all four factors, including an abandoned utility 
patent, advertising materials touting the useful advantages of the design, a li-
mited number of design alternatives, and a comparatively low cost and simple 
method of manufacturing supported the opposer’s claim of functionality, at least 
with respect to the guide rails’ use in areas where conveyors are frequently 
washed.291  The applicant argued on appeal that the TTAB should have consi-
dered all uses of the guide rails, not just usage in so-called “wet areas.”292 
The Federal Circuit recognized that it had to determine the impact of the 
TrafFix decision on the TTAB’s use of Morton-Norwich and its four-factor 
functionality analysis.  Despite the Supreme Court’s assertion in TrafFix that 
  
285 Eppendorf-Netheler-Hinz GMBH v. Ritter GMBH, 289 F.3d 351, 358 (5th Cir. 2002). 
286 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
287 Id. at 1271. 
288 Under the 2(e)(5) standard, the burden of proof is on the party seeking to deny registration to 
prove an article’s functionality.  Lanham Act, § 2(e)(5) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(5)). 
If a plaintiff has a federally registered trademark or service mark, however, the functionality 
burden of proof shifts to defendant to challenge the validity of the mark.  Registration is pri-
ma facie evidence of the validity of a trademark, although rebuttable.  See discussion at supra 
note 61.  For a comparison of the burden of proof under section 43(a), see supra note 280.  
289 Valu Eng’g, 278 F.3d at 1279. 
290 Id. at 1271. 
291 Id. at 1272. 
292 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1272–73 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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there was no reason to consider design alternatives if a product’s design was 
“essential to the use or purpose”293 and not merely an arbitrary embellishment, 
the Federal Circuit read the case to allow for consideration of alternative designs 
and found that TrafFix did not mean that the Morton-Norwich test should be 
abandoned. 
We do not understand the Supreme Court’s decision in TrafFix to have altered 
the Morton-Norwich analysis. . . .  Nothing in TrafFix suggests that considera-
tion of alternative designs is not properly part of the overall mix, and we do 
not read the Court’s observations in TrafFix as rendering the availability of al-
ternative designs irrelevant.  Rather, we conclude that the Court merely noted 
that once a product feature is found functional based on other considerations 
there is no need to consider the availability of alternative designs, because the 
feature cannot be give trade dress protection merely because there are alterna-
tive designs available.  But that does not mean that the availability of alterna-
tive designs cannot be a legitimate source of evidence to determine whether a 
feature is functional in the first place.294 
The court used as an example a product found to be functional based solely on 
cost or quality factors.295  In that case, alternative designs would be irrelevant 
because as long as the applicant’s design was cheaper or better quality than 
those alternatives, those alternatives would not be competitive alternatives and 
thus, the applicant’s design would still be considered functional.296   
What the court did not adequately explain, however, is why alternative 
designs would ever be evidence of functionality.  If a design was utilitarian and 
not arbitrary, how would alternative configurations make it any less “essential to 
the use or purpose of the article” and therefore functional?297  The Federal Cir-
cuit was implicitly suggesting that even if a product design was useful, it would 
still not be legally “functional” and denied trade dress protection if available 
alternatives existed.  In this respect, the Federal Circuit seemed to be following 
the older formulation of the competitive effects test, which as the Fifth Circuit 
in Eppendorf had recognized, had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Traf-
Fix.  In fact, the Federal Circuit explicitly stated that in making determinations 
of functionality, the TTAB had to “assess the effect registration of a mark would 
have on competition.”298 
  
293 Id. at 1275 (quoting TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001)). 
294 Id. at 1276 (footnote omitted). 
295 Id. at 1276 n.5. 
296 Id. at 1276. 
297 Id. at 1275. 
298 Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Palladino asserts 
that Valu Engineering is correctly decided because it preserves the policy concern with the 
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In Valu Engineering, there was no evidence of alternative designs so the 
TTAB’s finding of functionality was not based on that factor.  The Federal Cir-
cuit did not have to address what would happen in a case where available alter-
natives were used as the basis for finding non-functionality because of the lack 
of competitive effect.  The court’s broad language, however, upholding the con-
tinuing viability of the Morton-Norwich factors and its test for functionality, had 
a substantial impact on how trademark examiners and the TTAB would handle 
functionality decisions.299 
Thus, within a year of the TrafFix decision, there was a split in the cir-
cuits, with the Fifth Circuit taking strictly the TrafFix admonition against the 
use of alternative designs as evidence of functionality, and the Federal Circuit 
essentially ignoring that language and continuing to apply the Morton-Norwich 
standard set out twenty years before.  Within the next year, three other circuits 
had also addressed these issues.300   
  
effect of competition, which Palladino argues the TrafFix court endorsed.  See Palladino, su-
pra note 14, at 1229–31.  It is not clear how the Supreme Court in TrafFix endorsed that view 
in its discussion of utilitarian functionality, either explicitly or even implicitly.  
299 See infra notes 508–618 and accompanying text. 
300 There were also a number of district court decisions which struggled with these issues in the 
first few years after TrafFix.  See, e.g., Maharishi Hardy Blechman Ltd. v. Abercrombie & 
Fitch Co., 292 F. Supp. 2d 535, 547, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (ruling that evidence of alternative 
configurations of baggy, military style pants is admissible to demonstrate non-functionality 
of plaintiff’s design); Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 2d 854, 874 (S.D. 
Ind. 2003) (finding an expired utility patent demonstrated that the convex and circular shape 
of plaintiff’s thermostat cover was functional and holding that evidence of alternative designs 
was irrelevant given that TrafFix “soundly rejected that approach”); Logan Graphic Prods., 
Inc. v. Textus USA, Inc., No. 02 C 1823, 2003 WL 21011746 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2003) (hold-
ing that a patent did not demonstrate functionality of the plaintiff’s mat-cutting boards and 
tools’ overall look and that evidence of design alternatives is relevant to functionality deter-
mination) (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord Corp., 278 F.3d 1268 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); In re 
Dippin’ Dots Patent Litig., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1373–74 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding that 
plaintiff’s flash frozen ice cream trade dress was functional, using both the TrafFix test and 
the Morton-Norwich factors without analyzing their differences or the policies behind them); 
Keystone Consol. Indus. Inc. v. Mid-States Distrib. Co., Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 901, 906 (C.D. 
Ill. 2002) (holding that plaintiff was likely to succeed in its infringement claim based on its 
registered trademark for a red-topped barbed wire fencing product because the defendant had 
insufficient evidence to prove that the product’s configuration was functional as the color 
was “ornamental and decorative,” and did not “enhance the efficacy” of the fencing, nor was 
it  “necessary to compete effectively in the marketplace”); Adidas-Salomon AG v. Target 
Corp., No. CV-01-1582-ST, 2002 WL 31971831, at *9 (D. Or. July 31, 2002) (evaluating the 
configuration of plaintiff’s footwear—three stripes on the side with a flat sole and colored 
heel patch—as a whole to determine functionality and holding that the fact that some features 
were functional was not enough to find the entire configuration functional where a “multi-
tude of design alternatives are available to other shoe manufacturers”);   Metrokane, Inc. v. 
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In Talking Rain Beverage v. South Beach Beverage Co.,301 a case in-
volving a registered trademark for a water bottle design, the Ninth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s summary judgment invaliding the plaintiff’s registra-
tion and dismissing its infringement claim based on its finding that the bottle 
shape was functional and should not therefore have been registered.302  The bot-
tle had smooth sides and a recessed grip which made it easier to hold and to 
place in a bike bottle holder and gave it added structural stability.303  The court 
quoted the TrafFix definition of functionality and then pointed out that it gener-
ally considered four factors similar to those used in Morton-Norwich to deter-
mine functionality.304  Instead of relying on evidence of a utility patent, howev-
er, the Ninth Circuit considered, “whether the design yields a utilitarian advan-
tage.”305  The court recognized that TrafFix had established that there was no 
need to consider design alternatives but observed that “the existence of alterna-
tive designs may indicate whether the trademark itself embodies functional or 
merely ornamental aspects of a product.”306  As applied to the water bottle con-
figuration, the court found that three of the factors supported the district court 
finding of functionality: advertising touting its advantages, manufacturing ad-
vantages, and a utilitarian advantage based on the bottle’s greater structural sta-
bility and easier grip.307  In response to the plaintiff’s argument regarding the 
numerous available design alternatives, the court, citing TrafFix, said that “the 
mere existence of alternatives does not render a product nonfunctional.”308  
Thus, the court upheld the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant in a decision that seems largely consistent with TrafFix and inconsis-
tent with pre-TrafFix decisions which relied on evidence of design alternatives 
to conclude that a particular configuration was non-functional. 
In Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp.,309 the Sixth Circuit also read 
the TrafFix decision at face value and held that evidence of alternative designs 
  
Wine Enthusiast, 160 F. Supp. 2d 633 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that the features of 
corkscrew, shaped like a rabbit’s head, were arbitrary, ornamental, and not functional). 
301 349 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2003). 
302 Id. at 605. 
303 Id. at 602. 
304 Id. at 603. 
305 Id.  The court cited Disc Golf Ass’n, Inc. v. Champion Discs, Inc., 158 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 
1998) as its precedent for using these factors, calling them the Disc Golf factors.  Id.  
306 Id. 
307 Talking Rain Beverage v. S. Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601, 604–05 (9th Cir. 2003). 
308 Id. at 604. 
309 347 F.3d 150 (6th Cir. 2003). 
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was not relevant to the determination of functionality.310  The product in that 
case was a scrapbook with a dual-strap hinge which enabled the pages to lie flat 
while open, facilitating both insertion of additional pages and turning of pages, a 
cover over the spine of the book concealing the strap-hinge, ribbed page edges 
which provided reinforcement, held the staples together, and kept pages sepa-
rated, and a laminated, padded cover.311  The defendant copied this design, and 
the plaintiff claimed trade dress infringement.  Defendant moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that the trade dress was functional, but the district court de-
nied its motion, finding that there were questions of fact with respect to functio-
nality based on evidence of design alternatives.312  The district court, which 
reached its decision prior to the Supreme Court’s opinion in TrafFix, relied on 
the competitive necessity test.313  After the TrafFix decision was handed down, 
the defendant renewed its summary judgment motion, and the district court this 
time granted it on the basis of the TrafFix test which precluded consideration of 
design alternatives.314 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed.  Although the court observed that 
the competitive necessity test was still considered appropriate in cases of aes-
thetic functionality after TrafFix, “[t]he traditional Inwood test for functionality 
is the main rule, and if a product is clearly functional under Inwood, a court 
need not apply the competitive necessity test and its related inquiry concerning 
the availability of alternative designs.”315  As worded, the court seemed to sug-
gest that evidence of alternative designs, although not a required element of 
functionality determination, is admissible where relevant, an approach that 
seemed similar to that taken by the Ninth Circuit in Talking Rain Beverage.  In 
the case before it, however, the Sixth Circuit ruled that it was not error for the 
district court to reject evidence of alternative designs because the lower court 
had correctly concluded that “[t]he dual strap hinge design, the spine cover, 
padded album cover, and reinforced pages are all components that are essential 
to the use of the [plaintiff’s] album and affect its quality.”316 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although an arbitrary, fanci-
ful or distinctive arrangement of individual functional features may be non-
  
310 Id. at 156–57. 
311 Id. at 152. 
312 Id. 
313 Id. at 153. 
314 Id. at 154. 
315 Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 2003). 
316 Id. at 157. 
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functional, that was not the case with the plaintiff’s configuration.317  The scrap-
book’s design was primarily based on its dual-strap hinge, and the other features 
worked in conjunction with that central functional feature to provide the com-
bined benefits promoted by the plaintiff in its advertising.318  Furthermore, the 
court found that plaintiff’s configuration constituted a type of album itself which 
plaintiff could not monopolize.319  Plaintiff’s design “brought together several 
features . . . that allowed the overall album to function optimally,”320 and defen-
dant was free to copy that configuration.  Interestingly, the court pointed out that 
the defendant had used its own logo and other symbols to prevent any consumer 
confusion as to source, implicitly suggesting that, as seen in older cases,321 that 
even though the defendant had the right to copy the design, it did not have the 
right to pass off its product as originating with the plaintiff.322  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit, like the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, read TrafFix as returning the law of 
functionality to a focus on the usefulness of the design at issue and the public’s 
right to copy that design, regardless of design alternatives and “competitive ne-
cessity.” 
The Seventh Circuit shed some light on its views on this issue in Eco 
Manufacturing v. Honeywell International.323  Honeywell sought to enjoin Eco 
from infringing the trade dress of its thermostat design, known as “The 
Round.”324  The configuration had been previously protected by a utility patent 
and a design patent that had expired in 1970, after which Honeywell had sought 
a trademark registration.325  The TTAB initially had denied the registration, con-
cluding that the thermostat’s shape was functional and could not serve as a 
trademark.326  A decade later, Honeywell had again sought a trademark registra-
tion and succeeded.327  The registration later became incontestable.328  Eco pro-
posed to manufacture a similar thermostat model with a circular, convex shape 
and a round dial and sought a declaratory judgment that its product would not 
  
317 Id. at 158, 160. 
318 Id. at 158–59. 
319 Id. at 159. 
320 Id. at 160. 
321 See supra notes 131–145. 
322 Antioch Co. v. Western Trimming Corp., 347 F.3d 150, 160 (6th Cir. 2003). 
323 357 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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infringe Honeywell’s intellectual property rights.329  Honeywell filed a counter-
claim for equitable relief.330 
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s refusal to grant prelimi-
nary injunctive relief in favor of Honeywell based on the court’s conclusion that 
Honeywell was not likely to be able to establish that the circular, convex shape 
of Honeywell’s thermostat was non-functional.331  The Seventh Circuit observed 
that TrafFix treated a utility patent as “strong evidence that the [patent] features 
therein claimed are functional.”332  Therefore, “one who seeks to establish trade 
dress protection [for the features claimed in the expired patent] must carry the 
heavy burden of showing that the feature is not functional.”333  The Seventh Cir-
cuit concluded that Honeywell had failed to meet this burden at this preliminary 
stage in the proceedings.  The court considered Honeywell’s proposition that 
technological advancements to thermostat transistors made the round casing 
merely ornamental in its current capacity and agreed that today there were 
“plenty of other ways to package the controls.”334  Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that there were still several ways in which the round shape could be con-
sidered functional, including that the round shape could result in fewer injuries 
due to the lack of corners and that persons who suffered from arthritis could find 
turning a dial easier than pushing a slider.335  The court found that these theoreti-
cal uses were sufficient to prevent Honeywell from prevailing at this stage of 
litigation.  The court observed that it did not matter whether these uses were 
“essential” to the use of the thermostat because TrafFix did not equate functio-
nality with necessity.336  Rather, “it is enough that a design be useful.”337  Thus, 
  
329 Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2003). 
330 Id. at 651.  
331 Honeywell’s appeal was principally based on its argument that the potential functionality of 
the thermostat’s shape was irrelevant because it had an incontestable registration, which was 
“conclusive evidence . . . [of] the registrant’s exclusive right to use the mark in commerce,” 
preventing others from selling a round thermostat as long as Honeywell made its product.  Id.  
The appellate court disagreed with Honeywell’s assertion, noting that a mark may be can-
celled if it is, or becomes, functional under section 1064(3) of the Lanham Act.  Thus, “in-
contestability does not avoid the question of whether the thermostat’s round shape is func-
tional.  Id.   
332 Id. at 653 (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg.Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001)).  
333 Id.  
334 Id. 
335 Eco Mfg. LLC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 357 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2003). 
336 Id. at 654–55.   
337 Id. (“The Justices [in TrafFix] told us that a design is functional if it is essential to the design 
or it affects the article’s price or quality.”)   
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like the Sixth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit read TrafFix as a 
strict limitation on the availability of trade dress protection for the shape of a 
useful article.     
Similarly, in Shire U.S. Inc. v. Barr Laboratories Inc.,338 the Third Cir-
cuit also relied on TrafFix, concluding that the district court had not erred in 
denying the plaintiff preliminary injunctive relief against defendant’s copying of 
the shape and color of its medication, Adderall, because the plaintiff did not 
seem likely to succeed in proving that the medicine’s configuration was non-
functional.339  The district court had relied on evidence from physicians indicat-
ing that the appearance of a medication enhances patient safety by promoting its 
use.340  The Third Circuit recognized that other cases had rejected such evidence 
to establish functionality, but concluded that those cases were distinguishable 
and that the district court’s finding of functionality here was not clearly errone-
ous.341  The court then observed, “Moreover, we have the benefit of the Supreme 
Court’s most recent trade dress decisions which caution against the over-
extension of trade dress protection.”342  Although this case did not address the 
issue of competitive necessity and design alternatives, it, like the other Courts of 
Appeal (aside from the Federal Circuit), read TrafFix to represent a desire to 
restrict trade dress protection for product configurations and thus, expand the 
meaning of functionality. 
B.  The Last Five Years: What the Split Has Engendered 
In the last five years, there has been very little appellate court case law 
on the issue of functionality.  In General Motors Corp. v. Lanard Toys, Inc.,343 
the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the approach it had taken in Antioch, ruling that 
GM’s evidence of available alternative designs was not relevant to determining 
whether the configuration of a Humvee front grille was functional.344  That same 
year, however, a different panel of the Sixth Circuit muddied these waters by 
seemingly endorsing both approaches from TrafFix and Morton-Norwich.  In 
  
338 329 F.3d 348 (3rd Cir. 2003). 
339 Id. at 358–59. 
340 Id. at 355. 
341 Id. at 358–59. 
342 Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). 
343 468 F.3d 405 (6th Cir. 2006). 
344 Id. at 416–17.  The court went on, however, to conclude that the grille configuration was not 
functional because it was not based on function but “more likely an unrelated afterthought.”  
Id. at 417. 
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Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pacific Bay International,345 the court affirmed the district 
court’s cancellation of the plaintiff’s registered trademarks for the design of its 
fishing line guides on the basis of functionality.346  Fuji not only had three 
trademark registrations for the fishing line configurations; it also had obtained 
both utility and design patents relating to those products.347  The court observed 
that Fuji was attempting to extend its patent monopoly through trademark law 
by seeking trademark protection for the same configuration that had been pro-
tected under its now expired utility patents.348   
Fuji argued in part that the district court had erred in placing too much 
weight on the expired utility patents as evidence of functionality because the 
configurations of its fishing line guides were not part of Fuji’s patent claims.  
The appellate court disagreed, reasoning that as long as the configuration was 
claimed by the patent or within the scope of the doctrine of equivalents349 used 
to determine infringement under patent law, then the lower court did not err by 
using the patent as evidence of the design’s functionality.350   
In its discussion, the appellate court quoted the Federal Circuit’s Valu 
Engineering decision and its continuing use of the Morton-Norwich factors to 
determine functionality in the aftermath of TrafFix.351  The court noted that the 
district court had relied on these factors, including the evidence of the utility 
patents, advertising touting the advantages of Fuji’s design, and the cost effi-
ciencies of the process used to make the fishing line guides according to Fuji’s 
configuration.352  The court did not discuss the availability of alternative designs, 
stating instead that the evidence showed that the guides’ shape was determined 
by their use, and that the shape was widely believed to be a superior design.353  
  
345 461 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2006). 
346 Id. at 690. 
347 Id. at 679. 
348 Id. at 689. 
349 The doctrine of equivalents is “a judicially created theory for finding patent infringement 
when the accused process or product falls outside the literal scope of the patent claims.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (3d ed. 1996).  The purpose of the doctrine was to prevent 
fraud upon a patent by imitators who would change minor details of an invention in an at-
tempt to bring their copy outside the scope of the patent protection.  Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. 
v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950) (holding that “a patentee may invoke this 
doctrine to proceed against the producer of a device if it performs substantially the same 
function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.”) (citation omitted).   
350 Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 687–90 (6th Cir. 2006). 
351 Id. at 685. 
352 Id. at 685–86. 
353 Id. at 686. 
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Thus, while seeming to approve of both Valu Engineering and Morton-Norwich, 
the Sixth Circuit still did not endorse the use of evidence of alternative designs 
to determine that a design is non-functional. 
The Federal Circuit in In re Bose Corp.354 reiterated its view that Traf-
Fix did not mandate a change in the approach to determinations of functionality, 
rejecting the applicant’s contention that res judicata should not apply to an earli-
er TTAB decision which predated TrafFix.355  The court said, “Bose next con-
tends that the Supreme Court’s intervening case, TrafFix, represents a change in 
the law and sets forth additional considerations in a functionality analysis.  We 
do not agree.”356 
Thus, the split in the circuits continues, as a review of the decisions of 
the district courts and the TTAB illustrates.  As will be seen, this means that 
generally, the test for determining whether a product design is functional for 
purposes of registration is different when the test is in the context of trade dress 
infringement. 
1. District Court Struggles 2004–2009 
a.  Treatment of Evidence of Utility Patents 
One of the issues that has concerned the district courts in the aftermath 
of TrafFix and the appellate decisions following is how to determine the extent 
to which a utility patent is evidence of a product configuration’s functionality 
for which trade dress protection is being asserted.  Often district courts are find-
ing themselves involved in questions of patent interpretation to make this de-
termination.  For example, in Keystone Manufacturing Co. v. Jaccard Corp.,357 
the court had to analyze the plaintiff’s utility patent to determine its evidentiary 
value with respect to the functionality of the plaintiff’s meat tenderizer trade 
dress.358  After examining the patent claims, specifications and prosecution his-
tory, the court construed the patent to include the use of certain grooves and 
openings which improved the cleaning and drainage of the meat tenderizers.359  
  
354 No. 74734496, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 293 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476 F.3d 1331 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
355 Id. at *28. 
356 In re Bose Corp., 476 F.3d 1331, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing Valu Eng’g, Inc. v. Rexnord 
Corp., 278 F.3d 1268, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“We do not understand the Supreme Court’s 
decision in TrafFix to have altered the Morton-Norwich (functionality) analysis.”)).   
357 No. 03-CV-648S, 2007 WL 655758 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007). 
358 Id. at *1. 
359 Id. at *4–5. 
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The court then found that the products sold by the plaintiff for which trade dress 
protection was being sought did not, in fact, practice that improvement.360  The 
court concluded that 
[U]nder TrafFix, only a prior utility patent (or patents) that is practiced by the 
product at issue is evidence of functionality for trade dress purposes.  Other-
wise, the direct connection between the expired patent and the claimed trade 
dress that was critical in TrafFix is absent.361 
Because the plaintiff was not practicing its patent in the product configuration 
for which it was seeking trade dress protection, the court held that the patent did 
not carry the evidentiary weight accorded patents under TrafFix.362 
Other courts have focused on whether the product configuration reflects 
the “central advance” of the patent.  In Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Universal Security 
Instruments,363 the plaintiff sued the defendant for both patent and trade dress 
infringement of its ground fault circuit interrupting product design.364  The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that TrafFix established that the 
existence of a patent precluded the plaintiff from proving the non-functionality 
of its trade dress.365  The court disagreed, saying that the TrafFix Court “did not 
prohibit trade dress protection in all cases where features were disclosed in a 
utility patent. . . .  Rather, the Court prohibits affording trade dress protection of 
the central advance of an existing patent.”366  Because the central advance of the 
plaintiff’s patent was not the outward appearance of the ground fault circuit 
interrupting product but the mechanism used in that product, the court con-
cluded that the existence of that patent did not preclude the plaintiff from estab-
lishing non-functionality.367 
On the other hand, in Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc.,368 the court found 
that the central advance of the patent was, in fact, the configuration claimed as 
trade dress.  The plaintiff had brought a declaratory judgment action challenging 
the validity of a trademark registration issued to the defendant for the design of 
  
360 Id. at *5. 
361 Id. at *6. 
362 Id. 
363 304 F. Supp. 2d 726 (D. Md. 2004). 
364 Id. at 731. 
365 Id. at 735. 
366 Id. at 736. 
367 Id. at 736. 
368 Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009). 
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a circular beach towel.369  The court found that the design was a central claim 
advanced by a patent owned by a third party.370  The patent described as one of 
its claims that the circular shape enabled a user to reposition his or her body 
towards the sun without having to move the towel, an advantage also claimed by 
the defendant in its product promotion.371  This invention’s preferred embodi-
ment372 and the application’s brief summary supported the court’s conclusion 
that the towel’s circular shape was the central advance of the patent and thus 
strong evidence of the design’s functionality.373  As a result, the burden shifted 
  
369 It is important to note how the burden of proof is treated differently in cases where there is a 
registered trademark as opposed to unregistered trade dress at issue.  See supra notes 280, 
288.  Registration of a mark is prima facie evidence of its validity, but the mark is still sub-
ject to a number of legal and equitable defenses.  15 U.S.C. § 1115(a).  Where there is a reg-
istered trademark for a product design, there is a presumption that the trademark is valid, and 
the burden is initially on the challenger to establish functionality.  Once the challenger intro-
duces evidence of functionality, such as a utility patent covering the design, then the burden 
shifts to the trademark registrant to prove non-functionality.  See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. 
v. Pacific Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683–84 (6th Cir. 2006); Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at 
*9–10; Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo North America, Inc., No. 3:03-CV-93-H, 
2008 WL 4165456, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008); Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., 
Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d  792, 801–02 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (distinguishing TrafFix where there was 
no statutory presumption of validity and therefore the burden was on the trade dress owner 
initially to prove non-functionality).  On the other hand, where there is no registration and the 
party seeking trade dress protection is suing for infringement on the basis of § 43(a), there is 
no such presumption of validity and the burden is on the suing party to establish non-
functionality.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3).  See, e.g., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32 (2001); Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd., No. CV 05-
0529(JO), 2008 WL 905898, at *6 (E.D.N.Y Mar. 31, 2008); Specialized Seating, Inc. v. 
Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (court erroneously states 
that the burden is on party seeking to invalidate trade dress protection whether it is registered 
or not).  See also Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 
273129, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007) (holding that party seeking protection for unregis-
tered trade dress ultimately has burden of proving non-functionality, but on a motion for 
summary judgment, a party need only raise a question of fact regarding non-functionality). 
370 The court rejected the trademark owner’s arguments that the patent was not relevant because 
it did not belong to the trademark owner or because it was filed after the trademark owner 
began using its trademark.  Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *13 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009). 
371 Id. at *4. 
372 An invention’s preferred embodiment refers to the patent application requirement that “[t]he 
specification . . . set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his in-
vention.”  35 U.S.C. § 112; see also Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. P’ship, 860 F.2d 415, 418 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (“The purpose of the best mode requirement is to ensure that the public, in ex-
change for the rights given the inventor under the patent laws, obtains from the inventor a 
full disclosure of the preferred embodiment of the invention.”  (internal citation omitted)). 
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to the defendant to prove that the design of its beach towel was non-
functional.374 
Similarly, in Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc.,375 the court 
found that the design of Stull’s child proof container cap was the central ad-
vance of a utility patent, making the patent conclusive evidence of the product’s 
functionality.376  The patent in that case described the specific details of the 
cap’s configuration and appearance.377  After reviewing the Supreme Court’s 
functionality analysis in TrafFix, the court examined the patent specifications 
and preferred embodiments as well as the patent claims to determine whether 
the central advance of the patent and the essential feature of the trade dress were 
the same.378  The court reasoned that 
Those elements that make the cap unique, and therefore deserving of the pa-
tent, are the same features for which Stull received a patent.  The cap looks 
the way it does and is designed in a specific way because that “look” is neces-
sary to its operation; the cap’s design furthers the purpose of the cap claimed 
in or protected by the [relevant] patent.  As noted above, that purpose is to 
provide a novel and improved leak resistant locking arrangement for holding 
the cap permanently captive on the container.  Because the look of the cap is 
necessary for its operation and is not ornamental, the essential feature [of the 
trade dress] and the central advance claimed [in the patent] overlap.  Under 
the TrafFix analysis, the locking closure cap is functional as a matter of 
law.379 
The court therefore concluded that Stull had no validly protectable trade dress 
and that Berlin Packaging was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the 
trade dress claim.380   
Other courts have reached different conclusions with respect to the de-
gree to which a patent may bear on the functionality of a particular product de-
sign.  In Clark Tile Co. v. Red Devil, Inc.,381 the district court denied the defen-
  
373 Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *10.  As discussed below, the court went on to consider the 
relevance of design alternatives and ultimately concluded that the trademark owner had not 
produced sufficient evidence of non-functionality to defeat the plaintiff’s motion for sum-
mary judgment.  See infra notes 449–453 and accompanying text. 
374 Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269, at *10 
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009). 
375 381 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
376 Id. at 802. 
377 Id. at 795. 
378 Id. at 799. 
379 Id. at 803–04. 
380 Id. at 805. 
381 No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 2007). 
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dant’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were questions of fact 
regarding the functionality of the plaintiff’s disposable plastic hand trowels.382  
Plaintiff sold the hand trowels, used in connection with spreading adhesives, in 
two different colors, red and white.383  The red ones had a 1/8 inch notch whe-
reas the white ones had a 3/32 inch notch.384  Plaintiff sought protection for the 
trowels’ overall configuration, including their shape and color, which defendant 
allegedly had copied.385  The plaintiff owned a patent, however, which covered 
several different embodiments of the trowels’ shape and configuration, includ-
ing some claims which specifically described a trapezoidal shape for the blade, 
an arcuate shape for the handle, reinforcing ridges along the handle and blade, 
an insert plate recessed into an opening in the blade, and notched edges on the 
blade.386  The patent included several illustrations of various embodiments, in-
cluding those which showed different features and triangular shaped notches in 
the blade.387  Defendant asserted that the trade dress of plaintiff’s trowels in-
cluded these same features and that each feature was functional and thus, not 
protectable as trade dress.388 
In analyzing the defendant’s functionality assertion, the court first con-
sidered each component part of the trade dress.389  The court reviewed not only 
the evidence that the triangular notches or serrations were part of the patent 
claims, but also testimony from the plaintiff’s president that the size of the notch 
determined how thickly the trowel would spread the adhesives and thus could be 
considered a gauge to allow users to control a layer’s application.390  Despite this 
evidence, the court concluded that questions of fact remained with respect to the 
functionality of the notches.391  The court noted that the patent claims did not 
require any specific type or shape of notch, but, in fact, said that shapes other 
than a triangular shape could be used to spread adhesive.392  Thus, the court 
  
382 Id. at *7, *8. 
383 Id. at *1. 
384 Id. 
385 Id. 
386 Id. at *2–3. 
387 Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *3 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 7, 2007). 
388 Id. at *3–4. 
389 Id. at *6. 
390 Id. at *6–7. 
391 Id. at *7. 
392 Id. 
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found that the patent claim did not conclusively establish that triangular notches 
were functional for purposes of trade dress protection.393 
The court next addressed the defendant’s assertion that the insert plate 
was functional because it was also described in one of the patent claims.394  The 
court relied on language in the patent which stated that “the use of the insert 
plate . . . is not essential to the invention”395 to conclude that the patent itself did 
not establish this feature’s functionality despite the fact that the patent went on 
to say that the plate “adds strength to the assembly . . . protects the user’s hand 
from the material being troweled, and . . . provides a surface on which informa-
tion such as advertising, instructions, and the like may be placed . . . .”396  The 
court observed: 
The fact that the insert plate serves some use or purpose does not necessarily 
mean that it is essential to the use or purpose of the plaintiff’s spread-
ers. . . .  This is particularly true here because the [relevant] patent expressly 
states that the feature is not essential.  Simply put, defendants rely too heavily 
on the presumption that a feature disclosed in the claims of a utility patent 
constitutes strong evidence of functionality.  This Court finds that such a pre-
sumption is overridden where the language of the utility patent expressly 
states that the feature in question is not essential to the invention.397 
The court’s reliance on the plaintiff’s use of the words “not essential” in the 
patent’s description to reach the legal conclusion that the feature was not essen-
tial and thus non-functional seems inappropriate.  The wording chosen by a par-
ty in describing its invention for patent purposes should not have such weight in 
the completely separate determination of trade dress protection. 
The court also considered whether the insert plate affected the cost or 
quality of the plaintiff’s trowels and concluded that there were questions of fact 
regarding that issue.398  Because there were questions of fact regarding the func-
tionality of both the triangular notches and the insert plate, the court said that it 
could not determine for summary judgment purposes whether the overall look of 
the trowels was functional.399  Other courts have often found that even if every 
feature of a particular product configuration is functional, the overall combina-
  
393 Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *7 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 7, 2007). 
394 Id. at *7–8. 
395 Id. at *7. 
396 Id. 
397 Id. at *8.   
398 Id. at *7–8. 
399 Clark Tile Co., Inc. v. Red Devil, Inc., No. 04 C 2928, 2007 WL 4335436, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
Dec. 7, 2007). 
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tion of those features can be non-functional.400  The court here failed to address 
that possibility. 
Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Technologies, Inc.401 is another deci-
sion reflecting the difficulties faced by the district courts when deciding the 
weight to be given to a utility patent in functionality determinations. In that 
case, the plaintiff sought protection for the configuration of a battery pack at-
tached to an electric fence dog collar.402  The design’s key element asserted by 
the plaintiff was an indentation formed by two raised ridges that allowed a coin 
to be inserted to lock and unlock the battery pack.403  The plaintiff owned a pa-
tent that included a claim for an external slot that would allow a coin to be in-
serted for purposes of locking and unlocking the battery pack.  In the figure illu-
strating this claim, however, only an indentation was depicted, not the two 
raised ridges actually used in plaintiff’s product.404  When the defendant’s copy 
included the raised ridges, the plaintiff sued under section 43(a) for trade dress 
infringement.405  The defendant moved for summary judgment, and the court 
granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff had failed to raise a genuine issue 
of fact with respect to the non-functionality of the coin slot configuration and 
  
400 E.g., Taco Cabana Int’l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991), aff’d, 
505 U.S. 763 (1992) (holding that “functional features cannot be protected, . . . but a particu-
lar arbitrary combination of functional features, the combination of which is not itself func-
tional, properly enjoys protection.”  (internal citation omitted)); Tools USA & Equip. Co. v. 
Champ Frame Straightening Equip., Inc., 87 F.3d 654, 658 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that a 
combination of mail-order catalog features was nonfunctional and stating that “the critical 
functionality inquiry is not whether each individual component of the trade dress is function-
al, but rather whether the trade dress as a whole is functional”); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc’s 
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[F]unctional elements that are sepa-
rately unprotectable can be protected together as part of a trade dress.”); LeSportsac, Inc. v. 
K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding that the combination of potentially 
functional lightweight luggage features was nonfunctional and protectable).  See also 
MCCARTHY,  supra note 21, § 7:76, at 7-230  (4th ed. 1996) (“When the thing claimed as 
trade dress or a trademark consists of a combination of individual design features, then it is 
the functionality of the overall combination that controls.  Thus, an overall design combina-
tion of individually functional items is protectable because while the pieces are individually 
functional, this particular combination of those pieces is not functional.”) (citing 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17, cmt. b (1995)).  See also infra note 506 
for a discussion of recent cases addressing this issue. 
401 No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007). 
402 Id. at *1. 
403 Id. 
404 Id. at *2. 
405 Id. at *1. 
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that the patent created a “heavy presumption of functionality” that the plaintiff 
had failed to rebut.406  
In analyzing the effect of the patent, the court addressed the plaintiff’s 
assertion that the patent claims did not cover the coin slot as configured by the 
plaintiff in its products, i.e., with raised ridges, and therefore the patent did not 
have the strong evidentiary effect suggested by TrafFix.407  The court disagreed 
and pointed out that in TrafFix, the plaintiff’s actual product looked different 
from the invention disclosed in the patent, a fact that was of no consequence to 
the TrafFix court.408  The court said that the burden was on the plaintiff to dem-
onstrate that the patent claims did not cover the plaintiff’s coin slot configura-
tion and that no evidence had been presented to so demonstrate.409  After consi-
dering other arguments raised with respect to functionality,410 the court con-
cluded that the defendant was entitled to summary judgment based on the func-
tionality and hence non-protectability of the plaintiff’s product design.411 
The dangers implicated by an overly broad reading of the effect of a pa-
tent were recognized in another recent district court opinion, New Colt Holding 
Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida.412  In that case, plaintiff sought protection for 
the overall configuration of its revolver.413  Defendant asserted that the revolv-
er’s features were “dedicated to the public” and not protectable because they had 
been depicted in drawings of utility patents which had expired.414  The court 
reasoned that the patent law principle which provided that matter not claimed in 
a patent was considered dedicated to the public had no application to matters of 
trade dress.415  The court said: 
Indeed, such a rule would exclude trade dress protection for any shape or de-
sign visible in a patent specification regardless of the functionality of that fea-
  
406 Id. at *7. 
407 Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129, at *7 
(N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007). 
408 Id. at *6.  See also Berlin Packaging v. Stull Techs., 381 F.Supp. 2d 792, 800 (N.D. Ill. 2005) 
(dicta).  Professor Weinberg points out that the patent at issue in TrafFix was read this broad-
ly because the patent holder had successfully established patent infringement by a different 
user whose configuration of the invention was similar to that of the defendant in the TrafFix 
case itself.  Weinberg, supra note 16, at 43. 
409 Invisible Fence, 2007 WL 273129, at *3. 
410 See infra notes 443447, 499–502 and accompanying text. 
411 Invisible Fence, 2007 WL 273129, at *8. 
412 312 F.Supp. 2d 195 (D. Conn. 2004). 
413 Id. at 201. 
414 Id. at 212, n.10.   
415 Id. at 212. 
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ture and would seem to cut against, if not render obsolete, the Supreme 
Court’s statement about the significance of utility patents for determining 
functionality.  A utility patent would not be strong evidence of functionality, 
but conclusive evidence of the unavailability of trade dress protection.  Ac-
cordingly, it is most in line with trademark law to apply a functionality analy-
sis, which addresses the concerns surrounding the perpetual nature of trade 
dress protection applied to a utilitarian design, rather than fashion a potentially 
overbroad rule and exclude designs otherwise protectable under the principles 
of trade dress law. 416 
These recent cases indicate how the lower courts are being drawn into 
interpretations of patents and their scope in trying to evaluate the weight to be 
given to a patent in determinations of functionality.  Courts struggle to define 
the central advance of a patent and what its claims cover; they struggle to de-
termine whether the trade dress actually practices those claims and advances.417  
It seems that the TrafFix decision has created an unnecessary level of confusion 
as courts attempt to analyze the meaning of a patent in cases which really have 
nothing or little to do with patent law.  Moreover, this heavy focus on the patent 
language seems to place far too much weight on the subtleties of a patent in-
stead of the purposes of the doctrine of functionality in the context of trade dress 
law.  As Judge Rich recognized years ago, the right to copy a product belongs to 
the public independent of patent law.418  The fact that a design is, or was, cov-
ered by a patent only means that that right is restricted for some limited period 
while the patent endures; it does not define or restrict that underlying public 
interest in competition and the right to copy the products of others as long as 
one does not engage in passing off those products as one’s own. 
b.  Evidence of Alternative Designs 
The lower courts are also struggling with the question of whether and 
when it is appropriate to consider the availability of alternative designs.  In cir-
cuits where the appellate courts have addressed the issue, the district courts have 
tried to follow the relevant controlling precedent.  For example, in Maker’s 
Mark Distillery v. Diageo North America,419 the Kentucky district court, follow-
ing Sixth Circuit precedent which allowed, but did not require, evidence of al-
  
416 Id. at 212 n.10. 
417 See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 362–64 (criticizing TrafFix for the complexity costs it will 
engender by involving the federal courts outside the Federal Circuit in matters of patent 
claims interpretation). 
418 See In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496, 501 (C.C.P.A. 1961); text at supra note 92. 
419 No. 3:03-CV-93-H, 2008 WL 4165456 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008). 
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ternative designs on the issue of functionality, ruled that summary judgment was 
inappropriate given that the possibility of alternative designs raised sufficient 
questions of fact with respect to the functionality of the configuration of a wax 
seal used on liquor bottles.420  In that case, Maker’s did not have a patent on the 
design, but it did have a trademark registration for a “‘wax-like coating covering 
the cap of the bottle and trickling down the neck of the bottle in a freeform irre-
gular pattern.’”421  The defendant copied the configuration and claimed that it 
was functional in that the seal made the bottles tamper-proof in compliance with 
federal regulations, and preserved the contents of the bottles.422  The plaintiff 
asserted that it used a patented twist cap, not the wax seal for those purposes, 
but the court said what mattered was whether plaintiff’s trademark would pre-
vent competitors from using that feature in a useful way, not whether plaintiff 
used the seal for those purposes.423   
To the extent the defendant was relying on the tamper-proof function, 
the court said that “given the variety of alternative ways of complying with the 
tamperproof requirement, it seems unlikely that the evidence would show” that 
the wax coating was cheaper or a superior way of fulfilling that purpose.424  
With respect to protecting the liquor in the bottles, however, the court said that 
there might be fewer alternatives available to accomplish that purpose and thus 
more evidence was needed to determine the functionality of that configura-
tion.425  Thus, summary judgment was not appropriate.  As there was no patent 
or advertising touting the advantages of the plaintiff’s wax seal in this case, the 
court’s functionality analysis rested almost entirely on the availability of alter-
native designs and their relative cost and quality. 
On the other hand, in Kodiak Products Co. v. Tie Down, Inc.,426 the 
Texas district court, following Fifth Circuit precedent, rejected the relevance of 
alternative designs in concluding that plaintiff was not likely to succeed on the 
merits of its trade dress infringement claim and thus, not entitled to preliminary 
injunctive relief against the defendant.427  Plaintiff manufactured hydraulic disc 
  
420 Id. at *7. 
421 Id. at *1.  
422 Id. 
423 Id. at *3. 
424 Id. at *5 (quoting Fuji Kogyo Co. v. Pacific Bay Intern., Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 685 (6th Cir. 
2006)).  
425 Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-93-H, 2008 WL 
4165456, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 5, 2008). 
426 No. Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004). 
427 Id. at *4. 
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brakes with a triangular piston housing design.428  Defendant copied this pattern, 
claiming that it was functional and not protectable as trade dress.429  Plaintiff’s 
principal response was that its design was arbitrary and that defendant could use 
other arrangements and angles which would achieve the same purpose.430  The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s reliance on alternative designs: 
Simply because a manufacturer can achieve the same result through an alter-
native method does not show that a particular product feature is non-
functional.  Rather, a court must determine whether a particular placement 
serves an essential function—in essence, whether that configuration is the rea-
son the device works or whether it affects the cost or quality of the prod-
uct. . . .  An examination of alternative design possibilities is irrelevant under 
the traditional test.431 
The court then considered evidence that the locations used for the product’s 
bleed screws and the intake valve were, in fact, the optimal locations, making it 
unlikely that the overall configuration would be proven non-functional.432  
In two recent district court decisions from the Ninth Circuit, there were 
differing views on the treatment of evidence of the availability of alternative 
designs.  In Too Marker Products, Inc. v. Shinhan Art Materials, Inc.,433 the 
court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that the 
plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits due to the functionality of the 
registered trade dress of its art markers.434  The parties agreed that the design 
was not “essential” to the purpose of the markers, but the defendant asserted that 
the design did affect the “quality” of the markers, thus fitting within the Quali-
tex definition of functionality.435  Defendant asserted that the square body of the 
markers prevented them from rolling off work surfaces and that the rounded 
ends, colored bands and indented caps were advantageous in terms of comfort, 
color identification, and cap storage.436  The court found this argument sufficient 
for purposes of defeating the motion for preliminary relief and found that plain-
tiff’s evidence of alternative designs was not enough to overcome defendant’s 
  
428 There were two bleed screws at the 10:00 and 2:00 positions and an intake plug at the 6:00 
position.  Id. at *1.   
429 See id. at *3. 
430 Id. at *4. 
431 Id. at *5. 
432 Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No. Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353, 
at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004). 
433 No. CV 09-1013-PK, 2009 WL 4718733 (D. Or. Dec. 3, 2009). 
434 Id. at *5. 
435 Id. at *3. 
436 Id. at *4. 
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evidence of functionality.437  The court observed that TrafFix and Talking Rain 
had “significantly reduc[ed] the importance placed upon alternative designs.”438 
Similarly, in Atlas Equipment Co. v. Weir Slurry Group, Inc.,439 the dis-
trict court adhered strictly to the TrafFix test for functionality in finding that the 
design of a slurry pump was functional.  Weir, the party asserting trade dress 
protection, argued that the product’s exterior design did not have any bearing on 
its ability to pump slurry; Atlas argued that, in fact, the pump’s design had some 
utilitarian advantages relating to its stability, bearing load capacity, smaller 
footprint, need for fewer bolts and ease of manufacturing, among others.440  The 
court found that Atlas’ evidence was sufficient to establish that the design of the 
pump was de jure functional and that the fact that it may not affect the central 
purpose of the product, i.e., pumping slurry, was not relevant.441  On the ques-
tion of the relevance of available alternative designs, the court, citing TrafFix 
and Talking Rain, concluded that given the evidence of the product design’s 
utilitarian advantages, “there is no need to address the availability of alternative 
designs.”442 
Where there is no clear appellate court precedent dealing with the relev-
ance of available alternative design evidence, the district courts in those circuits 
have sometimes reached conflicting results, as two decisions from the Seventh 
Circuit illustrate.  The plaintiff in Invisible Fence443 rested its argument that the 
plaintiff’s battery pack design was non-functional on the fact that there were 
alternative configurations that could be used to lock and unlock the battery 
pack.444  In response to the defendant’s assertion that TrafFix precluded the court 
from considering the availability of alternative designs in determinations of 
functionality, the Indiana district court reviewed the split in the circuits and ob-
served that the Seventh Circuit had not yet ruled on this issue.445  The district 
court concluded, however, that it was “apparent from TrafFix and the resulting 
  
437 Id. 
438 Id. at *4.  
439 No. C07-1358Z, 2009 WL 4670154 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2009). 
440 Id. at *9. 
441 Id. 
442 Id. at *10.  The court, however, went on to address the evidence of alternative designs that 
Weir had submitted, finding that it was merely speculative and unsupported.  Id. at *11.  See 
also Minemyer v. B-Roc Representatives, Inc., 2009 WL 5275826 (N.D. Ill. October 26, 
2009) (where plaintiff admitted that each component of its plastic pipe couplers was func-
tional, evidence of alternative designs was not probative of non-functionality). 
443 No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2007) 
444 Id. at *4. 
445 Id. at *4–5. 
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jurisprudence that if functionality can be conclusively established under the 
traditional rule, then courts need not consider a plaintiff’s design alternatives.”446  
As discussed above,447 because the court found that evidence of a utility patent 
established that the design of the battery pack coin slot was functional, the court 
found that it did not need to consider the potential design alternatives. 
In contrast, another district court within the Seventh Circuit did consider 
the availability of alternative designs despite the fact that it also found that the 
configuration of the allegedly infringed product, a circular beach towel, was 
covered by the central claim of a utility patent.448  In Franek,449 the Illinois dis-
trict court quoted and relied on the language from Valu Engineering, conclud-
ing, “The Court finds the Federal Circuit’s synthesis to be sensible and thus will 
consider evidence of alternative designs to probe whether the circular towel is 
functional in the first instance.”450  The court then found that in fact the evidence 
of alternative designs was further indication of the functionality of the circular 
configuration: 
[B]each towels could be made in any design, and if large enough, a sunbather 
would not have to reposition the towel while following the sun.  However, the 
undisputed evidence before the Court indicates that there still are significant 
advantages to the circular form. . . .  If a circular design admittedly is the most 
efficient shape, then any other manufacturer of towels permitting rotation with 
the sun would be forced to manufacture sub-optimal towels.451  
As the court further observed, “To be sure, a circular shape is not as essential to 
the functionality of a beach towel as an oval shape is to the functionality of a 
football.  But it need not be indispensable; it is enough that circularity is one of 
a few superior designs for a beach towel.”452 
Thus, unlike the Invisible Fence court which found that evidence of the 
utility patent conclusively established functionality and made it unnecessary to 
consider design alternatives, the Franek court considered both types of evidence 
in concluding that the circular beach towel configuration was functional.  In 
addition, it looked at the other factors identified in Morton-Norwich: the use of 
advertising to tout those functional advantages and the effect of the design fea-
ture on the cost and quality of the towel.  These cases can be distinguished in 
  
446 Id. at *5. 
447 See supra notes 406–408.  
448 See supra notes 368–373. 
449 Nos. 08-CV-0058, 08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009). 
450 Id. at *16. 
451 Id. 
452 Id. at *17. 
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that there was a trademark registration for the beach towel configuration in Fra-
nek, putting the initial burden of proof of functionality on the party seeking to 
invalidate the trademark, and no registration for the battery pack in Invisible 
Fence, placing the burden of proving non-functionality on the party seeking to 
protect the trade dress.  The Franek court, however, relied on the utility patent 
evidence to shift the burden to the trademark owner to establish non-
functionality.  It then turned to the Morton-Norwich factors in determining that 
the trademark owner had not met its burden and the party challenging the 
trademark was therefore entitled to summary judgment.  Those procedural dis-
tinctions, however, do not explain entirely the greater willingness of one court 
to look at design alternatives in the face of its own conclusion that the configu-
ration at issue was covered by the central advance of a utility patent.  That fact 
alone would seem to have been sufficient to establish functionality on the me-
rits, not just for burden shifting purposes.453 
In John M. Middleton, Inc. v. Swisher International, Inc.,454 the Penn-
sylvania district court engaged in a fairly superficial analysis of the functionality 
of a cigar configuration.  Plaintiff claimed trade dress protection for the follow-
ing features: the octagonally shaped ivory-colored plastic tip, the specific length 
and diameter of the cigar, the dark brown wrapper with pink and bone-colored 
spots, a straight seam holding the wrapper together, and a black cigar band with 
gold trim on the edge.455  The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing 
that each element was functional and therefore the design itself was unprotecta-
ble.456  The court said, “The availability of alternative designs is one factor to be 
considered in determining whether a feature is functional, though alternative 
designs need not be considered if the feature has been conclusively shown to be 
functional pursuant to one of the [tests identified in TrafFix],”457 and relied on 
both TrafFix and Valu Engineering as support.  In its analysis of the case before 
it, the court then in fact considered design alternatives in reaching the conclu-
sion that there were questions of fact going to the issue of functionality that pre-
  
453 See also Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 472 F.Supp. 2d 999, 1010–11 
(N.D. Ill. 2007) (registered trademark for folding chair design held invalid after trial based on 
functionality; court relied both on evidence of utility patents covering the various elements of 
the chair’s configuration as well as evidence based on the other Morton-Norwich factors, 
stating that “[a]lternative designs . . . may be relevant with regard to proving functionality as 
it affects use, cost, or quality.”). 
454 No. 03-3908, 2006 WL 2129209 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 2006). 
455 Id. at *4.   
456 Id. at *5. 
457 Id. 
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vented summary judgment.458  The court considered each individual feature of 
the plaintiff’s cigars separately and found that the defendant had failed to estab-
lish functionality with respect to each element.459  For example, in terms of the 
cigar’s shape and dimensions and the dimensions of the cigar’s tip, the court 
said that the plaintiff had offered evidence of numerous alternatives and that the 
defendant had not demonstrated that changing those features would affect the 
use or cost of the cigar.460  Thus, at least for purposes of defeating a motion for 
summary judgment, the court was content to rely on evidence of design alterna-
tives to create questions of fact on the issue of functionality.  The court did not 
address any of the underlying policy issues implicated by the functionality doc-
trine or the larger questions of trade dress protection of product designs. 
In comparison, in New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Florida, 
Inc.,461 the Connecticut district court engaged in an in-depth analysis of available 
alternative designs in considering summary judgment on the question of wheth-
er plaintiff’s revolver design was functional.  After reviewing TrafFix and the 
split in the circuits on the relevance of alternative design evidence, the court 
concluded that the law no longer required consideration of design alternatives 
but did not prohibit it either.462 
[U]nder the present circumstances and given the nature of the product, the ex-
istence of design alternatives is helpful for determining whether a particular 
design is truly necessary to the way the revolver works. . . .  The mere exis-
tence of other designs does not satisfy that requirement as those designs may 
be functionally deficient by comparison.  Accordingly, for design alternatives 
to be probative, Plaintiffs must produce evidence that could demonstrate that 
the alternative design would be equally effective as a functional matter.463 
The court then engaged in a feature-by-feature analysis of plaintiff’s revolver 
configuration, concluding that there was no question of fact with respect to the 
functionality of some features and that there were questions of fact with oth-
ers.464 
For example, the defendant asserted that the shape, style, composition 




460 John M. Middleton, Inc. v. Swisher Int’l, Inc., No. 03-3908, 2006 WL 2129209, at *5 (E.D. 
Pa. July 26, 2006). 
461 312 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. Conn. 2004). 
462 Id. at 212–14. 
463 Id. at 214. 
464 Id. at 214–19. 
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handling of the revolver, worked more effectively, and prevented oxidation.465  
The court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to raise a question of fact re-
garding this functionality as it did not establish that alternative choices would 
work as well.466  On the other hand, the court found that there were questions of 
fact regarding functionality with respect to the angle of the grip frame in relation 
to the frame and barrel of the revolver.467  Whereas the plaintiff asserted that the 
angle was cosmetic and not related to how the gun worked, the defendant as-
serted that the angle affected how the shooter would point the barrel of the 
gun.468  The court found that it was not clear that the angle did not serve both a 
useful and a cosmetic purpose and thus, could not find it functional or non-
functional for purposes of summary judgment.469  The court engaged in a similar 
step-by-step analysis of each element of the revolver configuration, considering 
plaintiff’s asserted design alternatives and finding some elements functional as a 
matter of law and finding questions of fact regarding the functionality of others.  
In the end, the court held that it was inappropriate to grant summary judgment 
with respect to the overall design of the revolver, since there were factual dis-
putes requiring resolution with at least some of the gun’s features. 
In Sharn, Inc. v. Wolfe Tory Medical, Inc.,470 the Florida district court 
denied a preliminary injunction to Wolfe Tory because it found insufficient evi-
dence to support its claim that the trade dress of its medical devices was non-
functional.471  The court found that each of the device’s individual features 
served “a function that is essential to the overall use or purpose”472 of those de-
vices, additionally demonstrated by Wolfe Tory’s advertising touting the fea-
tures’ advantages.  In response, Wolfe Tory argued that “the sizes and geometry 
of the various features . . . were chosen arbitrarily, and that the combina-
tion . . . created a finished product with a distinctive size and geometry . . . .”473  
Wolfe asserted that there were numerous alternative features and arrangements 
  
465 Id. at 219.   
466 Id. 




470 No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009). 
471 Id. at *8, *9. 
472 Id. at *4. 
473 Id. at *5. 
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which would serve the same functions and thus its arrangement was non-
functional.474 
The court ruled that it was proper to consider alternative designs “be-
cause in order to determine if a product feature is essential to the use or purpose 
of a product then logically the Court should consider other available like fea-
tures that may accomplish the same purpose of a product without affecting the 
cost or quality of the product.”475  The court failed to address how this conclu-
sion was consistent with TrafFix.  In the end, however, the court’s rule did not 
affect the outcome in this case because it concluded that Wolfe Tory’s evidence 
did not demonstrate “a single alternative design which would have a similar cost 
and quality of the [Wolfe Tory] devices.”476  Thus, Wolfe Tory had failed to 
meet its burden of establishing a likelihood of success on the merits of its trade 
dress claim.477 
Most of these cases were decided on the basis of summary judgment 
motions where any question of fact regarding functionality would be sufficient 
to deny relief, but in Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Products, Ltd.478 the 
district court had the benefit of a full trial in reaching its conclusion that the 
plaintiff had failed to demonstrate the non-functionality of the its vacuum clean-
er design.479  The defendant conceded that the design elements were not essential 
to the use or purpose of the vacuum cleaner, but argued that they affected the 
cost or quality of the product and were therefore functional.480  The court had 
allowed evidence of alternative designs, but did not find it persuasive on the 
issue of functionality. 
In adducing evidence of alternative designs, Electrolux demonstrated that it 
could have chosen a design that would produce a cheaper and more efficient 
vacuum. . . .  For example, instead of using a chrome hood on the base assem-
  
474 Id. 
475 Id. at *6.  
476 Sharn, Inc. v. Wolfe Tory Med., Inc., No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503, at *7 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009).  
477 In Predator Int’l, Inc. v. Gamo Outdoor USA, Inc., No. 09-cv-00970-PAB-KMT, 2009 WL 
3526497 (D. Colo. Oct. 22, 2009), the Colorado district court failed to discuss or even cite 
TrafFix or Inwood in a case involving the trade dress of airgun pellets.  It relied largely on 
the fact that there were a number of design alternatives available in concluding that the evi-
dence did not support a finding that the trade dress was functional, although the court denied 
the plaintiff’s request for a preliminary injunction based on insufficient evidence of second-
ary meaning and likelihood of confusion.   
478 No. CV 05-0528(JO), 2008 WL 905898 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). 
479 Id. at *17. 
480 Id. at *17. 
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bly, Electrolux could have produced a more durable and less expensive prod-
uct by using a plastic hood. . . .  I can fairly draw an inference from Electro-
lux’s choice to use chrome for the hood that it viewed as worthwhile the trade-
off of cost and durability for what it deemed to be a more distinctive product 
design.  But such an inference does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that 
the design of the [Electrolux] hood, when combined with the other elements, 
is non-functional.481 
The court then found that that product’s design did affect the overall cost and 
quality of the product and was therefore functional, as discussed below.482 
The varied approaches to the treatment of alternative designs, reflected 
both in the split in the circuit courts as well as the decisions of the various dis-
trict courts, is troubling and confusing.  It remains unclear whether such evi-
dence will be admissible at all, and if so, how it will be used in determinations 
of functionality.   
c.   Definitions of Functionality 
Although the district court cases quote the “essential to use or purpose 
or affect cost or quality” test of TrafFix, it is revealing to see how those courts 
interpret and apply that language.  For example, some interpret the language to 
require that the plaintiff prove that other configurations will serve the same 
function as well as the plaintiff’s design in order to be considered functional.  
As the court said in New Colt Holding,483 “[F]or design alternatives to be proba-
tive, Plaintiffs must produce evidence that could demonstrate that the alternative 
design would be equally effective as a functional matter.”484  If equivalent op-
tions are available, the design will be considered non-functional.  Only when 
there is no equivalent, and the plaintiff’s design is the best, will that design be 
considered functional.  This is similar to the approach in Wolfe Tory,485 where 
the court wanted evidence that there were alternative designs that did not affect 
“the devices’ optimal functionality” or “their cost and/or quality”486 before treat-
ing a design as non-functional.  It is not enough that there are alternatives; those 
alternatives must be comparable in functionality, cost and quality to the design 
for which protection is being sought. 
  
481 Id. at *9. 
482 See infra notes 493–505 and accompanying text. 
483 312 F. Supp. 2d. 195 (D. Conn. 2004). 
484 Id. at 214 (emphasis added). 
485 No. 8:09-cv-706-T-33AEP, 2009 WL 3416503 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2009). 
486 Id. at *6. 
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Other courts do not require that the design be the best in order to be 
considered functional.  For example, in Specialized Seating,487 the court said,  
To be considered functional, the [design at issue] does not need to be the best 
design available.  All that must be shown is that the design is one of a few su-
perior designs for its purpose or an improvement to the quality of the product.  
Precluding a finding of functionality for a feature unless it was the best design 
would essentially allow the creation of a monopoly for all but the best version 
of a functional feature.488   
Under this approach, in order for the design to be considered non-functional and 
protectable, the plaintiff would need to show that enough other designs exist to 
give competitors options for producing products to serve the same function.  
Even if the plaintiff’s design is not the best, if there are too few competitive 
options, these courts would deny the plaintiff trade dress protection.  Thus, in 
Specialized Seating, because the court found that there were only a limited 
number of ways to design the back panels of folding chairs for strength, comfort 
and spacing, it denied trade dress protection to that design.489 
The Franek court took yet a different approach.  In determining whether 
a beach towel’s circular configuration was functional, the court said that “the 
correct inquiry is whether or not the article reflects a utilitarian design of a utili-
tarian object.”490  The court interpreted this to mean that it should determine 
whether the configuration was selected for a useful purpose.491  If the design was 
chosen to serve a utilitarian purpose, then it should be considered functional.492  
Under this approach, far more designs will be found to be functional as there is 
no requirement that the design be superior or one of limited options.493   
  
487 472 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
488 Id. at 1013 (citations omitted).  See also Franek v. Walmart Stores, Inc., Nos. 08-CV-0058, 
08-CV-1313, 2009 WL 674269, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2009) (“[A] design need not be the 
best designs available for its purpose; it need only be one of a few superior designs.”).  
489 Professor Thurmon argues that the equivalent design standard is preferable, as it best ensures 
that competition will be protected.  See Thurmon supra, note 16, at 300–02. 
490 Franek, 2009 WL 674269, at *11. 
491 Id. 
492 Id. 
493 In its actual analysis of a circular beach towel’s functionality, the court relied in large part on 
evidence of both a patent and alternative designs to conclude that the configuration was not 
only useful, but superior for achieving its purpose of allowing sunbathers to reposition them-
selves without moving the towel.  Thus, the court seemed to apply a higher standard than the 
one it had at first articulated as described above. 
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That approach is also similar to the one taken in Berlin Packaging,494 
where the court defined the test for functionality as requiring the party seeking 
trade dress protection to show that the feature “is only an incidental, arbitrary or 
ornamental aspect of the device.”495  Because the child-proof container cap at 
issue was “not a whimsical design” but “designed to address specific functions,” 
it was held to be functional.”496  Even the additional features such as the words 
“pry open” and an arrow on the cap were considered functional because they 
were “essential for the use of the device—they instruct the user of the device 
how to operate it.”497  The court did not consider whether the design was supe-
rior or one of a few design choices available, but instead focused on the fact that 
the design was utilitarian and not ornamental.498 
In Invisible Fence,499 the court also considered whether the plaintiff had 
demonstrated that the ridges of its battery pack coin slot were ornamental, inci-
dental or arbitrary to its purpose of enabling users to lock and unlock the prod-
uct, but only after it concluded that the patent established the essential functio-
nality of the overall configuration.500  The court then discussed, in dicta, the gen-
eral standard for proving functionality, saying that the test was not whether the 
configuration served a use or purpose, but whether it was “essential to the use or 
purpose.”501  The court compared this to the distinction made between de facto 
and de jure functionality by some courts, where de jure, or legal functionality, 
required not only that the design was useful but that the product worked better 
in that configuration.502   
  
494 Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792 (N.D. Ill. 2005). 
495 Id. at 797. 
496 Id. at 802. 
497 Id. at 804. 
498 See also Atlas Equip. Co., LLC v. Weir Slurry Group, Inc., No. C07-1358Z, 2009 WL 
4670154, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 15, 2009) (a product design is de jure functional where 
product design features all have a utilitarian function, even if those features do not contribute 
to the central purpose of the product);  Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No. 
Civ.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 WL 2599353, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004) (design of pis-
ton housing not shown to be arbitrary in relation to its purpose even if other alternatives are 
available; design is functional if it is “the reason the device works or whether it affects the 
cost or quality of the product”). 
499 Invisible Fence, Inc. v. Perimeter Techs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-361, 2007 WL 273129 (N.D. 
Ind. Jan. 26, 2007). 
500 Id. at *2, *4, *6. 
501 Id. at *7.  The court had concluded that plaintiff’s patent established the essential functionali-
ty of the battery pack’s overall configuration.   
502 Id. at *7 n.11. 
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Finally, the Imig503 court also seemed to apply a rather lenient test for 
functionality in concluding that the configuration of a vacuum cleaner was func-
tional.  In that case, the court was not applying the “essential to use or purpose” 
prong of the TrafFix test but instead the “affects cost or quality” prong, as the 
parties agreed that the design did not serve a useful purpose.504  The court’s 
analysis of the evidence seemed to place an extremely heavy burden on the 
plaintiff to prove that its design choices did not lower the cost or improve the 
quality of the vacuum cleaner. 
For example, the shape of the base assembly hood has a low profile that al-
lows the vacuum to reach under furniture. . . .  The prominent display on the 
bag of the term “heavy duty commercial,” which is used commonly through-
out the industry, suggests a descriptive or identifying function. . . .  The use of 
a dial for the height adjuster is less expensive than the alternative of a slide 
lever . . . and the location in the front of the base is viewed as a “useful” fea-
ture.505 
The court’s conclusion seems based on a view that if each element serves a pur-
pose, then the overall configuration is functional, even if some choices were 
more aesthetic than utilitarian, and even if for some choices, other design alter-
natives were available. 
This spectrum of approaches to determining functionality is another ex-
ample of the confusion that still afflicts the lower courts in attempting to decide 
cases of product design trade dress in the aftermath of TrafFix.506  As seen in the 
  
503 Imig, Inc. v. Electrolux Home Care Prods., Ltd., No. CV 05-0529(JO), 2008 WL 905898 
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008). 
504 Id. at *7, *9. 
505 Id. at *9. 
506 Another issue that has created some inconsistencies among the courts involves the approach 
taken to designs involving multiple features.  Some courts have recognized that even if each 
individual element is functional, the overall configuration may still be non-functional if those 
elements are arranged in an arbitrary or ornamental way.  E.g., Minemyer v. B-Roc Repre-
sentatives, Inc., No. 07-C-1763, 2009 WL 5275826, at *8 (N.D. Ill. October 26, 2009) 
(where plaintiff failed to show that it assembled components of its plastic pipe couplers in an 
arbitrary or fanciful way, it failed to meet its burden of proving that the overall arrangement 
was non-functional); Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp., No. H-08-0361, 2009 WL 
1562179, at *3 (S.D. Tex. June 2, 2009); Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Indus., L.P., 
472 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding that overall configuration of product 
must be considered, but if “there is no other way to engineer or construct” the product, it is 
functional); Kodiak Prods. Co., Inc. v. Tie Down, Inc., No. CIV.A.4:03-CV-1474-Y, 2004 
WL 2599353, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 12, 2004).  Other courts fail to consider whether the 
overall configuration itself may be non-functional even if each individual element is func-
tional.  See Berlin Packaging, LLC v. Stull Techs., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 792, 805 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (holding that where every element of design is functional, there is no need to consider 
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next section, the approach of the TTAB is more consistent and predictable, but 
its difference from the approach of the courts raises another set of difficult is-
sues. 
2.  TTAB Decisions on Functionality 
In an article published in November 2004, Attorney John Welch re-
ported that only one percent of the TTAB rulings since March 2000 had dealt 
with trade dress issues and even fewer had dealt with issues of functionality.507  
Attorney Welch opined:  “This paucity of Board decisions may reflect a reluc-
tance on the part of applicants to seek registration for trade dress in light of cur-
rent case law.  Or perhaps most trade dress applications are refused registration 
and the refusal is not appealed.”508  Mr. Welch reported that there had been ele-
ven decisions in that time period which addressed functionality, only three of 
which had been deemed citable by the TTAB.509  All three had upheld the denial 
of registration on functionality grounds.  Mr. Welch’s analysis of these three 
cases and the eight other non-citable cases led him to conclude that the Morton-
Norwich factors were still critical to the TTAB’s functionality analysis and that 
“a utility patent disclosing or claiming the utilitarian advantages of the trade 
dress, and/or promotional material touting those advantages, will be roadblocks 
to registration.”510 
In the years since November 2004, not much has changed in the ap-
proach taken by the TTAB, although there are far more recent decisions ad-
dressing the issue of functionality.  The Board continues to affirm an over-
whelming number of refusals and sustain oppositions to register product design 
on the basis of functionality.  It continues to rely on the Morton-Norwich factors 
  
alternative designs or secondary meaning); New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., 
Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 219 (D. Conn. 2004) (“If there are factual disputes as to the indi-
vidual elements, then it follows that there would be a factual dispute as to whether these in-
dividual features add up to a functional whole.”). 
507 John L. Welch, Trade Dress and the TTAB: If Functionality Don’t Get You, Nondistinctive-
ness Will, ALLEN’S TRADEMARK DIG., Nov. 2004, at 9, available at http://www.ll-
a.com/welch/tradeDressTTABOCT2004.pdf. 
508 Id. 
509 Id. at 11. 
510 Id. at 14. 
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in reaching those conclusions.511  A review of some representative decisions will 
illustrate the TTAB’s approach. 
a.   Cases Involving Utility Patents 
In American Flange & Manufacturing Co. v. Rieke Corp.,512 the Board 
sustained an opposition on functionality grounds to an application to register the 
configuration of a closure that consisted of a hexagonal base and a butterfly-
shaped grip used for turning to seal drum containers.513  The Board first ob-
served that the appropriate functionality test used by the Board in light of Valu 
Engineering’s interpretation of TrafFix was the Morton-Norwich test, which 
identified four factors, including the existence of a utility patent related to the 
product configuration at issue.514  In analyzing the patents in the case before it, 
the Board revealed its approach to interpreting the relevance of a particular pa-
tent to a determination of functionality. 
The Board separated its product design analysis into two components; 
the hexagonal base and the butterfly grip, and stated that if either was function-
al, then registration should not be granted.515  With respect to the hexagonal 
base, the fact that the patent relied on by the opposer was not owned by the ap-
plicant was rejected as irrelevant.516  The Board said, “Any expired patent is 
potentially relevant if it covers the feature at issue, regardless of the owner.”517  
It then went on to reject the applicant’s argument that because the patent appli-
cation had been filed after the base was already in use, the patent was not di-
  
511 E.g., Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1403 (T.T.A.B. 
2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 
2009); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1509 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  
512 Am. Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397. 
513 Id. at 1411. 
514 Id. at 1403.  The Board also observed that the “applicant bears the ultimate burden on the 
issue of functionality” once the opposer (or the examiner in a refusal) has made a prima facie 
showing of functionality such as evidence of a utility patent relating to the product’s configu-
ration.  Id. at 1404. 
515 Id.  For further discussion of this aspect of the Board’s approach, see infra notes 603–605 
and accompanying text.  
516 Id. 
517 Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1404 (T.T.A.B. 2006), 
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009); ac-
cord In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1627 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re Woodlink, Ltd., 
No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *12–13 (T.T.A.B. July 17, 2009) (not preceden-
tial). 
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rected to the hexagonal shape, but rather to a particular means of sealing the 
drum containers.  The Board said: 
Applicant may be correct in noting that the hexagonal base was in use long 
prior to the patent application and that the patent was “directed to” a sealing 
means rather than the hexagonal base.  Nonetheless, the patent language clear-
ly refers to the functional advantage of the hexagonal base, that is, “to ac-
commodate a standard wrench.”  Thus the terms of the patent indicate that the 
feature is a functional one and not an “ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary as-
pect of the device.”518 
In contrast, in its analysis of the butterfly-shaped grip’s functionality, 
the Board found that although there was a utility patent for a “transverse raised 
handle,” the patent did not specify that the handle needed to be butterfly-
shaped.519  The Board concluded that although the grip need not have been the 
“primary object of the patent,”520 the fact that the language never identified the 
butterfly shape meant that the patent was not evidence that feature’s functionali-
ty. 
Similarly, in In re Howard Leight Industries LLC,521 the Board upheld a 
refusal to register the configuration of foam ear plugs where the examiner had 
relied on a utility patent as evidence of functionality.522  The applicant sought 
registration for the ear plugs’ design—a bullet shape with a flared end—and 
argued on appeal that the examiner had erred in relying on the patent claims to 
establish functionality because those claims did not specifically address the 
functionality of that particular shape.523  The Board disagreed, concluding that 
TrafFix did not restrict the evidentiary use of a patent to its claims, but rather 
allowed for the use of specifications and arguments in the patent’s prosecution 
history to establish functionality.524  The Board then incorporated large segments 
of the patent application into its opinion, including the claims, and concluded 
that the patent in this case was “a sufficient basis in itself for finding that the 
configuration is functional, given the strong weight to be accorded such patent 
evidence under TrafFix.”525  The Board reasoned that although the “primary 
focus of the patented invention is the composition of the foam material out of 
  
518 Am. Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404.   
519 Id. at 1410. 
520 Id. 
521 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  
522 Id. at 1508. 
523 Id. at 1514. 
524 Id. at 1515. 
525 Id. 
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which the earplug is formed,”526 the patent also disclosed the functional advan-
tages of both the bullet shape and the flared end in its claims and preferred em-
bodiment description.  The bullet shape allowed the plug to fit into the ear canal, 
and the flared end prevented too deep of an insertion.  Thus, the Board con-
cluded that neither aspect of the product design was an “arbitrary or incidental 
design flourish, but rather [they are] essential to the proper functioning of the 
earplug.”527 
On the other hand, in In re Udor U.S.A. Inc.,528 the Board, while still af-
firming the refusal to register a spray nozzle’s configuration on grounds of func-
tionality because of other evidence,529 disagreed with the examiner’s use of the 
nozzle’s utility patent as evidence of functionality.530  The Board compared the 
drawings submitted for trademark registration with the patent drawings and de-
scription, and concluded that the patent did not show or describe the external 
appearance of the nozzle for which trademark registration was being sought, but 
rather the patent was limited to the nozzle’s internal workings: 
As we understand the teachings of this utility patent, it is clear that the spray 
patterns of these removable/changeable nozzle heads are determined by rather 
complex principles of physics. . . .  While we do not purport to understand flu-
id mechanics, we accept the teachings of this patent that the tuned interaction 
of pressurized fluids hitting an impingement surface and the deflection ridges 
determines the variety of dispersion patterns of these various nozzle heads.  
These features are internal, largely non-visible components of the spray noz-
zle that are neither shown nor described in the trademark drawing, and some 
of which are not readily apparent without disassembly of the spray nozzle. 
  . . . . 
  . . .  The product features shown and described in the trademark configu-
ration design do not serve a function within the terms of the utility patent, and 
are not shown as useful parts of the claimed invention.531 
Thus, the Board found that the patent was not convincing evidence of the appli-
cant’s nozzle configuration functionality.532 
Based on the treatment of the patents in these cases, it appears that the 
Board is willing to consider a utility patent to be strong evidence of functionali-
  
526 Id. at 1514. 
527 In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1514 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
528 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
529 Id. at 1988; see infra notes 572–579 and accompanying text. 
530 Udor, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1982. 
531 Id. at 1981–82. 
532 Id. at 1982. 
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ty as long as there is language in the patent, its prosecution history, or its pre-
ferred embodiment that relates to the usefulness of the specific configuration, 
even if that configuration is not the “primary object” of the patent.533  This ap-
proach gives greater weight to patent evidence than that adopted by those courts 
which require that the product configuration overlap with the “central advance” 
of the patent in order for it to be strong evidence of functionality.534  Thus, it is 
likely far more difficult to obtain trademark registration of product design if 
there is a related utility patent than it is to obtain protection under section 43(a) 
for unregistered product design even when there is a related utility patent. 
b.  Evidence of Advertising Touting the Utilitarian 
Advantages of Product Design 
The Board also gives substantial weight to the second Morton-Norwich 
factor, evidence of advertising that touts the utilitarian advantages of a product’s 
configuration.  In those cases where there is a patent, the Board has relied on 
  
533 See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1633, 1635 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (utility 
patent supports finding of functionality of bicycle wheel spoke arrangement even if appli-
cant’s specific arrangement is not identical to the preferred embodiment; Board asserts that 
“[t]he fact that the patents may encompass a wide variety of spoking patterns means only that 
the patents are broad in scope, not that applicant’s particular applied-for design is not func-
tional”); In re Woodlink, Ltd., No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *14 (T.T.A.B. July 
17, 2009) (not precedential) (utility patent is strong evidence of functionality of bird feeder 
design); In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *6–7, *8–9 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2008) (not precedential) (applicant’s toilet plunger utility patent is evi-
dence of functionality even if patent claims are broader than the specific configuration 
claimed in the trademark application where description in patent identified the utility of that 
configuration); In re Richemont Int’l, S.A., Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 
251, at *27–28, *33 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006) (not precedential) (watch configuration which 
allows watch face to be reversed for protection is functional; utility patent covered the specif-
ic configuration, and fact that applicant uses new technology in its design does not render the 
patent less relevant or prove that the configuration is not functional); In re The Kong Co., 
LLC, No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854, at *11–12 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006) (evidence 
of patent supports finding of pet toy functionality, even though trademark application did not 
define configuration to include key elements of the patent, whereas the drawing included 
with the trademark application revealed said elements); cf. In re Karsten Mfg. Corp., No. 
77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *16–18 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009) (not precedential) 
(although Board finds that patent claims cover applicant’s golf putter configuration and thus 
are evidence of its functionality, Board, in dicta, opined that a patent must be examined 
closely to be sure that the features described or depicted within are actually functional, and 
not just incidental or unrelated to that function).   
534 See supra notes 363–379 and accompanying text. 
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advertising evidence to bolster its finding of functionality.535  On the other hand, 
the absence of such evidence has not been enough to outweigh the utility patent 
evidence of functionality.536 
Advertising evidence has been given more substantial weight in cases 
where no utility patent exists.  For example, in In re N.V. Organon,537 the Board 
relied largely on the applicant’s marketing claims touting the advantages of us-
ing orange flavoring in antidepressants in finding that the flavor was functional 
and thus non-registrable.538  The Board observed that the absence of patent evi-
dence, as well as the absence of evidence that there was a cost advantage in us-
ing the orange flavoring, did not mean that there was insufficient evidence of 
functionality given the advertising evidence and the lack of available alterna-
tives, the other two Morton-Norwich factors.539  The Board observed that “[t]he 
second Morton-Norwich factor, namely applicant’s promotional materials tout-
ing the utilitarian advantages of the orange flavor, is particularly significant in 
assessing functionality in this case.”540  The applicant’s website claimed that the 
orange flavor made the medication more palatable and thus resulted in increased 
patient compliance—evidence that was considered persuasive of its utilitarian 
advantages over non-flavored medication.541 
Similarly, in In re Gratnell’s Limited,542 the Board relied solely on ad-
vertising evidence and the lack of available alternatives in finding that the appli-
  
535 See, e.g., In re Woodlink, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at *14–15 (not precedential); In re Kars-
ten, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *17–18; In re Tash, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *8–10; In re 
Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *21–22 (T.T.A.B. 
Feb. 21, 2007) (not precedential);  Am. Flange & Mfg Co. v. Rieke, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1397, 1405 (T.T.A.B. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
536 See In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1635, 1636; In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1978, 1982 (T.T.A.B. 2009); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
1507, 1517–18 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
537 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006).  
538 Id. at 1645. 
539 Id. at 1646. 
540 Id. at 1645.  The Board concluded that the flavoring, by increasing patient compliance and 
thus the efficacy of the medication, functioned in a utilitarian way, not merely aesthetically.  
Id. at 1647–49.  As discussed infra notes 583–586 and accompanying text., however, the 
Board’s analysis of the appropriate test here is not entirely consistent with that conclusion. 
541 As discussed below, the Board also found that there were not enough alternative flavors 
available to provide competitors with other options.  See infra notes 583–586 and accompa-
nying text.   
542 No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 2009) (not precedential). 
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cant’s configuration of its plastic trays was functional.543  In its advertising, the 
applicant promoted the fact that the trays were stackable, space-saving, sturdier, 
safer to grip, and that the design allowed the tray’s contents to be visible.544  The 
Board rejected the applicant’s argument that these statements were “mere puf-
fery,” as they “point to specific characteristics of applicant’s product.”545 
On the other hand, in In re Brayco Products, Ltd.,546 the Board found 
that advertising evidence relied upon by the examiner was not sufficient to es-
tablish functionality.547  Where the advertising did not specifically assert that the 
elongated oval configuration of a flashlight claimed as trade dress made it a 
superior product, then that advertising was not persuasive evidence of the de-
sign’s functionality.548 
c.  Evidence of the Availability or Not of Alternative 
Designs 
Despite the TrafFix language that indicates that evidence of alternative 
designs is not an essential part of the functionality analysis, the Board consis-
tently considers such evidence, even in cases where a utility patent has clearly 
established the functionality of a product’s design.  For example, in In re How-
ard Leight,549 as discussed above, the Board relied heavily on the utility patent 
evidence to conclude that the design of the applicant’s earplugs was functional, 
in fact saying that the patent evidence was “a sufficient basis in itself for finding 
that the configuration is functional, given the strong weight to be accorded such 
patent evidence under TrafFix.”550  As such, the Board stated that there was no 
need to consider alternatives in light of TrafFix and Valu Engineering, but nev-
ertheless considered that evidence and concluded that the applicant’s earplug 
shape was “one of but few possible alternative designs which provide these fea-
tures and serve these functions.”551 
  
543 Id. at *8–9. 
544 Id. at *7. 
545 Id. 
546 No. 77296052, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2009). 
547 Id. at *6–7. 
548 Id. 
549 In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507, 1518 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
550 Id. at 1515. 
551 Id.  The Board further observed: 
However, even if some of these alternative designs are deemed to be function-
ally equivalent designs and thus are evidence in support of a finding of non-
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In American Flange,552 the Board analyzed two features, including the 
hexagonal-shaped plug base made by applicant for securing storage drums.553  
The base’s functionality was demonstrated by a utility patent, as discussed 
above.  In spite of finding that patent to be strong evidence of functionality, the 
Board went on to examine in considerable depth the availability of alternative 
designs to bolster its conclusion.  The opposer presented evidence that there 
were two dominant ways on the market to configure the plugs’ base: hexagonal, 
like the applicant’s design, and round, the system then used by the opposer.554  
The opposer pointed out certain advantages to the hexagonal shape, principally 
that it was easier to grip with a standard wrench.555  Applicant asserted that other 
wrenches were available to turn the round shape base and that other shapes 
could be used with other wrenches.556  The Board was not convinced, finding 
that the hexagonal shape was “in many ways optimal”557 and that other shapes, 
including the round shape, were harder to grip for opening and closing.  Thus, 
the lack of suitable alternative designs was further evidence of the hexagonal 
base’s functionality.558 
  
functionality, we find that this evidence is simply outweighed, in our functio-
nality analysis, by the clear and strong evidence of functionality contained in 
applicant’s expired utility patent. 
 Id. at 1516.  See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1636 (T.T.A.B. 2009) 
(where a feature is found to affect the quality of a product, there is no need to consider alter-
native designs to establish competitive necessity) (citing TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing 
Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34  (2001)); In re Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 
2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *29–32 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 2007) (not precedential) (citing Valu 
Eng’g, the Board stated that “the fact that other competitive alternatives may exist, does not 
alter the initial finding that the configuration is functional and, thus, unregistrable”; the 
Board then went on to look at alternatives and concluded that the evidence did not refute the 
superiority of applicant’s design to those alternatives); In re Bose Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 
TTAB LEXIS 293, at *26, *29–30 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 
2007) (evidence about other designs not necessary in light of other evidence of functionality 
from patent and advertising;  moreover, evidence of such alternatives does not indicate that 
other alternatives function as well as applicant’s speakers).  
552 Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1404 (T.T.A.B. 2006), 
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
553 Id. at 1404. 
554 Id. at 1406. 
555 Id. 
556 Id. 
557 Id. at 1407.  
558 Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1409 (T.T.A.B. 2006), 
withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009).  On 
the other hand, as discussed infra notes 552–558 and accompanying text, the evidence re-
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Similarly, in In re Richemont International, S.A.,559 the Board specifical-
ly considered the fact that there were only a few alternatives to the plaintiff’s 
reversible watch configuration in support of its finding of functionality.560  The 
applicant had introduced evidence of three other reversible watches, each of 
which used a different mechanism to reverse the face of the watch.561  The Board 
reviewed this evidence and concluded that “while there may be minor variations 
in how the watch may be reversed, there are only two basic ways: horizontally 
or vertically.”562  The fact that the patent also demonstrated the superiority of the 
horizontal mechanism used by the applicant was also considered by the Board in 
concluding that there were too few equivalent alternative designs and therefore 
the applicant’s design was functional.563 
The Board also upheld a finding of functionality in In re Karsten Manu-
facturing Corp.,564 based on the strong utility patent evidence covering the ap-
plicant’s golf putter configuration and the lack of available alternative de-
signs.565  Despite the fact that the applicant introduced evidence of eighteen al-
ternative designs manufactured by its competitors of “high moment of inertia 
putter heads,” the Board was not convinced.566 
  
garding the lack of design alternatives for the butterfly-shaped handle used to turn the base of 
the plug, for which the Board had found no probative evidence of functionality in the utility 
patent, was not sufficient to establish functionality.  The Board accepted the applicant’s as-
sertion that other handles, including that used by the opposer, worked as well, if not better, 
than the butterfly-shaped handle used by the applicant.  Id. at 1410.  The Board did not dis-
cuss how many possible alternatives there were, or whether the butterfly-shape was one of 
only a few configurations that would work as well. 
559 Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 251 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006). 
560 Id. at *39–40. 
561 Id. 
562 Id. at *39. 
563 Id. at *40–41.  See also In re Dietrich, 91 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1636 (T.T.A.B. 2009) 
(“[T]he question is not whether there are alternative designs that perform the same basic 
function but whether the available designs work ‘equally well.’”); In re Tash, Nos. 
76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *10–11 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 2008) (“Fur-
thermore, in order for a mark to be held functional, the evidence need not establish that the 
configuration at issue is the very best design for the particular product or product packaging.  
Rather, a finding of functionality is proper where the evidence indicates that the configura-
tion at issue provides specific utilitarian advantages that make it one of a few superior de-
signs available.”) (emphasis added). 
564 No. 77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009). 
565 Id. at *18, *21, *23. 
566 Id. at *20–21. 
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Although this evidence shows a variety of designs that are specifically differ-
ent, all are similar in design and involve the same utilitarian features. . . .  
These other designs presumably work equally well, but the number of alterna-
tives to increase the moment of inertia in a putter head is relatively limited.567  
This conclusion illustrates how difficult it may be for an applicant to 
use evidence of alternative designs to establish non-functionality in the face of a 
utility patent.  Although the Board concluded that this evidence weighed against 
a finding of functionality, it relied on TrafFix in observing that “[i]t is important 
to note, however, that the availability of alternative designs does not convert a 
functional design into a non-functional design.”568  Thus, even if there was more 
persuasive evidence of equivalent design alternatives, the Board might not have 
found non-functionality here. 
The Board’s reluctance to rely on design alternatives as evidence of 
non-functionality in the face of a utility patent is also demonstrated by In re The 
Kong Co.569  This case involved the registrability of applicant’s dog toy, which 
was covered by a patent claiming it as a teeth cleaning product based on its 
shape and grooves.570  Applicant asserted that there were many differently 
shaped dog toys on the market, but the Board did not find that evidence proba-
tive of non-functionality because it did “not see a single example of a product 
which is functionally equivalent to applicant’s product from the standpoint of 
dental hygiene.”571 
Thus, where there is a utility patent which demonstrates the functionali-
ty of a product configuration, the Board will look at evidence of available alter-
natives despite TrafFix’s statement that such evidence is not necessary once 
functionality has been established by other evidence.  The Board, however, ap-
pears to view such alternatives from a perspective which makes it very unlikely 
that such evidence will outweigh the patent as evidence of functionality.  By 
requiring that those alternatives be few in number and function in a way that is 
equivalent to the applicant’s design, the Board has made it very difficult for an 
applicant to use alternative designs to prove non-functionality in a case where 
there is a relevant utility patent. 
Where the patent does not establish the functionality of the product con-
figuration, or there is no patent, the Board relies more on the evidence of alter-
native designs, but again, in a way that makes it unlikely that a design will be 
  
567 Id. at *21. 
568 Id. at *22. 
569 No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006). 
570 Id. at *7–8. 
571 Id. at *19. 
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considered non-functional.  For example, in In re Udor U.S.A. Inc.,572 the Board 
seemed quite reluctant to allow for registration of a spray nozzle design, even 
though it concluded that the utility patent was not probative of functionality 
because it did not relate to the product’s external appearance.573  Not only was 
the patent irrelevant, there was no evidence of advertising touting the functional 
advantages of the design.574  In finding functionality, the Board thus relied 
heavily on the lack of available alternative designs.  The Board criticized the 
examiner for giving “relatively-short shrift”575 to the lack of evidence regarding 
available design alternatives.  The Board said that there were no alternative de-
signs presented by the applicant in the record and that “[t]here is certainly no 
point in our speculating about hypothetical alternatives . . . .”576  In fact, the 
record demonstrated that competitors were producing nozzles very similar to the 
applicant’s, although none was identical.577  Based on this common use, the 
Board concluded that the nozzle’s shape was not “an arbitrary flourish in the 
configuration of metal spray nozzles” and was therefore functional.578  
The Udor decision is a good example of a case where the Board was 
willing to stretch quite far to find that a configuration was functional.  Without 
patent evidence or advertising touting functionality, the Board relied on the fact 
that competitors were using a similar but not identical nozzle shape and the ap-
plicant’s failure to produce evidence of alternative designs to reach a conclusion 
that the shape was not arbitrary, but a functional element of the product.  As 
discussed below, the Board also relied on the lack of evidence demonstrating 
that the shape was easier or less expensive to manufacture than other shapes.  
The Board did not believe that the applicant had produced sufficient evidence 
on the third and fourth Morton-Norwich factors, ignoring the fact that the bur-
den initially falls on the examiner to establish functionality in registration deci-
sions.  The Board justified its conclusions by stating that “the decision-maker 
should ensure that one who seeks to establish trade dress protection in a product 
configuration does not stifle competition due to uncertainty about exactly which 
non-patentable product designs adopted by the junior user might comprise in-
  
572 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
573 See id. at 1982. 
574 Id.  The Board also relied on the fourth Morton-Norwich factor, the simplicity and cost of 
manufacturing the nozzle in applicant’s configuration, as discussed below.  See infra note 
588.  
575 In re Udor, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1982. 
576 Id. at 1983. 
577 Id. 
578 In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978, 1984 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
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fringing trademark configurations.”579  The Board seemed to be leaning over 
backwards to prevent registration of a shape that it considered utilitarian and too 
similar to what competitors were already using. 
This demanding standard for using alternative designs to establish non-
functionality is also illustrated by Gratnell’s,580 involving the registrability of 
stacking trays.  There was no patent, but there was advertising evidence touting 
the advantages of the applicant’s configuration.581  Applicant submitted two ex-
amples of alternative designs of stackable trays but the Board was not per-
suaded, finding that the alternatives, in fact, “highlight the superiority of appli-
cant’s design for monitoring content, handling and storage because of the com-
bination of the recessed front, flanged edges and flat surfaces incorporated into 
applicant’s design.”582   
Similarly, in Organon,583 the Board was not persuaded by evidence of 
other flavors that could be used to make medications more palatable in conclud-
ing that the orange flavoring used by the applicant was functional.584  The Board 
observed that Federal Circuit precedent established that “the mere fact that other 
designs are available does not necessarily mean that applicant’s design is not 
functional. . . .  The question is not whether there are alternative flavors that 
would perform the same basic function, but whether these flavors work ‘equally 
well.’”585  Because there was evidence suggesting that not all flavors mask the 
taste of medication as well as orange, and the fact that applicant only offered 
cherry and grape as alternatives, the Board concluded,  
Although we cannot definitively say that orange is the most popular flavor, it 
certainly would appear on the short list of most popular flavors.  Thus, on this 
record, we cannot say that there are true alternatives, or at least a significant 
number of acceptable alternatives, to an orange flavor for antidepressants.586 
  
579 Id. at 1986. 
580 In re Gratnell’s Ltd., No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 8, 2009). 
581 Id. at *4–5. 
582 Id. at *8. 
583 In re N.V. Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
584 Id. at 1648. 
585 Id. at 1645. 
586 Id. at 1646.  See also In re Armament Sys. & Procedures, Inc., No. 75107678, 2005 TTAB 
LEXIS 384, at *35, *43, *50 (T.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2005) (not precedential) (despite availabili-
ty of other colors, red, used to designate non-working weapons used for training purposes, 
was deemed functional because common usage had established red as the color that signaled 
that a weapon was not real and there were too few other bright colors that would work as 
well as a visual cue); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil-Quaker State Co., Opposition No. 91120520,  
2004 TTAB LEXIS 397, at *21–22 (T.T.A.B. May 28, 2004) (not precedential) (Although 
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In sum, whether or not there is a patent, the Board places a heavy bur-
den on the applicant to present persuasive evidence that alternatives exist, that 
there are more than a few, and that those alternatives are equivalent, or better, 
than the applicant’s design.  Even with such evidence, the applicant is unlikely 
to overcome the weight of the evidence of functionality presented by a utility 
patent.  Without such evidence, the Board is likely to conclude that the design is 
functional, even if no patent exists and there is no advertising touting the advan-
tages of the product.   
d.  Evidence that the Design Is Comparatively Cheap or 
Simple to Manufacture 
The fourth Morton-Norwich factor, which considers the relative cost 
and simplicity of manufacturing the applicant’s product, appears to be treated as 
the least important of the four factors in recent cases.  In some cases,587 the 
Board has not addressed this factor at all, and in others,588 it has found that there 
is simply insufficient evidence regarding this factor and that it remains neutral 
in the overall analysis.   
Even in those cases where there is some evidence that the plaintiff’s 
product is either more expensive or more difficult to manufacture, the Board has 
downplayed the significance of this factor.  For example, in In re The Kong 
  
the Board recognized that the law gives more leeway for packaging and container design than 
for product design, it held that the clear color was functional where applicant sought to regis-
ter it in relation to motor oil containers, in part based on the limited alternatives available, i.e. 
opaque containers, and the advantages touted in advertising).   
587 E.g., In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 18, 
2008); In re Howard Leight Indus. LLC, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (T.T.A.B. 2006); In re 
Baby Bjorn AB, No. 75751554, 2004 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 18, 2004). 
588 E.g., In re Gratnell’s Ltd., No. 78450327, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 187, at *9 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 9, 
2009); Am. Flange & Mfg Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1409, 1410 
(T.T.A.B. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d 1127 (T.T.A.B. 
2009); In re Richemont Int’l, S.A., Nos. 76413051, 76413157, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 251, at 
*41–42 (T.T.A.B. June 22, 2006); In re Udor U.S.A. Inc., 89 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1978,  1985 
(T.T.A.B. 2009) (evidence of relative cost of manufacturing is conclusory); In re Elevator 
Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501, at *30–32 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 
2007) (applicant’s vice president statement that he is not aware that product is simpler or eas-
ier to manufacture than others was not enough to establish non-functionality); cf. In re Bose 
Corp., No. 74734496, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 293, at *30 (T.T.A.B. July 12, 2005), aff’d, 476 
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (examiner’s reliance on statement in patent that configuration is 
“relatively easy and inexpensive to manufacture” considered sufficient evidence of functio-
nality on this factor). 
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Co.,589 the applicant introduced evidence that other pet toys were less, or as cost-
ly, as the applicant’s product.590  The Board considered such evidence unpersua-
sive: “Even if applicant’s design is more expensive to manufacture than the or-
dinary pet toy, the functional advantages of Applicant’s product in the area of 
dental health may very well outweigh any increase in cost.”591  Similarly, in In 
re N.V. Organon,592 the Board commented in a footnote that  
Even if the addition of an orange flavor to applicant’s pharmaceuticals adds to 
the cost of manufacture, such additional cost does not prove that orange fla-
voring is a non-functional feature of the goods.  Indeed, improving the utilita-
rian features of a product may dictate that the manufacturing process be more 
expensive or complicated.593 
Thus, in the overall analysis, the relative cost or simplicity of manufacturing a 
product does not seem to play an important role in the Board’s determinations of 
functionality. 
e.  Viewing the Whole Versus the Parts of a Product 
Consistent with its general reluctance to find a product configuration 
non-functional, the Board has not been persuaded to find non-functionality 
simply because some features or aspects of a product’s configuration may be 
arbitrary or incidental.  In In re The Kong Co.,594 the Board explained its ap-
proach.  In that case, the applicant asserted that there were a number of non-
  
589 No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006). 
590 Id. at *22. 
591 Id.  
592 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (T.T.A.B. 2006). 
593 Id. at 1651 n.7.  See also In re Woodlink, Ltd., No. 78971622, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 507, at 
*17 (T.T.A.B. July 17, 2009) (not precedential) (“Even if applicant’s design is no more ex-
pensive to manufacture than other bird feeders, the functional advantages of applicant’s 
product nonetheless afford applicant a competitive advantage.”); In re Dietrich, 91 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1622, 1637 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (“[E]ven if applicant’s wheels with this de-
sign are more costly to produce, and while a lower manufacturing cost may be indicative of 
the functionality of a product feature, a higher cost does not detract from the functionality of 
that feature.”); In re Karsten Mfg Co., No. 77170356, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 256, at *22–23 
(T.T.A.B. Apr. 15, 2009) (although evidence that applicant’s golf putter is not relatively 
cheap or simple to manufacture weighs in favor of finding non-functionality, the Board still 
concludes functionality based on other factors); American Flange, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1409 (“If 
the evidence related to other factors, on balance, indicates that the hexagonal base is func-
tional, the functional advantages may very well outweigh the rather minor increase in cost [of 
manufacturing the hexagonal base].”). 
594 No. 78259826, 2006 TTAB LEXIS 854 (T.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2006). 
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functional, arbitrary elements to the configuration of its dog toy, including the 
shape of the rubberized element, the position of the rope, and the number and 
placement of the grooves.595  The Board considered those features “incidental 
and of little importance in determining whether the mark is functional over-
all.”596  The Board reasoned: 
The reason for this rule is self evident—the right to copy better working de-
signs would, in due course, be stripped of all meaning if overall functional de-
signs were accorded trademark protection because they included a few arbi-
trary and nonfunctional features.597 
Similarly, in In re Elevator Safety Co.,598 the applicant asserted that the 
examiner had erred in finding its product configuration functional because she 
had dissected the configuration into its parts rather than considering functionali-
ty based on the overall configuration.599  The Board disagreed, stating that before 
a design can be considered registrable, the entire configuration must be non-
functional.600  In this case, the Board concluded: 
The configurations are by their nature functional because the designs bring the 
functional features together and the configurations retain the functional as-
pects of their parts.  They are, in the end, only the sum of their parts, inasmuch 
as the various patents of record show the way in which the parts are put to-
gether and interact.601 
The Board thus seems less willing than some courts602 to consider whether a 
configuration of useful features may be non-functional when arranged in an 
arbitrary or ornamental manner. 
This reluctance to find a design non-functional even if part of the design 
is non-functional is most dramatically seen in American Flange & Manufactur-
ing,603 where the Board considered only two features of the applicant’s drum cap 
  
595 Id. at *14. 
596 Id. at *15. 
597 Id.; accord In re Tash, Nos. 76577156, 76577157, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 101, at *11 (T.T.A.B. 
Apr. 18, 2008)  (“Where the evidence shows that the overall design is functional however, 
the inclusion of a few arbitrary or otherwise nonfunctional features in the design will not 
change the result.”). 
598 In re Elevator Safety Co., Nos. 76507505 et al., 2007 TTAB LEXIS 501 (T.T.A.B. Feb. 21, 
2007) (not precedential).  
599 Id. at *27–28. 
600 Id. 
601 Id. at *27. 
602 See supra note 506. 
603 Am. Flange & Mfg. Co. v. Rieke Corp., 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397 (T.T.A.B. 2006), with-
drawn and superseded on reargument, 90 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1127 (T.T.A.B. 2009). 
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or plug: the hexagonal shaped base and the butterfly shaped handle.604  The 
Board found that the butterfly shaped handle was non-functional but despite this 
fact, it still found that the device’s overall configuration was functional because 
the hexagonal shaped base was functional.605  That is, even where there are only 
two features, the functionality of one feature will outweigh the non-functionality 
of the other in an overall functionality determination. 
f.  Board Findings of Non-Functionality: Two Cases 
As the discussion above reveals, the Board has generally upheld refusals 
to register on the basis of functionality.  Relying heavily on the Morton-Norwich 
factors, in particular evidence of a utility patent, the Board has in almost every 
case found that the configuration of a useful product is functional and non-
registrable.  In recent years, there have been only two clear cases606 where the 
Board has found that the configuration of a product is non-functional. 
In Triforest Enterprises, Inc. v. Nalge Nunc International Corp.,607 the 
applicant sought to register the overall shape of a plastic water bottle, sold as an 
empty bottle, not as a container for another product.608  The bottle was transpa-
rent, cylindrical in shape with rounded “shoulders,” a narrow neck, a screw cap, 
and a flat bottom.609  The opposer, a competitor of the applicant, claimed that the 
shape was functional.   
  
604 Id. at 1404. 
605 Id. at 1411.  The Board suggested that if the applicant had sought registration of just the 
butterfly-shaped handle alone, the result could have been different, but seeking registration of 
the two features together correctly resulted in a finding of non-registrability.  Id.  
606 In American Flange, the Board did conclude that one feature of the applicant’s product was 
non-functional—the butterfly-shaped handle on its plug.  The Board found no relevant pa-
tent, no advertising touting the handle’s advantages, no indication that the shape was easier 
or less expensive to make, and “numerous alternative designs which would work equally 
well . . . .”  Id. at 1409–11.  Despite finding this feature non-functional, however, the Board 
went on to conclude that the overall configuration, that is, the combination of the butterfly 
shaped handle and the hexagonal shaped base, was functional and non-registrable.  See supra 
notes 603–605 and accompanying text.  In Duramax Marine LLC v. R.W. Fernstrum & Co., 
80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1780 (T.T.A.B. 2006), the Board concluded that a two-dimensional 
drawing of a useful product could not be held to be functional where the registration was for 
the actual drawing and not for the three-dimensional shape of the product itself.  Id. at 1793.  
Thus, Duramax cannot be considered a decision finding a product configuration itself to be 
non-functional. 
607 Opposition No. 91165809, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 578 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2008) (not preceden-
tial). 
608 Id. at *1. 
609 Id. at *1–2. 
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In an opinion that does not even cite TrafFix but merely relies on the 
Morton-Norwich factors, the Board rejected the opposer’s claim of functionali-
ty.  On the first factor, the evidence of utility patents, the Board found that the 
patents the opposer submitted as evidence were not relevant as they related to 
products that were not plastic water bottles.610  There was also no evidence of 
any touting of the bottle shape’s utilitarian advantages by the applicant.  With 
respect to the third factor, the Board found that “the record is replete with evi-
dence of alternative designs. . . .  [W]hile each incorporates some of the features 
of applicant’s bottle design, there are still other features which give each design 
an overall look that is different from applicant’s design.”611  Regarding the 
fourth factor, the Board found that the opposer had not submitted any evidence 
that the applicant’s design was cheaper or easier to manufacture, but rather that 
there was evidence that the bottle was more expensive and complicated to make 
than alternative designs.612  Without further analysis, the Board, after this some-
what cursory review of the Morton-Norwich factors, concluded that the design 
was not functional and dismissed the opposition.613 
This decision is troubling for a number of reasons.  First, it is troubling 
that the Board did not cite TrafFix or Valu Engineering, nor did it engage in any 
in-depth analysis of the policy implications of its decision to allow this shape to 
be registered.  Secondly, it is troubling because the Board did not give any 
weight to evidence that the shape of the bottle was one that had been commonly 
used by others in the marketplace for a long time, evidence that might suggest a 
competitive need for such a shape.  Moreover, the Board found unpersuasive the 
fact that the applicant’s own president had testified as to the many utilitarian 
advantages of its bottle configuration.   
Although the decision may be explained away as a case of poor lawyer-
ing,614 it is illustrative of the dangers that are presented by a principle that allows 
for registration and protection of product configurations.  It seems quite absurd 
that a company would be entitled to stop others from copying the useful confi-
guration of a water bottle already prevalent in the marketplace, merely because 
that company is the first to seek registration and where others, such as the op-
  
610 Id. at *2. 
611 Id. at *19. 
612 Id. at *20. 
613 Triforest Enters., Inc. v. Nalge Nunc Int’l Corp., Opposition No. 91165809, 2008 TTAB 
LEXIS 578, at *20–21 (T.T.A.B. Jan. 31, 2008) (not precedential). 
614 Apparently, the opposer had failed to raise lack of acquired distinctiveness as a basis for 
denying registration, an argument that might have been more successful, given the fact that 
the shape was commonly used by others in the market.  Id. at *21. 
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poser in this case, are unable to come forward with sufficient evidence under the 
Morton-Norwich factors to block registration.  If there is no patent and no ad-
vertising which touts the advantages, it may theoretically be very difficult for 
the opposer (or an examiner) to come forward with evidence proving there are 
not any suitable alternatives, and that the applicant’s configuration is cheaper 
and easier to make than those alternatives.  The fact that in most of the cases 
before it, the Board has had a patent to rely on, or advertising to point to in sup-
port of finding functionality, does not mitigate the risks presented by cases such 
as Triforest, where there was no such evidence on those first two factors to 
make a persuasive case for functionality.  Given how little attention is ordinarily 
paid to the fourth factor, this means that in some cases, only the third factor, the 
availability of alternative designs, will be determinative of the result.  Since that 
factor is the one that the Supreme Court identified as not essential to a determi-
nation of functionality, it seems ironic that for registration purposes, it will carry 
the most weight in cases where there is no pertinent utility patent. 
This was demonstrated even more recently in In re Brayco Products, 
Ltd.,615 a case involving a flashlight configuration.  The design claimed as trade 
dress was “an elongated oval light casing having one end featuring a similarly 
formed transparent window for covering an array of lights beneath the transpa-
rent window.”616  There were no relevant patents, the advertising did not tout the 
advantages of the specific features of the configuration, and there was no evi-
dence that the applicant’s design was less costly or easier to manufacture.617  In 
reversing the examiner, the Board seemed particularly interested in the wide 
range of alternative flashlight designs, introduced into evidence by the appli-
cant, none of which used an elliptical cylindrical shape like the applicant’s.  On 
the basis of this evidence, the Board concluded that “the elongated oval design 
applicant seeks to register does not appear to be essential to competition,”618 and 
thus reversed the examiner’s refusal to register based on functionality.619 
3.  Summary of Recent Developments 
As we have seen, the federal courts have not followed one consistent 
path in determinations of functionality.  Although they quote the test from Traf-
Fix for the definition of functionality, some courts apply a narrower test than 
  
615 No. 77296052, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 666 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 16, 2009). 
616 Id. at *2.  
617 Id. at *4, *6–7, *10–11. 
618 Id. at *10. 
619 Id. at *11–12. 
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TrafFix suggests.  Some courts continue to rely on evidence of alternative de-
signs to determine functionality despite the language in TrafFix suggesting that 
such evidence is not relevant for that purpose; other courts adhere to the TrafFix 
admonitions against relying on such evidence.  Moreover, TrafFix has caused 
courts to engage in difficult interpretations of the scope of patents in order to 
determine whether such patents present persuasive evidence of a particular de-
sign’s functionality. 
In the Federal Circuit and at the TTAB, there tends to be one consistent 
approach, but that approach does not appear to follow the one suggested by the 
Supreme Court.  The TTAB, in light of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Valu 
Engineering, continues to use the four factors set out in 1982 in the Morton-
Norwich decision, including the factor which requires an examination of alterna-
tive designs as part of the functionality determination.  Although the Board has 
almost always refused to register product designs when functionality has been 
asserted either by an examiner or an opposer, the Nalge and Brayco cases indi-
cate that there is still some risk that where there is no utility patent or advertis-
ing which touts the advantages of a particular design, the Board may allow reg-
istration simply on the basis of evidence of alternative designs—evidence that 
the Supreme Court has considered irrelevant to a determination of functionali-
ty.620 
For the reasons discussed in the next section, this is an undesirable re-
sult in almost all cases.  The Board and the courts should either follow TrafFix 
more strictly, or Congress should act to eliminate the risks inherent in allowing 
for protection of the design of useful products. 
IV.  WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
In the years following, there has been much scholarly debate over the 
TrafFix decision, what it means and whether it was the correct ruling.  Some 
have argued that TrafFix was a radical departure from prior law and a serious 
mistake;621 others believe that it simply muddied the waters and did not really 
  
620 See Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 33–34 (2001). 
621 For example, Professor Thurmon argues for a return to the competitive necessity test for 
functionality, i.e., that a design should be considered functional only if it is necessary for 
competitors to copy that design in order to compete effectively.  If adequate alternative de-
signs exist, then he would allow for full protection of that design in the interest of preventing 
consumer confusion.  He believes that the requirement of distinctiveness will limit the poten-
tial number of product designs that receive such protection, but that once a design is proven 
to be distinctive, it should be protected to prevent consumer confusion.  He also rejects the 
idea that patent law and its policies will be undermined if parties can receive protection for 
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mean what it said.622  Others believe it was a step in the right direction but did 
not go far enough.623  
  
product designs that are not eligible for protection under patent law because trademark law 
differs sufficiently.  Trademark law provides more limited protection than patent law and 
Thurmon finds it highly unlikely that an inventor would seek a trademark instead of a patent 
in order to obtain longer, but less extensive, protection.  Thus, he sees no reason to deny 
trademark protection in order to preserve the patent system.  Thurmon, supra note 16, at 
341–62.  Instead, Thurmon’s preferred solution would be to use a strict competitive need de-
finition of functionality to filter out unprotectable designs as a first step, though he recogniz-
es that most designs will be treated as non-functional under this test.  He would then allow a 
defendant to assert as an affirmative defense that all that was copied were functional ele-
ments of that product design, which would result in no liability as long as the defendant has 
taken steps so that its product will not be confused with the plaintiff’s product. 
    The problem with this approach is acknowledged in part by Professor Thurmon himself.  
Id. at 368–70.  It will result in the registration of most product designs, resulting in more liti-
gation over these issues.  Moreover, it will lead to complex and expensive litigation.  The 
courts will have to determine functionality not once, but twice—first, as part of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case for protection and then again as an affirmative defense.  Thurmon admits 
that these are problems with his proposal, but because he believes that granting protection to 
product design is necessary to reduce the risks of consumer confusion, these are costs he be-
lieves to be worth incurring.  He prefers that only the designs that are truly necessary for ef-
fective competition be denied potential trademark protection. 
    See also Berger, supra note 16, at 402–04 (competitive need approach to functionality 
asserted to be superior to the approach adopted in TrafFix); Clegg, supra note 16, at 307–12 
(TrafFix criticized for narrowing the availability of trade dress protection for products; author 
proposes a “traderight” which would expand trade dress protection).  See generally Amir H. 
Khoury, Three-Dimensional Objects as Marks: Does a “Dark Shadow” Loom over Trade-
mark Theory?, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 335 (2008) (author argues in favor of broad 
protection of three-dimensional objects as trademarks in order to prevent confusion in the 
marketplace). 
622 One author argues that the Court should clarify the standard by defining it to treat only those 
features that would put a competitor at a significant competitive disadvantage as functional.  
That author would allow evidence of alternative designs as one type of evidence that could 
be considered to establish this standard.  See Palladino, supra note 14, at 1237–39.  This po-
sition seems to contradict TrafFix, which clearly limited the “significant competitive disad-
vantage” test to cases of aesthetic functionality.  It also would narrow substantially the defi-
nition of functionality, giving far more protection to the designers of useful products, a policy 
direction which the Supreme Court seems to be opposing and which this author also opposes. 
    Another author argues that TrafFix may have made the doctrine of functionality “more 
opaque.”  Weinberg, supra note 16, at 5.  Professor Weinberg believes that if courts cannot 
rely on evidence of alternative designs as part of the functionality determination, they “will 
be deprived of their best tool” for doing so.  Id. at 6.  Professor Weinberg asserts that func-
tionality should be determined based on economic theory and consumer demand for the 
product’s features.  He argues that evidence of alternative designs may be the best available 
evidence to make that determination because it helps to determine whether and why a partic-
ular product configuration may be more desirable to consumers than others based on cost, 
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What all these scholars assume, however, is that protection of a useful 
product’s overall configuration is appropriate in at least some cases.  I would 
suggest a different, more radical view.  Perhaps it is time to return to the law as 
it was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when the overall configuration of 
a useful product was not considered to be protected against copying as long as 
the copier did something to prevent consumer confusion, whether by adding 
some distinctive marking or simply labeling the product with its own name.624  
  
utility, aesthetics, and other factors.  Id. at 27–35.  He reasons that if demand indicates that 
consumers desire a particular design feature for its utility or aesthetics, one may infer that 
there are not sufficient alternative designs to compete with that particular design, and there-
fore it should be considered functional.   Weinberg states that, “TrafFix represents a missed 
opportunity to simplify and clarify the doctrine and to provide useful guidance for its applica-
tion.  Instead, TrafFix may make matters worse by, among other things, adding to the doc-
trine’s ambiguity and complexity, and by apparently limiting the use of evidence of alterna-
tive design features as the fulcrum for deciding functionality cases.”  Id. at 37–38.   
    Professor Weinberg agrees that the policy in favor of the public right to copy outweighs 
the concerns with consumer confusion, but he also believes that some design features should 
still be protected under the Lanham Act.  Id. at 40.  He argues that the best way to strike this 
balance is with a broad definition of functionality that includes both useful and aesthetic fea-
tures that are important to consumers, as demonstrated by the fact that there are few, or no 
suitable alternative design choices.   
    See also Halaby, supra note 17, at 172–74 (TrafFix rule criticized as difficult to apply).  
This author proposes a definition of functionality based on consumer demand: a feature is 
functional if it is a feature a consumer desires for any reason—utilitarian or aesthetic—other 
than source identification.  Id. at 182–90.  Such a test would lead to far wider protection of 
product configurations and is thus contrary to the policies identified in TrafFix and to the 
point of view asserted in this article. 
    See also McCormick, supra note 16 at 573–75 (TrafFix test is unclear; courts should 
instead use a definition of functionality which focuses on whether the product will operate 
properly without the feature for which protection is sought, or whether that feature allows the 
product to be made at a lower cost or improves the operation of the product). 
623 Professor Barrett argues that TrafFix represents a return to the position reflected in the Sears-
Compco-Bonito Boats line of cases, where the law was primarily concerned with preserving 
the public’s right to copy any product not protected by patent or copyright law.  Professor 
Barrett sees the Court as extending that reasoning beyond state trade dress protection law to 
federal trade dress protection, meaning that product designs should not get either state or fed-
eral protection for the useful designs of useful products.  See Barrett, supra note 145, at 136–
58.  She suggests, however, that the Court’s willingness to use the “important ingredient in 
the commercial success” test for aesthetic functionality conflicts with this goal, as that test 
would undermine the design patent laws and prevent free copying of some product designs.  
Id. at 145–46. 
624 Although Professor Thurmon suggests a different approach to resolving these issues and 
prefers to protect product design in order to reduce the occurrences of consumer confusion, 
he recognizes that this approach was once the law and incorporates part of that approach into 
his proposed resolution.  That is, he recognizes that the law can allow a defendant to copy as 
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Adopting such an approach would eliminate the conflict with patent law and the 
confusion created by the functionality doctrine.  As long as the copier took ade-
quate steps to prevent passing off, there would be no reason to be concerned 
with consumer confusion.  Moreover, this approach would eliminate some of the 
problems created as a result of the Walmart case, where courts now get entan-
gled in determinations of whether a product’s design has acquired sufficient 
distinctiveness to be protectable. 
Some may respond to this suggestion as being too far-fetched for Con-
gress to consider, given the more recent history which has been more generous 
in granting protection to the overall shape of products.625  Others will suggest 
that denying all protection to product configurations will lead to chaos and con-
fusion in the marketplace regardless of any labeling or disclosures used by copi-
ers.  There is, however, historical precedent for this approach as well as good 
policy reasons to do it.626  There is also an analogous model to refer to for reas-
surance that the world will not come to an end if we adopt this approach.  That 
model can be found in the treatment of terms that lose their trademark signific-
ance and become generic, as well as the treatment of terms that begin as generic 
and take on secondary meaning, but are nonetheless denied trademark protection 
on the theory of “de facto secondary meaning.” 
For example, in the famous case involving the mark “Aspirin,”627 the 
court found that the term had become generic among the consumer segment of 
the population who had no alternative identifying term, but that it retained 
trademark significance among pharmacists and doctors who knew the chemical 
name for the drug, acetylsalicylic acid.628  The court concluded that the plaintiff 
could not prevent others from using “aspirin” in selling the drug to the general 
public, but that when sold to pharmacists, it would still be necessary to use some 
  
long as steps are taken to prevent consumer confusion.  See Thurmon, supra note 16, at 366–
67. 
625 Recent legislative action by Congress, including two amendments to the Lanham Act incor-
porating functionality provisions, seems to indicate that it appears to favor at least some pro-
tection to product design.  See Trademark Amendments Act of 1999, 113 Stat. 218, 220 
(1999) (placing the functionality burden of proof in actions brought under section 43 (a) on 
the plaintiff); Trademark Law Treaty Implementation Act, 112 Stat. 3064 (1998) (adding 
functionality as grounds for rejection of trademark applications, for oppositions, and for can-
cellation proceedings).  See also Thurmon, supra note 16, at 357 n.550.  
626 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Trade Dress Emperor’s New Clothes: Why Trade Dress Does 
Not Belong on the Principal Register, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (2000). 
627 Bayer Co., Inc. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). 
628 Id. at 514–15. 
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other term to distinguish the plaintiff’s product from those of others.629  Similar-
ly, in the Thermos case,630 while the court concluded that the term “thermos” had 
largely lost its trademark significance and could be used by competitors, those 
competitors could not use a capital T or the words “genuine” or “original” in 
identifying their vacuum bottles, and they had to use their own company name 
to distinguish their products from those of the plaintiff.631  As such, the courts 
have clearly concluded that the right to copy—in these cases, a word, not a 
product configuration—outweighs the risk of confusion, as long as some steps 
are taken by copiers to reduce confusion.  Certainly the public’s interest in co-
pying useful products is at least as important as the public’s right to use certain 
words. 
The “de facto secondary meaning” cases illustrate this even more dra-
matically.  In those cases, even though a term is recognized to have taken on 
meaning as a source identifier, courts have insisted that such terms remain 
available for competitors to use despite the risks of possible consumer confu-
sion.   For example, in America Online, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,632 the plaintiff tried 
to claim trademark rights in the phrase “You Have Mail.”633  The court refused 
to grant such protection, even though the plaintiff presented evidence showing 
that some segment of the public associated that phrase with the its online servic-
es.634  The court reasoned: 
AOL’s evidence of association may establish what is called “de facto second-
ary meaning,” but such secondary meaning does not entitle AOL to exclude 
others from a functional use of the words.  Stated otherwise, the repeated use 
of ordinary words functioning within the heartland of their ordinary meaning, 
and not distinctively, cannot give AOL a proprietary right over those words, 
even if an association develops between the words and AOL.635 
Similarly, in Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc.,636 
the court refused to find the term “Lite” protectable despite evidence of second-
ary meaning because the word was considered generic in its origins.637  In cases 
such as these, the courts have obviously again weighed the risks of public con-
  
629 Id. at 515–16. 
630 King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1963). 
631 Id. at 581. 
632 243 F.3d. 812 (4th Cir. 2001). 
633 Id. at 814. 
634 Id. at 822–23. 
635 Id. at 822 (citation omitted). 
636 561 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1977). 
637 Id. at 77, 81. 
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fusion against the need for a competitor’s access to common words and found 
the latter interest to be more important, despite the potential for confusion 
among purchasers.  That same competitor access concern is at least as pressing 
when it comes to the design of useful products.  Consumers as well as competi-
tors have a great interest is having multiple producers of goods, especially utili-
tarian goods. 
In fact, this concept of genericism has been applied to product configu-
rations in a number of cases as a basis for denying protection, either as an alter-
native to, or in conjunction with, a functionality analysis.  The Second Circuit’s 
decision in Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc.,638 is often cited 
as the first case discussing this notion of generic trade dress.  In that case, the 
plaintiff sought trade dress protection for greeting cards which were made from 
glossy photographs, die-cut to the shape of the images.639  The court refused to 
find that trade dress protectable, describing it as a generalized idea.640  The court 
further observed that “the fact that a trade dress is composed exclusively of 
commonly used or functional elements might suggest that that dress should be 
regarded as unprotectable or ‘generic,’ to avoid tying up a product or marketing 
idea.”641  A few months later, the Second Circuit returned to this concept in Ma-
na Products, Inc. v. Columbia Cosmetics Mfg., Inc., 642 where the court used the 
genericism idea in the context of determining the distinctiveness of the plain-
tiff’s makeup compacts.643  The court observed that “where it is the custom in a 
particular industry to package products in a similar manner, a trade dress done 
in that style is likely to be generic.”644 
  
638 58 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 1995). 
639 Id. at 29. 
640 Id. at 33. 
641 Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
642 65 F.3d 1063 (2d Cir. 1995). 
643 Id. at 1069–70. 
644 Id.  See also Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 
638 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating as dicta that generic product configurations are not protectable as 
trade dress because “no designer should have a monopoly on designs regarded by the public 
as the basic form of a particular item”); Yurman Design, Inc. v. Paj, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 115 
(2d Cir. 2001); New Colt Holding Corp. v. RJG Holdings of Fla., Inc., 312 F. Supp. 2d 195, 
210 (D. Conn. 2004) (shape of handgun is generic after being used by others for many years); 
Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1247 (D. Haw. 2003) 
(shape of cookie is generic and not protectable, as it is nothing more than “a nondistinctive 
combination of a few basic, common design elements”). 
 Following the Direction of TrafFix 695 
  Volume 50—Number 4 
More recently, the court in Walker & Zanger, Inc. v. Paragon Indus-
tries, Inc.,645 summarized the case law on generic trade dress as falling into three 
categories:  
(1)  if the definition of a product design is overbroad or too generalized;  
(2)  if a product design is the basic form of a type of product; or  
(3)  if the product design is so common in the industry that it cannot be 
said to identify a particular source.646 
The court concluded that the design of decorative tiles which the plaintiff sought 
to protect as its trade dress was generic for all three reasons: the claim was over-
ly broad, portions of the trade dress were basic to tile design, and plaintiff’s 
design was commonly used by others in the tile industry.647 
Thus, the interest in public access to certain product designs, like the in-
terest in public access to certain common words, has been considered to out-
weigh the interest in preventing confusion through the doctrine of genericism, 
just as it has in cases where the product design is considered functional.  Before 
a court or the TTAB can resolve whether a particular product design is or is not 
protectable as trade dress, however, they must address all the complexities 
raised by the functionality doctrine, not to mention the complexities raised by 
determining genericism and distinctiveness.  Given the important public policies 
at stake in preventing the monopolization of the designs of useful products, this 
seems like an inappropriate approach to the problem.  Courts and consumers 
would be better off with a bright line rule that simply prevented anyone from 
obtaining exclusive rights to the design of a useful product except through the 
provisions of the patent and copyright laws.  If a producer wants to protect 
against consumer confusion and passing off, courts should be able to remedy 
those concerns by requiring adequate disclosure by competitors who wish to 
copy that product design.  There is no need to prohibit the copying of the design 
itself, as the Supreme Court recognized long ago in Sears and Compco.648 
V.  CONCLUSION 
It is now almost ten years since the TrafFix decision was handed down, 
and in the last five years, the courts and the TTAB have continued to struggle 
  
645 549 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
646 Id. at 1174. 
647 Id. at 1176. 
648 See supra notes 127–141 and accompanying text. 
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with that decision and the doctrine of functionality.  There are, however, a few 
important observations that can be culled from the more recent case law. 
First, it is extremely difficult to obtain registration of the overall confi-
guration of a useful product.  The TTAB continues to apply the four point Mor-
ton-Norwich test for determining functionality, including evidence of design 
alternatives, despite the language in TrafFix which asserts that such evidence is 
not pertinent to determinations of functionality.  In applying the Morton-
Norwich test, however, the TTAB has taken a very strict approach and has re-
fused to find a product design to be non-functional in almost every registration 
case, even though the burden of establishing functionality rests with the ex-
aminer or the opposer.  The TTAB has also adopted the underlying reluctance to 
protect product configuration trade dress reflected in TrafFix, although not fol-
lowing strictly its language.  Thus, a producer attempting to register the overall 
configuration of its product is not likely to succeed. 
Most product configuration trade dress will be protected, if at all, under 
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act through litigation in the federal courts.  As 
discussed above, the federal courts are not following one consistent path in de-
terminations of functionality, differing in their treatment of patent evidence and 
evidence of alternative designs, and how they even define functionality.  Some 
courts define it very broadly to reach any design that serves a purpose; some 
courts at the other end of the spectrum define it quite narrowly to cover only 
configurations that are the best design of that product.  Some courts fall in be-
tween, defining functionality based on whether the plaintiff’s design is one of a 
few possible options available to competitors.  Many have not been able to be 
decided on a summary judgment basis, meaning that many cases will need to go 
to trial to be resolved.  This lack of clarity is costly to producers.  More impor-
tantly, it is costly to consumers who will ultimately bear the burden of this liti-
gation in the prices they pay for products. 
Society’s interest in obtaining the best goods at the lowest cost is being 
hampered by the doctrine of functionality and the potential protection afforded 
to the design of useful products.  Consumers and competitors would be much 
better off in a world where there was no trade dress protection for product de-
signs.  Patent law and copyright law provide adequate incentives to promote the 
creation of useful and aesthetically pleasing products, and the concern with con-
sumer confusion can be best dealt with by labeling and disclosure requirements. 
It is time to return to the approach followed for many years before the 
twists and turns in trade dress law that began in the 1970s.  Congress should 
amend the Lanham Act to prevent registration and protection of the configura-
tion of useful products. 
 
